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Cover 
Not a traditional seasonal image for our 
Summer issue, but as Caitlyn L. Antrim, 
executive director of the Rule of Law 
Committee for the Oceans, points out in 
“The Next Geographical Pivot: The Rus-
sian Arctic in the Twenty-fi rst Century,” 
Arctic conditions are severe year-round. 
However, the fact that global climate 
changes are making them progressively 
less so, her article argues, is causing shifts 
that will become fundamental in the eco-
nomic, security, and geopolitical realms.
The nuclear-powered attack submarine 
USS Texas (SSN 775), reportedly the fi rst 
boat of the Virginia class to operate in 
the Arctic, on the surface near the North 
Pole in October 2009. U.S. Navy photo by 
Sonar Technician (Submarines) 1st Class 
Hamilton Felt, USN.
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FROM THE EDITORS
The often acrimonious debate over the nature and significance of global climate
change shows no signs of letting up anytime soon. There can be little doubt that
many have been too ready to accept extreme claims concerning the threat poten-
tially posed by global warming and associated changes in global sea level and
weather patterns. Nevertheless, there is one part of the world where rising tem-
peratures in recent years have indeed dramatically affected the environment and
posed clear new challenges and opportunities—the Arctic. In “The Next
Geopolitical Pivot: The Russian Arctic in the Twenty-first Century,” Caitlyn
Antrim provides a comprehensive analysis of the meaning of a more accessible
Arctic for the Russian Federation. She argues that development of the Russian
Arctic has the potential for effecting a profound geopolitical transformation of
Russia and its relationship with other maritime and Arctic powers, notably the
United States. Antrim’s article provides a useful complement to the article in our
last issue by Rear Admiral David W. Titley and Courtney C. St. John on Arctic se-
curity and the work of the U.S. Navy’s Task Force Climate Change.
In “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Oper-
ational View from Beijing,” Toshi Yoshihara of the Naval War College faculty of-
fers a timely and groundbreaking assessment of the potential threat to U.S. naval
bases in Japan from the growing ballistic-missile arsenal of the People’s Republic
of China. There is a surprising amount of detailed commentary on this highly
sensitive issue in the open Chinese literature. Of particular interest is Professor
Yoshihara’s identification of possible Chinese misconceptions that could come
into play under certain scenarios, with potentially dangerous consequences for
deterrence and escalation control.
Technological innovation has long been a key strength of the American mili-
tary and of the U.S. Navy in particular. Maintaining the pace of innovation and
leveraging new technologies effectively will be critical for the Navy in a period of
continued heavy demand for the nation’s ground forces and an increasingly
stressful fiscal environment. In “The Zumwalt-Class Destroyer: A Technology
‘Bridge’ Shaping the Navy after Next,” George V. Galdorisi and Scott C. Truver
discuss DDG 1000 as a test bed of revolutionary technologies with wide applica-
bility throughout the Navy. Thomas J. Culora’s “Strategic Implications of
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Obscurants: History and Future” shows that new technology does not have to be
high technology to play an important role in the Navy of the future. He argues
that low-cost obscurants based on a proven technology used by the Army hold
considerable promise for protecting Navy ships at sea from attack by advanced
antiship missiles. It may be added that this concept, currently in the process of
validation, originated in a student research project at the Naval War College.
Thomas J. Culora is chairman of the Warfare Analysis and Research Department
at the College.
Two articles by senior Pakistani defense analysts serve to highlight the grow-
ing importance of South Asia in American defense and foreign policy, particu-
larly following the recent intensification of U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan and Pakistan itself, as well as the strengthening of this nation’s stra-
tegic partnership with the Pakistani government. Muhammad A. Khan, a retired
commander in the Pakistan Navy, provides a detailed discussion of S-2, India’s
recently launched nuclear-armed ballistic-missile submarine, and its implica-
tions for regional security and for Pakistan’s own nuclear and naval policies.
Feroz Hassan Khan, in “Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control and
Confidence-Building Measures,” provides an authoritative account of the his-
tory of failed Indian and Pakistani arms control discussions and makes a cogent
case for the necessity and feasibility of steps by both countries to devise a range
of “CBMs” in order to defuse the increasingly dangerous tensions in their rela-
tionship. Feroz Hassan Khan is a retired Pakistan Army general and senior re-
searcher at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. His article is
based on a presentation given at a workshop titled “Asia and Arms Control” co-
sponsored by the Naval War College, the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, and the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and held in January of
this year in Washington, D.C.
Finally, two papers, also by foreign authors, address aspects of global mari-
time security cooperation. F. J. Sluiman and Philip de Koning, officers in the
Royal Netherlands Navy Reserve, in “Naval Vessel Traffic Services: Enhancing
the Safety of Merchant Shipping in Maritime Security Operations,” propose an
innovative concept for improving naval monitoring and protection of merchant
shipping in dangerous waters such as the Gulf of Aden. Alberto A. Soto, a
commander in the Chilean Navy and recently a student at the Naval War Col-
lege, discusses the political and operational challenges involved in maritime in-
formation sharing in the Americas.
NEW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
The newest (thirty-fifth) title in our Newport Papers monograph series, Piracy and
Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies, edited by Bruce A. Elleman,
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Andrew Forbes, and David Rosenberg, is now available from the editorial office,
in addition to its posting on our website (www.usnwc.edu/Publications/). Dr.
Elleman, of the Naval War College Maritime History Department, and his
coeditors have collected twelve case studies that allow conclusions to be drawn
on uses and limitations of naval antipiracy operations in the context of new
technology and modern national policy goals.
Nineteen-Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic
Naval Leadership during the 20th and Early 21st Centuries, edited by John B.
Hattendorf and Bruce A. Elleman, is now available for sale by the Government
Printing Office’s online bookstore, at bookstore.gpo.gov/. This collection of
brief biographies of nineteen U.S. Navy admirals, from W. S. Sims to Joseph W.
Preuher, with conclusions by the editors focusing particularly on leadership
skills in the operational and strategic arenas, was sponsored by the Naval War
College’s College of Operational and Strategic Leadership and was jointly pro-
duced by the Naval War College Press and the Government Printing Office.
The seventeenth in our Historical Monograph series—Digesting History: The
U.S. Naval War College, the Lessons of WorldWar Two, and Future Naval Warfare,
1945–1947, by Hal M. Friedman—has been delivered by the printer and is avail-
able for sale by the Government PrintingOffice’s online bookstore, at bookstore
.gpo.gov/. Dr. Friedman, professor of modern history at Henry Ford Commu-
nity College in Dearborn, Michigan, describes how the staff, instructors, and
students at the Naval War College attempted between 1945 and 1947 to deter-
mine the shape of future wars and what the Navy would have to do in order to
prepare to fight those wars in a Cold War context.
FROM THE EDITORS 7
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Rear Admiral James “Phil” Wisecup became the
fifty-second President of the U.S. Naval War College on
6 November 2008. He most recently served as Com-
mander, Carrier Strike Group 7 (Ronald Reagan Strike
Group), returning from deployment in October 2008.
A 1977 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Rear
Admiral Wisecup earned his master’s degree in interna-
tional relations from the University of Southern Califor-
nia, graduated from the Naval War College in 1998,
and also earned a degree from the University of Strasbourg,
France, as an Olmsted Scholar, in 1982.
At sea, he served as executive officer of USS Valley Forge
(CG 50) during Operation DESERT STORM. As Com-
manding Officer, USS Callaghan (DDG 994), he was
awarded the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Award for
Inspirational Leadership. He served as Commander,
Destroyer Squadron 21 during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM after 9/11.
Ashore, he was assigned to NATO Headquarters in
Brussels, Belgium; served as Force Planner and Ship
Scheduler for Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces,
Pacific; and served as action officer for Navy Headquar-
ters Plans/Policy Staff. He served as a fellow on the Chief
of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group; as Direc-
tor, White House Situation Room; and as Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces Korea.
Rear Admiral Wisecup’s awards include the Defense
Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star,
and various unit, service, and campaign awards.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
Some Reflections on Innovation, Problem Solving, and Original
Research
WE RECENTLY HAD VISITS from the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) and General James Mattis (Commander, U.S. Joint Forces
Command) to Newport. CNO likes to talk about the advantages of students hav-
ing “unstructured” time to think while at the Naval War College. Granted, there
are courses, research, conferences, and the like constantly in progress, so it’s not
completely unstructured. That said, a famous scholar of the Middle Ages, Joseph
Strayer of Princeton, liked to critique his students’ work as needing more “look-
ing out the window” time.1 Having in mind the million-dollar view out the win-
dows in Newport, rain or shine, it is the idea of taking this time to think about
our profession and problems that I’d like to talk about. In his recent remarks
General Mattis made the point that we always need to know “what problem
we’re trying to solve”—good guidance for a place like Newport.
If you read the books Plan Orange or Agents of Innovation, you will find that
in the period leading up to the Second World War there was a relatively simple
process by which the fleet and the Navy’s leadership could use the intellectual
capital of the Naval War College to look at issues of importance to the Navy and
Marine Corps.2 The results took the form, for example, of “Naval War College
Suggestions” to the General Board (naval leadership and senior action group,
which lasted for just over fifty years and was disestablished in 1951). Gaming
done in Newport was predominantly tactical, but it also involved campaign
planning, trying to resolve issues that were considered problems for the Navy.
This was not just a matter of the introduction of new technologies, like naval
aviation, but of attempts to overcome the nonfortification clause of the Wash-
ington Naval Treaty, to study logistics, and to conceptualize the network of bases
that would be needed to conduct operations over vast distances. Resolving that
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latter issue led to thinking about the scale of operations needed to capture and
hold the many islands that would have to be taken in the coming war with Japan.
Another good example is the story of Naval War College faculty member Cap-
tain Joseph Mason Reeves, who as head of the Tactics Department at the height
of the controversy over battleship vulnerability in 1925 convincingly showed the
General Board that naval aviation would undoubtedly influence the outcome of
future sea battles.3 Later, in 1929, as the Navy’s first qualified aviator to become a
flag officer, Reeves participated in Fleet Problem IX, in which he “attacked” the
Panama Canal, showing in practice how to use this new capability for offense
and demonstrating that aviation could do far more than scout for the
battleships.
My point is that though the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986 made the fight much more joint, and for good reason, there are still na-
val problems to solve. Here in Newport we are chartered to put intellectual effort
into looking for the solutions to these and other problems. Frustration breeds
innovation. To paraphrase John Boyd, “machines don’t fight wars, people do.
And they use their minds.”
It’s the “using our minds” piece that has my attention—and trying to answer
the “why” questions with a huge dose of intellectual honesty.
Sitting in my office last week, I was listening to a recording made in 1962, now
transferred to a CD, of a talk Admiral Chester Nimitz gave here at the College. I
had never heard Nimitz’s voice. He said that his preparation in Newport had given
him the intellectual wherewithal to consider the scale of operations that would
have to be accomplished in a Pacific campaign. When the time came, he already
had an idea what it would mean—for instance, he needed to expand the Navy’s of-
ficer corps by a “factor of fifteen.”That’s a huge impact. (Remember, Nimitz estab-
lished one of the first six Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps units, at the
University of California at Berkeley.) He went on to say that during the war he
hardly had to look at a map, as he had become familiar with the Pacific islands and
atolls during his studies in Newport in 1923, which had forced him for the first
time to consider the logistics of such a massive Pacific naval campaign.
The other aspect of the College, besides a top-flight education afforded by a
distinguished faculty and unstructured time to think, is original research, which
normally goes to the heart of “why” questions. We have that going on here in a
variety of areas. We have faculty experts in both the teaching and research ranks,
as you can see from the lineup of articles in this issue of the Naval War College
Review: “Chinese Missile Strategy,” “Maritime Information-Sharing Strategy,”
and work on tactics. There are also studies in progress on small wars, nuclear
weapons in North Korea, international law and operations in exclusive eco-
nomic zones, and a variety of work concerning South Asia, cyber issues, com-
mand and control, outer space, and ballistic-missile defense. There is no staff of
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“action officers” here, only a dedicated and distinguished faculty doing work
that—at least from where I sit—matters. They examine regional issues across
the world, working to help fleet commanders, combatant commanders, and
CNO to address some current “wicked hard” issues and to anticipate future is-
sues. The other part of this original research is student/faculty research done by
the Halsey Groups, which work on operational and regional problems, as well as
the Mahan Group, which works deterrence issues.
There is also the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership (COSL),
specializing in leadership and officer-development issues and overseeing the
Stockdale Group students. Its faculty is currently combing through three years
of original research for conclusions we might draw about how to educate and
develop our future leaders. COSL recently produced a very interesting ethics
conference and is conducting award-winning research on “Capabilities-Based
Competencies Assessment,” which could offer new ways to figure out how the
Navy should man, train, and equip itself.4 It’s an attempt to think in new ways
about how to get the right people into the right jobs in an organization as huge
as the U.S. Navy. We are working closely with the fleet on that, starting with what
type of people is needed in the Maritime Operations Centers. We’re teaming
with several organizations and will shortly be asking the numbered-fleet com-
manders questions about what kinds of folks they want and need to do their
work and how the system can respond to the demand. You get the picture.
This research is solid, and some of it is being done only here in Newport,
though we often work in close partnership with other parts of the Navy to ensure
we’re connected and not off in some “ivory tower”—one of the reasons we had a
small team at Carnegie Mellon in early April, for example. We’re simply looking
for the best ideas and trying to attract the best talent to come to Newport to help
us work on them, whether in uniform or civilian—we just want the best.
The final example is war gaming, which, in the United States, originated in
Newport and now comes in a variety of sizes and shapes. A lot of this work feeds
into research going on in other places or can spin off into new research efforts.
This work merits a slot in a future “President’s Forum.” For example, as this goes
to press we are in Colombia for a regional seminar, with officers from a dozen
countries, gaming scenarios for maritime domain awareness. So a combination
of teaching faculty, research faculty, and students makes up the intellectual capi-
tal we’re trying to get to the right places, whether in the Navy bureaus or in the
fleet. It’s a pretty interesting institution to be a part of, especially now.
A former President of the College, Admiral Stansfield Turner, once correctly
said, “Scholarship for its own sake is of no interest to us.” We are interested in
how research can influence policy, influence our decision making, and generally
improve how the naval services work to serve the nation. So I see one of my main
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 1 1
NWCR_Summer2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Summer2010\NWCR_Summer2010.vp
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 8:49:01 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
17
War College: Summer 2010 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
duties as helping get the best of our intellectual efforts in front of the right folks
and bringing them to bear in the right places in our own institutions, where they
can do some good. No one up here in Newport thinks we have all the answers,
but it’s progress to be asking the right questions and then at least trying to get the
results to where they might actually make a difference. We are, after all, engaged
in the longest conflict in our history, and we owe CNO, the Navy, and the nation
our best efforts—anything less, and we might as well pack up and go home.
There are times I feel a real sense of urgency about getting to the right answers
quickly, and that is the nature of things sometimes in our nation’s capital, where
they must live with the twenty-four-hour news cycle. But the history of the Na-
val War College is not about quick, snappy answers; it’s about doing the work.
It’s almost a biological process, like not expecting to eat popcorn the day after
planting the seeds. War and its prevention are among the most complex activi-
ties we human beings take on. Here in Newport we are trying our best to get our
thinking as right as we can. It’s about gaining insights—sometimes inexact, even
vague, and only after painstaking analysis and gaming, followed by synthesis,
sometimes over a period of years; getting the Navy leadership to accept or reject
the research, after iterative experimentation and testing; writing up the lessons
to inform doctrine; and then building on the lessons, year after year.
The composer Benjamin Britten once said, “Composing is like driving down
a foggy road toward a house. Slowly you see more details of the house—the color
of the slates and bricks, the shape of the windows. The notes are the bricks and
the mortar of the house.” I think this is a fitting metaphor, one that aptly de-
scribes, in part, the nature of our work at the Naval War College. Our record, as a
nation, of predicting the future is not great; we are often in the fog, often get
things really wrong, and sometimes we miss indicators that are obvious in
hindsight.
That doesn’t mean we should give up trying to peer into the fog and darkness
to see the way ahead—the work is too important—but it does mean that here in
Newport, as we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, we should
always be prepared for surprises, that we should be thinking continually about
what the people who have to make the tough decisions for the Navy of the future
will need to do business.
JAMES P. WISECUP
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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Caitlyn L. Antrim
The Russian Arctic in the Twenty-fi rst Century
THE NEXT GEOGRAPHICAL PIVOT
In the summer of 2007, when the Russian fl ag was placed on the ocean fl oor at the North Pole and the Arctic ice cover receded to the lowest extent ever record-
ed, the media sought story lines that would grab the public’s attention. Titles 
and headlines such as “Arctic Meltdown,” “A New Cold War,” and “Arctic Land 
Grab,” focusing on Russian activities in the Arctic, all fed a sense of competition, 
confl ict, and crisis.1
These story lines were effective because they built upon geopolitical beliefs 
that have been with us for over a century, from the fi nal years of the Russian 
Empire through the Soviet era and into the fi rst years of the Russian Federation. 
For all that time, the core of Western geopolitical thought has held that there is 
a natural confl ict between the landlocked Eurasian heartland and the Western 
maritime nations. In this analysis, the Arctic has played an essential, yet unrec-
ognized, role as the northern wall in the Western strategy to enclose and contain 
the world’s largest land power. Throughout the twentieth century, scant atten-
tion was given by the West to changes in Arctic technology, economics, climate, 
and law that had been under way since the 1930s. Stories of Russian claims to 
the Arctic Ocean seabed and control of new sea-lanes, interpreted through the 
old (and by now, creaky) geopolitics of the early twentieth century, heightened 
fears of confl ict.
The geopolitics of the twenty-fi rst century will be different from the days of 
empire and confl ict of the nineteenth and twentieth. The increased accessibility 
of the Arctic, with its energy and mineral resources, new fi sheries, shortened 
sea routes, and access to rivers fl owing north to the Arctic, is pushing Russia to 
become a maritime state. As it progresses, Russia will no longer be susceptible 
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to geographic isolation or encirclement. At the same time, these changes will 
require Russia to become more closely integrated into global commercial and 
fi nancial networks, to welcome international business involvement, and to par-
ticipate in international bodies that harmonize international shipping, safety, 
security, and environmental regulations. 
These changes are already opening the way for a new geostrategy that has 
its roots in the geopolitical thinking of the twentieth century but addresses the 
changes that are turning the Arctic from an afterthought to a central front in 
the new geopolitical view of the world. In this new geostrategy, Russia assumes 
a role as one of the maritime powers of the “rimland,” and the Russian Arctic 
becomes a new geographical pivot among the great powers. Decades will pass 
before Russia can fully make the shift from Eurasian heartland to Arctic coastal 
state, but it is already integrating policies toward this end into the strategies of its 
national security council and federal ministries, and it shows every indication of 
expecting to seize its future seat among the major maritime states of the world.
THE ARCTIC IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY GEOPOLITICS
The twentieth century began with Alfred Thayer Mahan’s geopolitical study The 
Problem of Asia.2 In it, Mahan addressed the competition between the land pow-
er of the Russian Empire and the colonial and trading nations whose interests 
lay along the periphery of the Asian continent, from the Near East to China. 
Mahan saw Russia as a land power that was limited in its ability to bring 
its strength to bear through the “debatable lands” that separated Russia from 
the Western powers in southern Asia, particularly the British Empire and the 
United States, which could maintain their dominance along the Asian coast by 
way of maritime trade and sea power. Maintenance of Western dominance in 
southern Asia depended on Russia’s inability to mount a naval front from the 
south in addition to its potential land approach from the north. To challenge 
the West, Russia needed either access to the sea from its own ports or an over-
land route to other ports, a possibility that gave rise to the “Great Game” of the 
nineteenth century and the armed and political confl icts in twentieth-century 
Afghanistan and Iran. 
In assessing Russia’s access to the sea, Mahan emphasized the geographi-
cal limitations on Russian sea power. From St. Petersburg, Russia had to pass 
through the Baltic Sea, facing the sea power of the Nordic states in the Gulf of 
Finland and the Danish straits. From the Crimea on the Black Sea, Russian ships 
had to pass through the Dardanelles and either the Strait of Gibraltar or the Suez 
Canal. Ocean access from the Far Eastern port of Vladivostok was possible, but 
its distance from the economic, political, and military center of Russia and the 
growing maritime challenge of Japan made that outpost only a limited threat to 
Western interests in Asia. 
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Four years after the publication of Mahan’s work on Asia, Halford Mackinder 
laid the groundwork for East-West geopolitics in the twentieth century. In a pre-
sentation to the Royal Geographical Society titled “The Geographical Pivot of 
History,” Mackinder identifi ed the southwest region of the Russian empire as 
the crossroads of power between East Asia and Western Europe.3 He viewed the 
steppes and plains of this region as an avenue by which a central land power, 
with internal lines of communication, could come to dominate the crescent 
from the coasts of China and South Asia westward through the Balkans and up 
to the English Channel.
Mackinder saw technological change, in the form of the railroad, as increasing 
the power of the heartland and amplifying the historical role of the steppes of 
Central Asia as the route by which invading peoples had for millenniums moved 
from Asia into Europe. He represented control of this region, with its wealth 
of agricultural production and industrial raw materials, and with the power of 
movement provided by the railroad, as the pivot around which the confl ict be-
tween the heartland and the crescent of maritime states revolved (see map 1). 
Thus, in the opening years of the twentieth century Mahan and Mackinder 
laid the groundwork for the most enduring perspective on the century of con-
fl ict yet to come: land power versus sea power, the contest between the Eurasian 
heartland and Great Britain and the United States for access to the marginal 
crescent from China to Western Europe. 
MAP 1
MACKINDER’S GEOGRAPHIC PIVOT AND THE ICY SEA
Source: Mackinder, “Geographical Pivot of History.”
Antrim_Lead.indd   17 5/10/2010   2:23:16 PM
23
War College: Summer 2010 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
 18 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Containment of Russia and its Eurasian heartland became the geostrategic 
theme of the century. Mackinder’s vision was refi ned in the early 1940s by Yale 
University professor Nicholas Spykman.4 Spykman died in 1943, but his ideas 
of enclosure and containment were to be put into practice in the postwar era in 
response to Soviet expansion of control over Eastern Europe and the short-lived 
alliance with communist China. 
Spykman, like Mahan and Mackinder before him, did not address Russian 
access to the Arctic. The signifi cance of this omission is hinted at by the crucial 
role of the port of Murmansk as the eastern terminus for supplies from the West 
in World War II, as well as by the establishment of the Soviet navy’s Northern 
Fleet in 1933 and the growing importance of sea routes linking ports along the 
Eurasian Arctic coast to the Soviet Union. 
Even as late as 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski (who had been President Jimmy 
Carter’s national security adviser), presented a view of an enclosable Russia 
bounded by Europe in the west, by former Soviet republics to the southwest, 
and by India, China, and Japan to the south and east.5 Although he updated the 
geopolitical situation to refl ect the breakup of the Soviet Union, his geostrategic 
approach remained one of enclosure and containment, with new relationships 
being established with the former Soviet republics and client states by the Unit-
ed States and NATO. Once again, the northern enclosure of Russia, the “fourth 
wall,” was assumed but not addressed—and so the twentieth century was clos-
ing with the same blind spot that had been introduced a hundred years before. 
By the end of the twentieth century, the enclosure and containment of Rus-
sia seemed complete, with NATO and the European Union to the west, Western 
military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the rise of India and China 
as substantial powers on land and sea. The strategy of enclosure and contain-
ment, which rested on the belief that geography and political power could per-
manently enclose Russia, appeared to have endured. But change was coming to 
the Arctic, the frozen north was changing, and the geopolitical wall to the north 
was beginning to crumble.
RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC
Most of the attention paid to the benefi ts of Arctic warming and retreat of the 
polar ice cover has focused on the economic potential of offshore oil and gas de-
posits and the savings of time and fuel made possible by new transarctic shipping 
routes. These benefi ts are signifi cant, but for Russia there are other interests relat-
ed to the increased accessibility of the Arctic, including securing a newly opened 
Arctic frontier and increasing access to the rivers that reach throughout the inte-
rior of the country. Russia’s perception of its Arctic interests can be grouped into 
four categories: economics, security, transportation, and development.
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Russia’s Arctic Seas and Their Economic Importance
Russia’s Arctic encompasses the northern seas, islands, continental shelf, and 
the coast of the Eurasian continent; in addition, it is closely linked to the vast 
watershed that fl ows to the sea. The Arctic coast of Russia spans from its border 
with Norway on the Kola Peninsula eastward to the Bering Strait. Along the 
coast is a wide continental shelf, running eastward from the Barents Sea in the 
west to the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea, and the Chukchi Sea. 
Of these seas, only the Barents is largely ice-free throughout the year, a result 
of the Gulf Stream returning there to the Arctic. The continental shelf extends 
northward far beyond the two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ). When free of ice, the coastline along the Arctic extends almost forty 
thousand kilometers (including the coasts of the northern islands), which must 
be patrolled and protected. The Russian Arctic coast drains a watershed of thir-
teen million square kilometers, equal to about three-quarters of the total land 
area of Russia and an area larger than any country on earth save Russia itself. 
Russia has long been a major producer of oil and gas from land-based re-
sources. Now the resources of the Arctic continental shelf are drawing increas-
ing attention. Deposits in the Barents Sea are already being developed, with oth-
er known deposits in both the Barents and the Kara seas being eyed for future 
exploitation. Still more energy resources are awaiting discovery. In 2008, the 
U.S. Geological Survey, estimating the as-yet-undiscovered resources of oil and 
gas in the Arctic, projected over 60 percent of the total resources (equivalent to 
about 412 billion barrels of oil) to be located in Russian territory, with all but a 
very small percentage on shore or inside the EEZ.6 The area of greatest poten-
tial is in the Kara Sea basin, with smaller, yet still respectable, prospects in the 
Laptev and East Siberian seas.
Security and Naval Operations
Russia’s Northern Fleet has been based on the Kola Peninsula, on the south-
west shore of the Barents Sea, since 1933. The fl eet is now the largest and most 
powerful component of the Russian navy. From its bases, the fl eet’s ballistic-
missile submarines deploy under the Arctic ice, as will be discussed below. The 
Northern Fleet is also well situated to deploy year-round to the North and South 
Atlantic and to escort commercial shipping to or from ports in northwest Rus-
sia. While the mobility of the Northern Fleet could be restricted to the Arctic in 
the case of unrestricted naval warfare, at other times it has the free access to the 
ocean that was sought by imperial Russia for centuries (see map 2). 
If Western geostrategists had a blind spot with regard to the fourth wall of 
Russia’s enclosure, the potential for change was apparent to others even before 
World War II. In a 1938 article in Foreign Affairs, H. P. Smolka offered a prescient 
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outlook for Russia in the Arctic. He addressed the basing of the Northern Fleet 
on the Kola Peninsula and examined the role of the newly formed Central Ad-
ministration of the Northern Sea Route as the development agency for the Rus-
sian Arctic coast in Asia, even comparing the Administration to the British East 
India Company.7 In spite of this prominent discussion, no hint of reconsidera-
tion of the strategy of enclosure was to appear in the work of the geostrategists 
who followed Mahan and Mackinder.
Smolka identifi ed the military benefi t of the northern development activities 
by addressing Mahan’s points about Russia’s lack of access to the high seas. He 
argued that the fl eet based in Murmansk would have access to the open ocean: 
“Russia would thus be bottled up on three sides: west, south and east. But in the 
North—and there only—there is an independent, continuous and all-Russian 
coastline, unassailable by anyone.”8
Today, Russia’s Coastal Border Guard, which has been evolving from the 
maritime division of the Soviet-era KGB into a modern coast guard with func-
tions comparable to those of similar services in Western states, is responsible for 
monitoring maritime activities along the coast and in the EEZ and for enforcing 
MAP 2
Source: Complied by author from polar projection and topography in GeoMapApp, Marine Geoscience Data System, Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, 
Columbia University, www.goemapapp.org/.
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national laws and regulations. It is a small service with assets that include con-
ventional frigates and corvettes assigned to the Pacifi c and Black Sea fl eets, sev-
eral fi sheries and EEZ patrol vessels, and lighter vessels intended for near-coast 
operations, but only a handful of these are designed for Arctic conditions or ice 
operations. Russia’s ability to patrol and monitor its increasingly accessible Arc-
tic EEZ has not kept pace with the receding summer ice cover.9
The Northeast Passage and the Northern Sea Route
The fi rst single-season transit of the Northeast Passage (that is, along the full 
length of the Arctic coast of Russia) was not completed until 1932, coinciding 
with the Soviet Union’s recognition of the north as a new and critical dimension 
of its national security. The Central Administration of the Northern Sea Route 
was created that same year with the mission of developing the resources of the 
north. Sea routes were charted and icebreakers were built to make it possible to 
reach ports from the Kara Gate (the passage between the island of Novaya Zem-
lya and the mainland, separating the seas north of Europe from those of Asia) 
eastward to the Bering Strait. This section of the Northeast Passage is defi ned as 
the “Northern Sea Route” (NSR). Military bases and closed industrial cities, as 
well as some of the infamous gulags, were established along this northern fron-
tier in the 1930s and 1940s, and air bases and monitoring stations were operated 
along the Arctic during the Cold War era. Port facilities were maintained near 
the mouths of the major rivers feeding into the Arctic to support access to the 
interior. Traffi c along the NSR grew slowly but continuously through the rest of 
the Soviet era.
The economic disruptions accompanying the transition from the Soviet 
Union to the Russian Federation led to a decade of neglect of the NSR and of the 
port facilities that had supported it. Cargo along the NSR declined precipitously 
during the 1990s. In 2000, then-president Vladimir Putin brought renewed at-
tention to the NSR, as part of a national economic strategy that marked the end 
of the decline and a new vision of the Northern Sea Route as a core component 
of Russia’s economic development strategy.10
The NSR serves both as a set of regional sea-lanes and as a transarctic passage, 
with a natural divide at the Taymyr Peninsula, which separates the Kara Sea to 
the west from the Laptev Sea to the east. This is the northernmost point of Asia 
and the last point that opens during the summer ice melt. The passage is con-
strained by the Vilkitski Strait, which separates the mainland from the island 
of Severnaya Zemlya, where the shallow depth and retention of ice late into the 
summer limit the transit of ships between east and west. Partial, regional routes 
continue to operate even when transit along its full length is prevented by the 
freezing of the straits along the way. 
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The NSR provides access to such regional ports as Novy Port, near the mouth 
of the Ob River; Dikson, Dudinka, and Ingarka (towns on the Yenisei that have 
served as loading points for mineral and timber resources); and Tiksi, at the 
mouth of the Lena River. These ports also support coastal shipping during the 
summer season, when ice cover is at its minimum.
Beyond providing a national route connecting northern ports and access to 
the interior, the NSR is of interest to global shipping fi rms as an alternative to 
the longer southern route between the Far East and Europe. The journey from 
Yokohama to Rotterdam can be reduced by about four thousand miles by way 
of the NSR. Even with reduced speeds in a northern passage, the shortened dis-
tance translates to a quicker transit time and decreased fuel consumption, with 
substantial fi nancial savings to the shipper. At present, the Arctic shipping sea-
son is of unpredictable length, dependent on changing climate patterns and sea 
and ice conditions that require ships designed specifi cally for passage through 
icy waters. The NSR will not appeal to major shipping fi rms as a regular route 
until more experience is gained and the route is upgraded with modern aids to 
navigation, port facilities, and search-and-rescue capabilities. Over time, those 
developments, with or without further retreat of the polar ice, will make the 
Northeast Passage more attractive, particularly as the number of ice-capable 
vessels increases.
The NSR depends on powerful icebreakers to open routes through the ice 
and to escort shipping even in summertime. Six nuclear icebreakers, four of 
the heavy Arktika class and two of the shallow-draft Taymyr class, maintain 
the NSR, and major Russian commercial enterprises have begun acquiring their 
own icebreaking cargo ships. In 2009, the fl eet operated by Norilsk Nickel MMC, 
in north-central Siberia, accounted for nearly a million tons of shipping from 
Dudinka through the Kara Sea and on to the Kola Peninsula. Norilsk’s success 
is leading to the design of similar vessels for unescorted transport of oil and 
natural gas in the Arctic.11
In theory, the NSR can also serve as a sea corridor by which the Northern 
Fleet could reach the Pacifi c Ocean, but such passage remains hazardous, be-
cause naval vessels are not designed to ice-class standards. Passage through 
ice-infested waters, even with icebreaker escorts, is potentially dangerous to the 
hulls and propulsion systems of warships, whose complex superstructures are 
also susceptible to icing, to the detriment of stability.12
The Arctic Watershed
Russia’s Arctic watershed comprises the Eurasian heartland and the northern 
coastal regions that until recently served as the fourth wall enclosing Russia and 
limiting its communication and commerce with the rest of the world. The Asian 
watershed alone, which constitutes what Mackinder defi ned as the “Pivot Area” 
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and Spykman called the “Heartland,” accounts for about two-thirds of the land 
area of Russia. 
Russia’s Arctic watershed is richly endowed. The southern part of western 
Siberia is a highly productive agricultural area. The region is rich in oil and 
coal, and the Ob and Yenisei provide hydroelectric power. Iron and bauxite pro-
vide the raw materials for steel and aluminum production. The central Siberian 
plateau in the north is home to Norilsk Nickel, the world’s largest producer of 
nickel and palladium. The Lena provides access to gold and diamond mines. 
The watershed is also home to the largest forest in the world, stretching across 
Siberia from the northwest to the southeast.
Vast distances, rugged terrain, and severe climate preclude the construction 
of highways and railroads in the north, but three major river systems—the Ob, 
Yenisei, and Lena—reach throughout the watershed, from the Ural Mountains 
to the west, Mongolia and Kazakhstan in the south, and the mountains border-
ing the Pacifi c in the east. The potential of these rivers to support the develop-
ment of the watershed can be seen in comparison to the importance of the Mis-
sissippi River for the United States (see fi gure 1). At present, this potential has 
been blocked by the Arctic climate, which opens the rivers in the north for only 
a couple of months each year.  
The climate of the Eurasian coast is one of the most extreme and inhospitable 
in the world, with winter temperatures reaching minus forty degrees centigrade 
and ice on the sea as much as two meters thick. The climate takes a severe toll on 
port facilities, produces extreme fl uctuations in river depth and fl ow during the 
summer melting season, and requires costly resupply to sustain human habita-
tion during the long and frigid winters. Costs that were borne as security ex-
penses during the Cold War now have to be justifi ed on commercial grounds. As 
 River System Greatest Length Basin Average Discharge
 (km) (sq. km) (m3/sec)
 Ob  5,410 2,972,497 12,500
 Yenisei  5,539 2,580,000 19,600 
 Lena  4,472 2,490,000 17,000 
 Comparison
 Mississippi  6,300 3,225,000 16,200
FIGURE 1
MAJOR RIVERS OF RUSSIA’S ARCTIC WATERSHED
Source: Russian river data from Global International Waters Assessment, Russian Artic, Regional Assessment 1a (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environmental 
Programme, 2005).
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a result, many old facilities have deteriorated or been abandoned over the past 
two decades and now need to be rebuilt from scratch. Maintenance of facilities 
has been complicated by seasonal warming, which causes melting and refreez-
ing of the permafrost that was once, but is no longer, a structurally stable base 
for construction. Only when commercial traffi c provides economic incentives to 
maintain facilities near or on the Arctic coast do ports (such as Dudinka, which 
services Norilsk Nickel) manage to operate at their former capacities.
CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC: BREACHING THE FOURTH WALL OF 
CONTAINMENT
In all of the geostrategic analyses that guided Western strategy in the twenti-
eth century, the Arctic played, as we have seen, a critical but unrecognized role 
as the fourth wall of the box that enclosed Russia. Western geostrategists from 
Mahan and Mackinder to Spykman and Brzezinski saw the frozen rivers and 
seas of the Arctic as completing the containment of Russia. The assumption of 
an impervious North was reasonable for the analysts of the early twentieth cen-
tury, who, like Nicholas Spykman, were convinced that “geography is the most 
fundamental factor in foreign policy because it is the most permanent.”13 This 
maxim, seemingly obvious though it appears, proved incorrect during the fi rst 
decade of the twenty-fi rst century as changing climatic conditions led to a string 
of summers that set record lows for ice cover—losses of 30 percent of average ice 
cover in the late summer and declines in maximum ice cover in winter of more 
than 10 percent (see fi gure 2). 
Had geostrategists in the middle to late twentieth century examined the evo-
lution of the Arctic in Russia, they would have recognized that the role of the 
Arctic in completing the enclosure of the heartland rested on four factors: tech-
nology, economics, climate, and law. Changes in these factors went unnoticed in 
the West, even though evidence that they were subject to change began to appear 
as early as the 1930s.
Arctic Transportation Technology. Russia has fought the barrier of the polar ice 
for over a century, building an impressive fl eet of icebreakers and ice-strengthened 
vessels. In the four and a half decades between World War II and the breakup of 
the Soviet Union, traffi c along the route rose from less than a half-million tons 
per year in 1945 to 6.6 million tons in 1989. During that time, the technology 
of Arctic transportation evolved from simple reinforced bows and strengthened 
hulls to specialized hull designs and coatings, ballast-shifting capability, nuclear 
power, pod-mounted directional thrusters, and other remarkable technologies.
Russia’s commitment to the development of ice-covered regions is illustrated 
by its investment in icebreakers. The current fl eet includes six second-generation 
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nuclear-powered icebreakers, four 
heavy-duty dual-reactor ships for 
use along the length of the NSR, 
and two smaller single-reactor ice-
breakers capable of clearing routes 
and escorting ships into ports and 
rivers. A focus on nuclear icebreak-
ers, however, fails to refl ect the 
full Russian commitment to ship-
ping in the Arctic. Diesel-electric 
icebreakers that support regional 
operations and maintain port and 
river access are being constructed 
to replace and expand the aging 
fl eet of Soviet-era vessels. The re-
cent introduction of tankers and 
cargo vessels of the “double act-
ing” type—with azimuthal pod 
propulsion, cruising bows (for 
good performance in open water, 
steaming ahead), and icebreaking 
hulls aft (for icebreaking, steam-
ing astern)—is helping privatize 
Arctic routes. Norilsk Nickel’s 
fi ve icebreaking cargo ships run 
throughout the year. In 2009 they 
carried almost a million tons of cargo between Dudinka and Murmansk. The 
state-owned shipping fi rm SovComFlot just commissioned its third seventy-
thousand-deadweight-ton (dwt) dual-acting tanker for use along the NSR.
Oil and gas technology developed for the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea 
is improving access to offshore oil and gas deposits in the Arctic. Advanced off-
shore techniques, including remote-exploration technology, directional drilling 
that allows a single well site to reach through the seafl oor to tap deposits many 
kilometers away, and seabed-based production technology, among others, are 
making development in the Arctic seas more attractive. 
New ships and oil and gas technology are only parts of the key to opening 
the Russian Arctic watershed. Development of ports and river transport systems 
are necessary to connect to currently isolated regions with the Eurasian heart-
land. Winter freezing of the northern reaches of rivers will require both new 
FIGURE 2
MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM ICE EXTENT IN THE ARCTIC 
1979–2009
Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center, “Archived Data and Images,” Sea Ice Index, nsidc.
org/data/seaice_index/archives/index.html.
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icebreaking capabilities and improvements to ports and waterways to extend the 
period during which shipping can reach the sea.
Energy Economics. Economic containment of the Soviet Union began to crum-
ble in the early 1980s, when European nations decided to facilitate the construc-
tion of a pipeline to bring natural gas from western Siberia to Western Europe. 
The pipeline had been opposed by the United States, because it put control over 
the most strategic of materials, energy, in Soviet hands and because it provided 
funds and technology to the struggling Soviet economic system. American pro-
ponents of using trade as a tool to infl uence the Soviet Union lost out to Europe-
an policies that favored East-West trade for mutual benefi t.14 A decade later, with 
the breakup of the Soviet Union and the rapid privatization of state enterprises, 
fears of trade and interdependence with Russia declined further. Rising oil and 
gas prices, the discovery of oil and gas deposits in the Barents Sea, and demon-
stration of deepwater and cold-weather exploration and exploitation technology 
made Arctic deposits attractive candidates for development. By the beginning of 
the twenty-fi rst century, with energy supplies already fl owing to Europe, there 
was little concern about the shift to new Russian sources in the Arctic. Finally, 
although the Russian Federation still sends mixed messages about foreign invest-
ment, particularly in strategic sectors of the economy, opportunities for foreign 
participation in oil and gas development and transportation now draw Western 
attention and investment at levels unheard-of only two decades ago.
Changing Climate. Over the last decades of the twentieth century scientists plot-
ted a slow reduction in the extent of ice cover in the Arctic. In the past decade 
this trend has accelerated. Scientists now are contemplating a continuation of the 
decline that could lead to a complete seasonal loss of ice cover toward the middle 
of the century.15 Arctic winters, however, will continue to be long and harsh, and 
there is no projection of a complete loss of ice cover in wintertime, though ice 
then will be of the thinner and less dense fi rst-year variety, and of lesser geo-
graphic extent. 
RosHydroMet, Russia’s hydrometeorological agency, has projected a winter 
temperature increase of up to four degrees centigrade along Russia’s Arctic coast 
by 2040.16 Base temperatures near minus forty degrees centigrade, however, 
mean that the winter ice of the coastal sea and rivers and temperatures will con-
tinue to be a challenge. Still, such a change in temperature would be signifi cant, 
because it would lead to a shorter and less extreme winter in the North, with less 
time for ice to spread and thicken. Warming in the southern Arctic region of the 
watershed, estimated at two degrees centigrade, will gradually increase growing 
periods and lead to the melting of permafrost, slowly moving northward the 
lands available to human development.
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Changes of International Law. Just as Arctic technology, economics, and cli-
mate changed over the twentieth century, so did international law as it applies 
to the Arctic. At the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Arctic was an 
ice-locked and unexplored realm, there was little need for an international legal 
regime. In the 1920s, Russia proposed that the coastal states simply divide the 
northern area into sectors bounded by lines drawn from the North Pole to the 
coastal borders between states, but this proposal was not accepted by the other 
Arctic states and eventually was dropped by Russia as well. 
It was not until a comprehensive law of the sea was negotiated and implement-
ed in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that 
rules applicable to the Arctic were agreed upon. Other laws and agreements, 
including the 1990 U.S.-USSR Maritme Boundary Agreement, the 1995 Fish 
Stocks Agreement, and conventions and guidelines of the International Mari-
time Organization, have further extended the legal regime of the Arctic.17 The 
Arctic Council, established in 1996, provides a forum for collaborative study of 
issues of sustainable development in the Arctic. The Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 
commits the fi ve Arctic coastal states (Russia, the United States, Canada, Nor-
way, and Denmark) to resolve issues through diplomatic channels.18 Additional 
effort will be needed to resolve disputes over boundaries and access rights be-
tween Russia and Norway, but these two nations have far more to gain from one 
another amicably than they could hope to gain through open confl ict. They are 
currently working to resolve their boundary in the Barents Sea and sovereignty 
issues around the Svalbard Archipelago.
From the perspective of Russia’s interests in the Arctic, the most important 
aspects of UNCLOS were its creation of the exclusive economic zone, recogni-
tion of national jurisdiction over the resources of the continental shelf beyond 
the EEZ, and establishment of the right of coastal states bordering ice-covered 
waters to establish and enforce regulations to protect the marine environment 
within the EEZ. These provisions give Russia jurisdiction over shipping in the 
NSR, fi sheries in the EEZ, and seabed minerals to the outer limit of the conti-
nental shelf, all subject to a responsibility to observe the rights of other states as 
specifi ed in the convention. Under the convention, Russia proposed boundaries 
of the shelf drawn on the basis of scientifi c data and a complex formula account-
ing for distance from shore, depth of seafl oor, thickness of sediment, slope of 
seabed, and the nature of underlying rock. The boundary proposal was submit-
ted in 2001 to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, an inter-
national commission of experts in marine geology and related fi elds established 
by UNCLOS for confi rmation of national claims.19 The Commission returned 
the proposal to Russia, saying that additional evidence would be needed before 
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it could rule on the proposal and a new submission is anticipated in the near 
future. 
Under the convention’s provisions governing navigation in ice-covered seas, 
Russia is allowed to establish and enforce regulations applicable to the protec-
tion of the Northern Sea Route as long as that route is ice covered for much of 
the year and the regulations are related to protecting the marine environment, 
are based on scientifi c evidence, and do not discriminate on the basis of national 
origin.20
RUSSIA’S ARCTIC VISION
Russia’s leadership has had long involvement in the development of its Arctic, 
from the establishment of the Northern Sea Route Administration in 1932 to 
the recent statement of Russia’s strategy for the Arctic. In September of 2008, the 
Security Council of the Russian Federation laid out its vision of Russia’s Arctic 
future, setting out its basic national interests in the Arctic:21 
a. Use of the Arctic zone of Russia as a strategic resource base of Russia to tackle 
socioeconomic development of the country;
b. Preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation;
c. Conservation of unique ecosystems of the Arctic; 
d. Use of the Northern Sea Route as a national integrated transport communica-
tions line in Arctic Russia.
The document Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the 
Arctic for the Period up to 2020 and Beyond focuses on priorities for Arctic pol-
icy, many of them incorporated into more specifi c strategies and concepts in 
other functional areas. From a functional perspective, the key provisions can 
be grouped into foreign policy, military security, economic development, and 
transportation and maritime policy.
Foreign Policy. In seeking to establish the Arctic as a “zone of peace and coop-
eration,” the Russian Arctic policy emphasizes mutually benefi cial bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation among Russia and other Arctic states on the basis of in-
ternational treaties and agreements to which Russia is a party. Underlying all Rus-
sian policies toward the Arctic is support for regional collaboration in the Arctic 
and commitment to UNCLOS and multilateral organizations and approaches, 
including the International Maritime Organization, the Arctic Council, and the 
fi ve Arctic coastal states, who met in Ilulissat, Greenland, in 2008 to issue their 
declaration on management of the Arctic. The key foreign policy point in the Ilu-
lissat Declaration—that the Arctic coastal states will resolve disputes peacefully in 
line with the law of the sea—is consistent with the Russian Arctic policy.22 
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The Arctic Council consists of the fi ve Arctic coastal states plus Sweden, Fin-
land, and Iceland, as well as the organizations representing indigenous peoples of 
the Arctic. The council is not a decision-making body; in fact, it has no standing 
infrastructure or secretariat. It is, however, the principal body in which the re-
gional agenda for environment and development issues in the Arctic is discussed. 
Military Security. In military terms, Russia’s Arctic policy focuses on the protec-
tion of the nation and its borders as they run north into the Arctic Ocean and on 
achieving a favorable operating regime in the Russian Arctic for the Russian Fed-
eration’s armed forces and other troops, military formations, and bodies needed 
in the region, particularly the Federal Security Service’s Coastal Border Guard. 
The opening of the Arctic brings up four issues of military security: the protec-
tion of the ballistic-missile submarine fl eet; protection of trade routes along the 
Arctic and from the Arctic to other parts of the world; defense of coasts, ports, 
and shipping; and the movement of warships between the Atlantic and Pacifi c.
The protection of the ballistic-missile submarine fl eet, which is part of the 
traditional naval and strategic security of the region, is not addressed by the 
Russian Arctic policy. The majority of Russia’s strategic missile submarines are 
based in the Kola Peninsula, from where they can deploy quickly in times of ten-
sion to stations under the polar ice cap. The thick and noisy ice pack provides se-
curity and eliminates the need to pass through the closely watched Bering Strait 
and the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap. Surface ships and the attack 
and patrol submarines of the Northern Fleet can provide additional security as 
the strategic submarines cross the relatively shallow continental shelf on the way 
to deep and ice-covered waters. The Northern Fleet also has the traditional roles 
of ensuring freedom of navigation for shipping and showing the fl ag overseas. 
Instead, the military-security issue upon which the Russian Arctic policy pri-
marily focuses is the defense and protection of the borders and area of the Rus-
sian Arctic zone. The primary border activities are
Creation of a functioning coast guard in the Arctic from the Federal Security •
Service and effective interaction with the coast guards of other Arctic coastal 
states in combating terrorism at sea, preventing smuggling and illegal 
migration, and protecting biological resources;
Development of the border infrastructure in the Russian border zone and •
reequipment of the border guard;
Implementation of an integrated system for the monitoring of surface •
activities and oversight of fi shing activities in the Russian Arctic.23
It is in the area of the Coastal Border Guard in which change is most demand-
ing. It has under nine thousand personnel and only some half-dozen 3,710-ton 
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patrol icebreakers, built almost thirty years ago, of which only two are reported 
to be in service in the Arctic. While naval vessels may take up some activities of 
the border patrol, these and a few lightly armed patrol tugs are the only ice -
capable armed vessels in either the Coastal Border Guard or the navy. These 
assets are spread thin: in addition to the Arctic, the Coastal Border Guard pa-
trols the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas; the Amur and Ussuri rivers; and the 
coastal Pacifi c Ocean.24 Nor are ice-capable ships, other than the large icebreak-
ers, available to provide quick search-and-rescue response along the northern 
shipping lanes. The sudden addition of the newly opened Arctic coast and the 
vast tract of EEZ and continental-shelf resources in the strenuous Arctic envi-
ronment is adding a heavy responsibility for managing shipping, enforcing en-
vironmental regulation and fi sheries policies, and providing search and rescue. 
It is not clear that the new demands upon the Coastal Border Guard have been 
fully understood. When they are, the service will need to increase its size and 
resources quickly to meet the new responsibilities. It will also need to collabo-
rate with the navies and coast guards of other Arctic states in monitoring vessel 
traffi c of commercial, economic, and scientifi c fl eets.
Economic Development. Socioeconomic development is the core element of 
Russia’s Arctic policy. Expanding the resource base of the Arctic zone of Russia 
would do much to fi ll the nation’s needs for hydrocarbon resources, aquatic bio-
logical resources, and other strategic raw materials. It would also provide foreign 
exchange to accelerate domestic development and growth.
Regional development of the Arctic is also an area of interest. The Ministry 
for Regional Development has prepared a paper on sustainable development in 
the Arctic for the Arctic Council and is tasked to prepare for review by Russia’s 
security council a regional development plan for the Arctic lands that addresses, 
fi nances, and promotes development of the Arctic region of Russia.25 This plan 
is also to address revision of the state subsidies for activities that support Arctic 
development.
Transportation and Maritime Policy. In 1987, General Secretary Mikhail Gor-
bachev broached the possibility of opening the Northern Sea Route to foreign 
traffi c.26 In 1991, this initiative was implemented by new rules governing the 
NSR. Finally, in the summer of 2009 the German ships MV Beluga Fraternity and 
MV Beluga Foresight became the fi rst foreign vessels to transit the length of the 
Northern Sea Route. They passed from Ulsan, South Korea, to Rotterdam, with 
a stop at Novy Port near the mouth of the Ob River to off-load heavy cargo. A 
revised set of rules is anticipated in the near future to govern such traffi c.27
The identifi cation of the Arctic as an area of strategic national interest has 
been incorporated into other national policies and plans. The Transportation 
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Strategy to 2030 established objectives of strengthening the NSR and the river 
network that links the route to the interior.28 It sets a specifi c goal of building 
three new “linear” icebreakers that will begin, after 2015, to replace the aging 
Arktika-class heavy nuclear icebreakers built in the 1970s and now due for re-
tirement.29 It also calls for building conventionally powered breakers to support 
regional development, river icebreaking, and port maintenance. Transportation 
Strategy to 2030 also anticipates a focus on developing ports and inland water-
ways along the NSR in the period from 2015 to 2030.
Russia’s maritime policy emphasizes increasing capacity to conduct maritime 
trade. This can be seen in the Arctic in the introduction of sophisticated ice-
capable cargo ships and tankers built both in Russia and in foreign shipyards. 
The dual-acting Norilsk ships are proving their worth in the Kara Sea, while in 
the summer of 2010 SovComFlot plans to demonstrate the capability of its own 
dual-acting tankers to move crude oil from the Kara Sea eastward to Japan.30
The relationship between maritime power and economic strength, a staple of 
American and British global strategies, has been becoming manifest in Russia as 
well. Refl ecting on the increasing globalization and the role of the Russian navy, 
Fleet Admiral V. I. Kuroyedov, then the service’s commander in chief, wrote in 
2005,
We understand very well that the 21st century is a century of the World Ocean, and 
this country should be ready for this if it is going to participate, on a par with other 
countries, in the competition for access to their resources and international trade 
routes. Only a modern, advanced fl eet, above all its naval component, can ensure 
Russia’s full-fledged participation in the sustained use of natural resources of the 
seas in the interest of advancing the State’s economic development.31 
AN ARCTIC GEOGRAPHICAL PIVOT: IMPLICATIONS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES
Mackinder’s original concept of the “geographical pivot” was of the area of Cen-
tral Asia through which peoples and armies had, for centuries, moved west-
ward to threaten European civilization. Over time, his concept evolved into the 
proposition that a powerful heartland could threaten Western interests across 
the southern rim of Asia and up through Central Europe. Concurrently, Mahan 
saw in southern Asia a potential battleground between the land power of the 
heartland and the maritime power of the British Empire and the United States 
over the resources of the coast of Asia. 
Now, things have changed. Russia has lost its territories to the south and the 
independent nations along the southern rim of Asia are able to defend their own 
interests. Any latent imperial designs on reaching the Indian Ocean or Persian 
Gulf by force appear forgotten. In the twenty-fi rst century, an accessible Arctic 
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will lead Russia to turn northward, not just to exploit Arctic resources but to 
connect its Asian interior to the rest of the world through maritime trade. 
The old geostrategy of enclosure and containment of Russia is gone for good. 
In a new geopolitical vision for the twenty-fi rst century, Russia takes a role not 
as a renewed heartland but as a maritime state that draws its strength from its 
Arctic coast and watershed. Even if the Arctic ice melt were to stall, advances in 
technology for Arctic shipping and resource development, combined with the 
economic return for development of the energy resources, would ensure that 
Russia increased its connections and commerce with the rest of the world. By 
midcentury, the Northern Sea Route is likely to be a regular shipping route, 
beginning with seasonal service based on ice-class vessels and expanding as 
climate and ice conditions allow. As the Arctic becomes more accessible, the 
northern coast of Eurasia may take the place of Mackinder’s pivot, as both a 
route of passage and an area of exploitable resources. 
This “geographical pivot” of the twenty-fi rst century will not be without con-
fl ict, but with commitment to international law and respect for the rights of 
the coastal and distant states, the confl icts can be political rather than military. 
Unlike the “Great Game” of Asian geopolitics of the nineteenth century and the 
heartland-versus-rimland contest of the twentieth, the groundwork has been 
laid through the Law of the Sea Convention and the Ilulissat Declaration to as-
sure peaceful development of the Arctic sea routes and recognize coastal-state 
rights to manage, develop, and protect the living and mineral resources in and 
under the Arctic coastal seas. 
Several sovereignty issues have yet to be resolved: Russia and Norway have 
complex boundary and resource access issues to resolve, the United States may 
challenge some of Russia’s claims of internal waters along the NSR, and the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf has yet to decide whether to 
recommend recognition of Russia’s expansive claim to much of the seabed on 
the Asian side of the Arctic. These are legal and diplomatic matters that, while 
important, do not touch on the security of the state or outweigh the overall 
benefi ts of maintaining peace and stability in the Arctic. As such, they are un-
likely to lead to more than demonstrations of interest through ship patrols and 
occasional harassment or detention of accused violators of jurisdiction claimed 
by Russia. 
As a maritime state with interests in sustaining freedom of navigation on a 
global stage and in maintaining safety and security in its offshore waters, Rus-
sia in the twenty-fi rst century will increasingly share interests long held by the 
United States and other ocean powers. Russia’s interests in its Arctic will fos-
ter a maritime policy that embraces coastal resource management and freedom 
of international navigation, though likely with a greater emphasis on offshore 
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sovereignty and less on distant-water power projection. Strategic security policy 
will be a continuation of past and current policy, the U.S.-Russian maritime 
boundary is already resolved de facto (pending offi cial approval of the bound-
ary treaty by the Russian Duma), and current and potential territorial disputes 
between Russia and U.S. allies Norway, Denmark, and Canada are likely to be 
resolved through peaceful means. The United States and Russia also have an 
agreement that maritime-boundary and navigation disputes will be resolved 
diplomatically rather than by resort to arms.32 The confl icts that do arise will 
be focused on matters of commercial navigation, boundary delimitation, fi sh-
eries management, energy development, environmental protection, and ocean 
science, all the subjects of international diplomacy and regulatory enforcement 
rather than warfare. 
Russia, with its newly accessible Arctic waters, will need to focus on develop-
ing the regulatory and enforcement capabilities to manage activities in an area 
that more than doubles the area of responsibility of the Coastal Border Guard. 
Its maritime security interests will focus on security (including customs, smug-
gling, and terrorism), management and protection of its offshore fi shery and 
mineral resources, and the maintenance and safe operation of the Northern Sea 
Route, both for its own fl eets and for foreign commercial transit.
The West, including the United States, can gain from the evolution of Rus-
sia’s Arctic from an isolated heartland of limited economic activity—a “black 
hole,” in the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski—to a maritime region trading in raw 
materials, agriculture, and industrial goods. The U.S. Arctic Policy, issued as a 
national security directive in early 2009, explicitly addressed military issues that 
Russia left out of its Arctic policy framework.33 But the rest of the Arctic interests 
of the United States fi nd counterparts in Russia’s policy objectives. Strategic de-
fense issues aside, Russia’s objective of establishing the Arctic as a “zone of peace 
and cooperation” is equally applicable to the United States and its allies. 
Mutual gain is the goal of U.S. and Russian policy that seeks to “reset” U.S.-
Russian relations. Arctic cooperation consistent with the Global Maritime Part-
nership initiative and capabilities and priorities found in the 2007 “Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” can promote the peaceful use of the Arctic 
while building familiarity among maritime users of the Arctic and demonstrat-
ing the potential to cooperate in an area of increasing geopolitical importance.34 
The mechanisms toward this goal will be diplomatic engagement, information 
sharing, business promotion, and cooperation between the Coastal Border Guard 
and the coast guards and navies of the other Arctic coastal states.
A regional application of the Global Maritime Partnership initiative, ex-
tended to include Arctic science, Arctic domain awareness, and ocean resource 
management, could support benefi cial maritime collaborations to enhance the 
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likelihood that the Arctic geographical pivot will be an area of peaceful col-
laboration rather than simply a shifting of confl ict from the south and west of 
Eurasia to its north. Elements of such a partnership include
Reinforcement of the rule of law: Russia and the United States need to take •
the lead in strengthening the rule of law in the Arctic. Russia should fi nally 
ratify the maritime boundary agreement with the United States, and the 
United States should accede to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
A fi rm commitment to a common understanding of the Law of the Sea 
Convention will help Arctic states to resolve issues among themselves and to 
implement policies and regulations governing Arctic use that will be accepted 
by nonarctic states seeking to transit the Arctic, exploit its resources, and 
conduct marine scientifi c research.
Military cooperation and emergency response: Regional application of the •
Global Maritime Partnership initiative can improve the capability of all 
Arctic states to respond to natural disasters and man-made crises. Increased 
activity in the Arctic need not require each Arctic state to maintain a full 
spectrum of ships, aircraft, satellites, and observation stations or emergency 
supplies. Shared awareness of assets and practice in combined operations 
would benefi t all users of the Arctic in providing combined aid and 
assistance.
Maritime safety and security: The Arctic states, with Russia and the United •
States in the lead, should be prepared to provide response to maritime 
emergencies, from search and rescue to response to major disasters at 
sea, such as oil spills. Leadership by the Arctic states in the International 
Maritime Organization can help avoid different, perhaps confl icting, national 
design specifi cations and operating regulations for transarctic shipping, 
and collaboration on regional fi sheries management can lead to sustainable 
fi sheries rather than overexploitation.
Arctic domain awareness: Maritime security, resource management, and •
marine environmental protection will all depend on accurate and up-to-
date information regarding human activities and ocean, ice, and climate 
data. Joint observation, identifi cation, and tracking of ships and aircraft, 
particularly those of nonarctic states, will be needed to maximize the 
effectiveness of the limited assets available in the Arctic. While military 
security will limit access to some information, particularly regarding military 
submarines, shared knowledge and expertise will be the framework upon 
which most collaborative work will be undertaken and upon which collective 
decisions will be made. 
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Arctic science: Conduct of Arctic research by all interested parties and •
sharing of results could be promoted. Successful multilateral polar science 
programs could be fostered and given access to nonsecurity, noncommercial 
data from national sources.
Arctic policy of regional and transiting states: Distant parties have interests •
and rights in Arctic waters, and indigenous people have their own interests in 
maintaining and developing their cultures, both through traditional activities 
and through trade and economic development made possible by a warming 
Arctic. These parties must be involved in all Arctic management activities 
that touch their substantive interests, not just in the Arctic Council but in 
other organizations and agreements that address Arctic issues.
The opening of the Arctic in the twenty-fi rst century will give Russia the oppor-
tunity to develop and grow as a maritime power, fi rst in the Arctic and eventu-
ally wherever its merchant fl eet carries Russian goods and returns with foreign 
products. This transformation of the threatening “heartland” of Mackinder and 
Spykman into a member of the maritime powers will require extensive effort 
to bring the new maritime Russia into the collaborations and partnerships of 
other oceangoing states. Commitment to the rule of law, shared Arctic domain 
awareness, joint security and safety operations, and collaboration in developing 
policies for the future can maintain the Arctic as a region of peace even while the 
coastal states maintain naval and law enforcement capabilities in the region.
The best course is to address Russia’s evolving maritime role with an Arctic 
regional maritime partnership based on the model of the Global Maritime Part-
nership initiative, expanded to address civilian interests in climate, resources, 
science, and conservation. The American objective should be to work collab-
oratively to resolve disputes over continental shelf and fi shery claims, negoti-
ate a regional high-seas fi sheries management plan, develop a regional Arctic 
maritime transportation plan, and coordinate security and safety policies on the 
ocean and ice surface and in the air, in line with the U.S. Arctic Policy and the 
sea services’ “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.”
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n recent years, defense analysts in the United States have substantially revised 
their estimates of China’s missile prowess. A decade ago, most observers rated 
Beijing’s ballistic missiles as inaccurate, blunt weapons limited to terrorizing ci-
vilian populations. Today, the emerging consensus within the U.S. strategic com-
munity is that China’s arsenal can infl ict lethal harm with precision on a wide 
range of military targets, including ports and airfi elds. As a consequence, many 
observers have jettisoned previously sanguine net assessments that conferred de-
cisive, qualitative advantages to Taiwan in the cross-strait military balance. In-
deed, the debates on China’s coercive power and Taiwan’s apparent inability to 
resist such pressure have taken on a palpably fatalistic tone. 
A 2009 RAND monograph warns that China’s large, modern missile and air 
forces are likely to pose a virtually insurmountable challenge to Taiwanese and 
American efforts to command the air over the strait and the island. The authors 
of the report believe that massive ballistic-missile sal-
vos launched against Taiwan’s air bases would severely 
hamper Taipei’s ability to generate enough fi ghter sor-
ties to contest air superiority. They state: “As China’s 
ability to deliver accurate fi re across the strait grows, 
it is becoming increasingly diffi cult and soon may be 
impossible for the United States and Taiwan to protect 
the island’s military and civilian infrastructures from 
serious damage.”1 As a result, the authors observe, 
“China’s ability to suppress Taiwan and local U.S. air 
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bases with ballistic and cruise missiles seriously threatens the defense’s ability 
to maintain control of the air over the strait.”2 They further assert, “The United 
States can no longer be confi dent of winning the battle for the air in the air. 
This represents a dramatic change from the fi rst fi ve-plus decades of the China-
Taiwan confrontation.”3
An unclassifi ed Defense Intelligence Agency report assessing the state of Tai-
wan’s air defenses raises similar concerns. The study notes that Taiwanese fi ghter 
aircraft would be unable to take to the air in the absence of well-protected airfi eld 
runways, suggesting a major vulnerability to the island’s airpower. The agency 
further maintains that Taiwan’s capacity to endure missile attacks on runways 
and to repair them rapidly will determine the integrity of the island’s air-defense 
system.4 While the report withholds judgment on whether Taipei can maintain 
air superiority following Chinese missile strikes in a confl ict scenario, a key con-
stituent of the U.S. intelligence community clearly recognizes a growing danger 
to Taiwan’s defense. 
China’s missiles also threaten Taiwan’s ability to defend itself at sea. William 
Murray contends that China could sink or severely damage many of Taiwan’s 
warships docked at naval piers with salvos of ballistic missiles. He argues that “the 
Second Artillery’s [China’s strategic missile command’s] expanding inventory of 
increasingly accurate [short-range ballistic missiles] probably allows Beijing to 
incapacitate much of Taiwan’s navy and to ground or destroy large portions of 
the air force in a surprise missile assault and follow-on barrages.”5 These are stark, 
sobering conclusions. 
Equally troubling is growing evidence that China has turned its attention to Ja-
pan, home to some of the largest naval and air bases in the world. Beijing has long 
worried about Tokyo’s potential role in a cross-strait confl agration. In particular, 
Chinese analysts chafe at the apparent American freedom to use the Japanese ar-
chipelago as a springboard to intervene in a Taiwan contingency. In the past, China 
kept silent on what the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would do in response to 
Japanese logistical support of U.S. military operations. Recent PLA publications, 
in contrast, suggest that the logic of missile coercion against Taiwan could be read-
ily applied to U.S. forward presence in Japan. The writings convey a high degree 
of confi dence that China’s missile forces could compel Tokyo to limit American 
use of naval bases while selectively destroying key facilities on those bases. These 
doctrinal developments demand close attention from Washington and Tokyo, lest 
the transpacifi c alliance be caught fl at-footed in a future crisis with Beijing. This 
article is a fi rst step toward better understanding how the Chinese evaluate the ef-
fi cacy of missile coercion against American military targets in Japan. 
This article focuses narrowly on Chinese assessments of U.S. naval bases in 
Japan, excluding the literature on such other key locations as the Kadena and 
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Misawa air bases. The writings on the American naval presence are abundant and 
far more extensive than studies on the land and air components of U.S. basing ar-
rangements. The dispatch of two carrier battle groups to Taiwan’s vicinity during 
the 1996 cross-strait crisis stimulated Beijing’s reevaluation of its military strat-
egy toward the island. Not surprisingly, the Chinese are obsessed with the U.S. 
aircraft carrier, including the facilities and bases that support its operations. It is 
against this rich milieu that this study explores how the Chinese conceive their 
missile strategy to complicate American use of military bases along the Japanese 
archipelago. 
This article fi rst explores the reasons behind Beijing’s interest in regional bases 
and surveys the Chinese literature on the U.S. naval presence in Japan to illus-
trate the amount of attention being devoted to the structure of American mili-
tary power in Asia. Chinese analysts see U.S. dependence on a few locations for 
power projection as a major vulnerability. Second, it turns to Chinese doctrinal 
publications, which furnish astonishing details as to how the PLA might employ 
ballistic missiles to complicate or deny U.S. use of Japanese port facilities. Chi-
nese defense planners place substantial faith in the coercive value of missile tac-
tics. Third, the article assesses China’s conventional theater ballistic missiles that 
would be employed against U.S. regional bases. Fourth, it critiques the Chinese 
writings, highlighting some faulty assumptions about the anticipated effects of 
missile coercion. Finally, the study identifi es some key operational dilemmas that 
the U.S.-Japanese alliance would likely encounter in a PLA missile campaign. 
EXPLAINING CHINA’S INTEREST IN REGIONAL BASES
Taiwan remains the animating force behind China’s strategic calculus with respect 
to regional bases in Asia. Beijing’s inability to respond to the display of U.S. naval 
power at the height of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis proved highly embarrassing. 
There is evidence that the PLA had diffi culty in monitoring the movement of the 
two carrier battle groups, much less in offering its civilian leaders credible mili-
tary options in response to the carrier presence. This galling experience steeled 
Beijing’s resolve to preclude U.S. naval deployments near Taiwan in a future crisis. 
Notably, the Yokosuka-based USS Independence (CV 62) was the fi rst carrier to 
arrive at the scene in March 1996, cementing Chinese expectations that Washing-
ton would dispatch a carrier from Japan in a contingency over Taiwan.
Beyond Taiwan, other territorial disputes along China’s nautical periphery 
could involve U.S. naval intervention. A military crisis arising from confl icting 
Sino-Japanese claims over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands northwest of Taiwan 
could compel an American reaction. While doubts linger in some Japanese policy 
circles as to whether foreign aggression against the islands would trigger Wash-
ington’s defense commitments as stipulated by the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, 
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joint allied exercises and war games since 2006 suggest that the U.S. military is 
closely watching events in the East China Sea. Farther south, Chinese territorial 
claims over large swaths of the South China Sea could also be sources of regional 
tensions. If a local tussle there escalated into a larger confl agration that threatened 
international shipping, the U.S. Navy might be ordered to maintain freedom of 
navigation. In both scenarios, the U.S. carrier based in Japan and other strike 
groups operating near Asian waters would be called upon as fi rst responders.
Concrete territorial disputes that have roiled Asian stability are not the only 
reasons that American naval power would sortie from regional bases to the detri-
ment of Chinese interests. More abstract and esoteric dynamics may be at work. 
For example, Chinese leaders fret about the so-called Malacca dilemma. China’s 
heavy dependence on seaborne energy supplies that transit the Malacca Strait has 
set off Chinese speculation that the United States might seek to blockade that 
maritime choke point to coerce Beijing.6 This insecurity stems less from judg-
ments about the possibility or feasibility of such a naval blockade than from the 
belief that a great power like China should not entrust its energy security to the 
fi ckle goodwill of the United States. If the U.S. Navy were ever called upon to 
fulfi ll an undertaking of such magnitude, forward basing in Asia would undoubt-
edly play a pivotal role in sustaining what could deteriorate into a protracted 
blockade operation.
Chinese analysts have also expressed a broader dissatisfaction with America’s 
self-appointed role as the guardian of the seas. Sea-power advocates have vigor-
ously pushed for a more expansive view of China’s prerogatives along the mari-
time periphery of the mainland. They bristle at the U.S. Navy’s apparent pre-
sumption of the right to command any parcel of the ocean on earth, including 
areas that China considers its own nautical preserves. Some take issue with the 
2007 U.S. maritime strategy, a policy document that baldly states, “We will be able 
to impose local sea control wherever necessary, ideally in concert with friends 
and allies, but by ourselves if we must.”7 Lu Rude, a former professor at Dalian 
Naval Academy, cites this passage as evidence of U.S. “hegemonic thinking.” He 
concludes, “Clearly, what is behind ‘cooperation’ is America’s interests, having 
‘partners or the participation of allies’ likewise serves America’s global interests.”8 
Some Chinese, then, object to the very purpose of U.S. sea power in Asia, which 
relies on a constellation of regional bases for its effects to be felt (see map).  
Long-standing regional fl ash points and domestic expectations of a more as-
sertive China as it goes to sea suggest that Beijing’s grudging acceptance of U.S. 
forward presence could be eroding even more quickly than once thought. Against 
this backdrop of increasing Chinese ambivalence toward American naval power, 
U.S. basing arrangements in Japan have come into sharper focus. 
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CHINESE VIEWS OF U.S. 
NAVAL BASES IN JAPAN
Some Chinese strategists appraise 
Washington’s military posture in 
the Asia-Pacifi c region in stark 
geopolitical terms. Applying the 
“defense perimeter of the Pacifi c” 
logic elaborated by Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson in the early 
Cold War, they see their na -
tion enclosed by concentric, lay-
ered “island chains.” The United 
States and its allies, they argue, 
can encircle China or blockade 
the Chinese mainland from is-
land strongholds, where power-
ful naval expeditionary forces are 
based. Analysts who take such a 
view conceive of the island chains 
in various ways. 
Yu Yang and Qi Xiaodong, for 
example, describe U.S. basing ar-
chitecture in Asia as a “three line 
confi guration [三线配置].”9 The 
fi rst line stretches in a sweeping 
arc from Japan and South Korea to 
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, 
forming a “zone of forward bases[前沿基地带].” This broad notion that the 
U.S. presence in the western Pacifi c and the Indian Ocean constitutes a seamless, 
interlocking set of bases is widely shared in Chinese strategic circles.10 The second 
line connects Guam and Australia. The last line of bases runs north from Hawaii 
through Midway to the Aleutians, terminating at Alaska. While these island chains 
may bear little resemblance to actual U.S. thinking and planning, that the Chinese 
pay such attention to the geographic structure of American power in Asia is quite 
notable. These observers discern a cluster of mutually supporting bases, ports, 
and access points along these island chains. Among the networks of bases in the 
western Pacifi c, those located on the Japanese archipelago—the northern anchor 
of the fi rst island chain—stand out, for the Chinese. Modern Navy, a monthly 
journal published by the Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army 
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Navy, produced a seven-part series on Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force in 
2004 and 2005. Notably, it devoted an entire article to Japan’s main naval bases, 
including Yokosuka, Sasebo, Kure, and Maizuru.11 The depth of the coverage of 
these bases is rather remarkable, especially when compared to the sparse report-
ing on similar topics in the United States and in Japan. 
Perhaps no other place captures the Chinese imagination as much as Yokosu-
ka, which analysts portray as the centerpiece of U.S. basing in Asia.12 One analy-
sis depicts a “Northeast Asian base group [东北亚基地群]” radiating outward 
from Yokosuka to Sasebo, Pusan, and Chinhae.13 Writers provide a wide range 
of details about the Yokosuka naval base, including its precise location, the sur-
rounding geography, the number of piers (particularly those suitable for aircraft 
carriers), the types and number of maintenance facilities, and the storage capac-
ity of munitions, fuel, and other supply depots.14 Wu Jian, for instance, fi nds the 
geographic features of Yokosuka comparable to those of Dalian, a major base of 
the Chinese navy’s North Sea Fleet.15 
Beyond physical similarities, Yokosuka evokes unpleasant memories for the 
Chinese. One commentator recalls the U.S. transfer of 203 mm heavy artillery 
from Yokosuka to Nationalist forces on Jinmen during the 1958 Taiwan Strait 
crisis.16 Tracking more recent events, another observer notes that the Kitty Hawk 
Strike Group’s deployments from Yokosuka to waters near Taiwan invariably co-
incided with the presidential elections on the island, in 2000, 2004, and 2008.17 
As Pei Huai opines, “Yokosuka has all along irritated the nerves of the Chinese 
people.”18 Moreover, Chinese analysts are keenly aware of Yokosuka’s strategic po-
sition. As Du Chaoping asserts: 
Yokosuka is the U.S. Navy’s main strategic point of concentration and deployment in 
the Far East and is the ideal American stronghold for employing maritime forces in 
the Western Pacifi c and the Indian Ocean regions. A carrier deployed there is akin to 
the sharpest dagger sheathed in the Western Pacifi c by the U.S. Navy. It can control 
the East Asian mainland to the west and it can enter the Indian Ocean to the south-
west to secure Malacca, Hormuz, and other important thoroughfares.19
Ma Haiyang concurs:
The Yokosuka base controls the three straits of Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima and the sea 
and air transit routes in the Indian Ocean. As the key link in the “island chain,” it 
can support ground operations on the Korean Peninsula and naval operations in the 
Western Pacifi c. It can support combat in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions 
while monitoring and controlling the wide sea areas of the Indian Ocean. Its strategic 
position is extremely important.20
It is notable that both Du and Ma conceive of Yokosuka as a central hub that tight-
ly links the Pacifi c and Indian oceans into an integrated theater of operations. 
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Intriguingly, some Chinese commentators view Yokosuka as the front line of 
the U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation on missile defense. They worry that Aegis-
equipped destroyers armed with ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) systems based 
in Yokosuka could erode China’s nuclear deterrent. Indeed, analysts see concen-
trations of sea-based BMD capabilities falling roughly along the three island 
chains described above. Ren Dexin describes Yokosuka as the fi rst line of defense 
against ballistic missiles, while Pearl Harbor and San Diego provide additional 
layers.21 Yokosuka is evocatively portrayed as the “forward battlefi eld position” 
(前沿阵地), the indispensable vanguard for the sea-based BMD architecture.22 
For some Chinese, these concentric rings or picket lines of sea power appear tai-
lored specifi cally to bring down ballistic missiles fi red across the Pacifi c from lo-
cations as diverse as the Korean Peninsula, mainland China, India, or even Iran.23 
Specifi cally, Aegis ships in Yokosuka, Pearl Harbor, and San Diego would be po-
sitioned to shoot down missiles in their boost, midcourse, and terminal phases, 
respectively.24 
Chinese observers pay special attention to Aegis deployments along the fi rst is-
land chain. Some believe that Aegis ships operating in the Yellow, East, and South 
China seas would be able to monitor the launch of any long-range ballistic mis-
sile deployed in China’s interior and perhaps to intercept the vehicle in its boost 
phase. Dai Yanli warns, “Clearly, if Aegis systems are successfully deployed around 
China’s periphery, then there is the possibility that China’s ballistic missiles would 
be destroyed over their launch points.”25 Ji Yanli, of the Beijing Aerospace Long 
March Scientifi c and Technical Information Institute, concurs: “If such [sea-
based BMD] systems begin deployment in areas such as Japan or Taiwan, the 
effectiveness of China’s strategic power and theater ballistic-missile capabilities 
would weaken tremendously, severely threatening national security.”26 Somewhat 
problematically, the authors seemingly assume that Beijing would risk its strate-
gic forces by deploying them closer to shore, and they forecast a far more capable 
Aegis fl eet than is technically possible in the near term. 
The indispensability of the ship-repair and maintenance facilities at Yoko-
suka emerges as another common theme in the Chinese literature. Analysts in 
China often note that Yokosuka is the only base west of Hawaii that possesses the 
wherewithal to handle major carrier repairs. Some have concluded that Yoko-
suka is irreplaceable as long as alternative sites for a large repair station remain 
unavailable. Li Daguang, a professor at China’s National Defense University and 
a frequent commentator on naval affairs, casts doubt on Guam as a potential can-
didate, observing that the island lacks the basic infrastructure and economies of 
scale to service carriers.27 China’s Jianchuan Zhishi (Naval and Merchant Ships) 
published a translated article from a Japanese military journal, Gunji Kenkyu 
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(Japan Military Review), to illustrate the physical limits of Guam as a permanent 
home port for carriers.28 
Chinese analysts also closely examine Sasebo, the second-largest naval base 
in Japan. Various commentators call attention to its strategic position near key 
sea-lanes and its proximity to China.29 As Yu Fan notes, “This base is a large-scale 
naval base closest to our country. Positioned at the intersection of the Yellow Sea, 
the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan, it guards the southern mouth of the 
Korea Strait. This has very important implications for controlling the nexus of 
the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan and for blockading the 
Korea Strait.”30 
It is clear, then, that Chinese strategists recognize the importance of U.S. naval 
bases in Japan for fulfi lling a range of regional and extraregional responsibilities. 
Indeed, some believe that the American strategic position in Asia hinges entirely 
on ready military access to bases on the Japanese islands. Tian Wu argues that 
without bases in Japan, U.S. forces would have to fall back to Guam or Hawaii. 
Tian bluntly asserts:
If the U.S. military was ever forced to withdraw from Okinawa and Japan, then it 
would be compelled to retreat thousands of kilometers to set up defenses on the sec-
ond island chain. Not only would it lose tremendous strategic defensive depth, but it 
would also lose the advantageous conditions for conducting littoral operations along 
the East Asian mainland while losing an important strategic relay station to support 
operations in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East through the South China Sea.31
This emerging discourse offers several clues about Beijing’s calculus in regard 
to U.S. naval basing arrangements in Japan. Chinese strategists see these bases as 
collectively representing both a threat to Chinese interests and a critical vulner-
ability for the United States. Bases in Japan are the most likely locations from 
which the United States would sortie sea power in response to a contingency over 
Taiwan. At the same time, the Chinese are acutely aware of the apparent Ameri-
can dependence on a few bases to project power. Should access to and use of 
these bases be denied for political or military reasons, they reason, Washington’s 
regional strategy could quickly unravel. While the commentaries documented 
above are by no means authoritative in the offi cial sense, they are clearly designed 
to underscore the strategic value and the precariousness of U.S. forward presence 
in Japan. 
U.S. BASES IN JAPAN AND CHINESE MISSILE STRATEGY
Authoritative PLA documents correlate with this emerging consensus that U.S. 
bases on the Japanese home islands merit close attention in strategic and opera-
tional terms. Indeed, Chinese doctrinal writings clearly indicate that the American 
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presence in Japan would likely be the subject of attack if the United States were 
to intervene in a cross-strait confl ict. The unprecedented public availability of 
primary sources in China in recent years has opened a window onto Chinese 
strategic thought, revealing a genuinely competitive intellectual environment 
that has substantially advanced Chinese debates on military affairs. This growing 
literature has also improved the West’s understanding of the PLA. 
In an effort to maximize this new openness in China, this article draws upon 
publications closely affi liated with the PLA, including those of the prestigious 
Academy of Military Science and the National Defense University, that address 
coercive campaigns against regional bases in Asia.32 Some are widely cited among 
Western military analysts as authoritative works that refl ect current PLA thinking. 
Some likely enjoy offi cial sanction as doctrinal guidance or educational material 
for senior military commanders. The authors of the studies are high-ranking PLA 
offi cers who are either leading thinkers in strategic affairs and military operations 
or boast substantial operational and command experience. These works, then, 
collectively provide a sound starting point for examining how regional bases in 
Asia might fi t into Chinese war planning. 
Among this literature, The Science of Military Strategy stands out in Western 
strategic circles as an authoritative PLA publication. The authors, Peng Guangqian 
and Yao Youzhi, advocate an indirect approach to fi ghting and prevailing against 
a superior adversary in “future local wars under high-technology conditions.”33 
To win, the PLA must seek to avoid or bypass the powerful fi eld forces of the ene-
my while attacking directly the vulnerable rear echelons and command structures 
that support frontline units. Using the human body as an evocative metaphor for 
the adversary, Peng and Yao argue, “As compared with dismembering the enemy’s 
body step by step, destroying his brain and central nerve system is more meaning-
ful for speeding up the course of the war.”34 To them, the brain and the central 
nervous system of a war machine are those principal directing and coordinating 
elements without which the fi ghting forces wither or collapse. 
The aim, then, is to conduct offensive operations against the primary sources 
of the enemy’s military power, what the authors term the “operational system.” 
They declare, “After launching the war, we should try our best to fi ght against 
the enemy as far away as possible, to lead the war to enemy’s operational base, 
even to his source of war, and to actively strike all the effective strength forming 
the enemy’s war system.”35 In their view, operational systems that manage com-
mand and control and logistics (satellites, bases, etc.), are the primary targets; 
they relegate tactical platforms that deliver fi repower (warships, fi ghters, etc.) to 
a secondary status. To illustrate the effects of striking the source of the enemy’s 
fi ghting power, Peng and Yao further argue:
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To shake the stability of enemy’s war system so as to paralyze his war capabilities has 
already become the core of the contest between the two sides in the modern high-
tech local war. So, more attention should be paid to striking crushing blows against 
the enemy’s structure of the operational system . . . especially those vulnerable points 
which are not easy to be replaced or revived, so as to make the enemy’s operational 
system seriously unbalanced and lose initiative in uncontrollable disorder.36
The authors are remarkably candid about what constitutes the enemy’s opera-
tional system. Particularly relevant to this study is their assertion that the supply 
system emerges as a primary target: 
The future operational center of gravity should not be placed on the direct confron-
tation with the enemy’s assault systems. We should persist in taking the information 
system and support system as the targets of fi rst choice throughout. . . . In regard to the 
supply system, we should try our best to strike the enemy on the ground, cut the 
material fl ow of his effi cacy sources so as to achieve the effect of taking away the 
fi rewood from the caldron.37 
Destruction of the supply system in effect asphyxiates the adversary. In order 
to choke off the enemy’s capacity to wage war, Peng and Yao contend, a “large part 
of the supply systems must be destroyed.”38 Their prescriptions for winning local 
high-tech wars suggest that the horizontal escalation of a confl ict to U.S. regional 
bases in Asia is entirely thinkable. Even more troubling, some Chinese appear 
to envision the application of substantial fi repower to pummel the U.S. forward 
presence. While The Science of Military Strategy should not be treated as offi cial 
strategic guidance to the PLA, its conceptions of future confl ict with a techno-
logically superior adversary provide a useful framework for thinking about what 
a Chinese missile campaign against regional bases might entail. 
There is substantial evidence in Chinese doctrinal writings that PLA defense 
planners anticipate the possibility of a sizable geographic expansion of the target 
set, to include U.S. forward presence in East Asia. Although the documents do not 
explicitly refer to naval bases in Japan, they depict scenarios strongly suggesting 
that Yokosuka is a primary target. In the hypothetical contingencies posited in 
these writings, U.S. intervention is a critical premise, if not a given. In particular, 
Chinese planners expect Washington to order the deployment of carrier strike 
groups near China’s coast, a prospect that deeply vexes Beijing. It is in this con-
text of a highly stressful (though by no means inconceivable) scenario that U.S. 
military bases come into play in Chinese operational thinking.
For PLA planners, the primary aims are to deter, disrupt, or disable the em-
ployment of carriers at the point of origin, namely, the bases from which carriers 
would sortie. Given the limited capability, range, and survivability of China’s air 
and sea power, most studies foresee the extensive use of long-range conventional 
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ballistic missiles to achieve key operational objectives against U.S. forward pres-
ence. In Intimidation Warfare, Zhao Xijun proposes several novel missile tactics 
that could be employed to deter the use of naval bases in times of crisis or war.39 
Zhao proposes demonstration shots into sea areas near the enemy state to compel 
the opponent to back down. Zhao explains, “Close-in (near border) intimidation 
strikes involve fi ring ballistic missiles near enemy vessels or enemy states (or in 
areas and sea areas of enemy-occupied islands). It is a method designed to induce 
the enemy to feel that it would suffer an unbearable setback if it stubbornly pur-
sues an objective, and thus abandons certain actions.”40 
One tactic that Zhao calls a “pincer, close-in intimidation strike” is particularly 
relevant to missile options against U.S. military bases. Zhao elaborates: “Pincer 
close-in intimidation strikes entail the fi ring of ballistic missiles into the sea areas 
(or land areas) near at least two important targets on enemy-occupied islands (or 
in enemy states). This enveloping attack, striking the enemy’s head and tail such 
that the enemy’s attention is pulled in both directions, would generate tremen-
dous psychological shock.”41 Zhao also proposes an “island over-fl ight attack” as 
a variation of the pincer strike. He states:
For high-intensity intimidation against an entrenched enemy on an island, an island 
over-fl ight attack employs conventional ballistic missiles with longer range and 
superior penetration capabilities to pass over the enemy’s important cities and other 
strategic targets to induce the enemy to sense psychologically that a calamity will 
descend from the sky. This method could produce unexpected effects.42 
While these missile tactics are primarily aimed at coercing Taiwan, they could 
also, in theory, be applied to any island nation. Reminiscent of the 1996 cross-
strait crisis, the PLA could splash single or multiple ballistic missiles into waters 
near Yokosuka (shot across Honshu Island, over major metropolitan cities) in the 
hopes that an intimidated leadership in Tokyo would stay out of a contingency 
over Taiwan, deny American access to military facilities, or restrict U.S. use of 
naval bases in Japan. 
Should deterrence through intimidation fail, the Chinese may seek to compli-
cate U.S. naval operations originating from bases located in the Japanese home 
islands. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, the most authoritative work 
on the PLA’s strategic rocket forces, furnishes astonishingly vivid details on the 
conditions under which China might seek to conduct conventional missile oper-
ations against outside intervention.43 Notably, the document explores “fi repower 
harassment” as a potentially effective tactic to resist external interference. Given 
its explicit references to the U.S. use of military bases on foreign soil, a passage on 
harassment strikes is worth quoting in its entirety:
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When the powerful enemy uses allied military bases in our periphery and aircraft 
carriers as aircraft launch platforms to implement various forms of military interven-
tion; and when the powerful enemy’s allied military bases around our periphery are 
beyond our air arm’s fi ring range, and when the carrier battle groups are far away 
from our shores, thus making it diffi cult to carry out the overall operational advan-
tages associated with fi repower coordination among the armed services and service 
arms, conventional missiles can be used to implement harassment strikes against the 
military bases of the enemy’s allies around our periphery as well as the carrier battle 
groups.44
In other words, PLA planners intend to assign long-range strike missions to 
the ballistic missile force if warships, bombers, and submarines prove unable 
to reach enemy bases. Since U.S. bases in South Korea are well within reach of 
China’s short-range ballistic missiles, shore-based aircraft, surface combatants, 
and undersea fl eet, the “allied military bases” to which the study refers can only 
be those located in Japan. For the authors, harassment strikes might involve peri-
odic missile launches into “no go” zones erected near the naval bases, in order to 
“block the points of entry and exit to important enemy ports,” or they might en-
tail direct attacks against “key targets within the enemy ports, such as fueling and 
fuel loading facilities, and logistical supply facilities.”45 Such operations would be 
intended to disrupt seriously the resupply and movement of U.S. naval forces.
Beyond selective attacks, some Chinese analysts advocate highly destructive 
operations against U.S. military bases. In a study on the PLA’s blockade operations 
against Taiwan, Chinese defense planners entertain the possibility of signifi cant 
vertical and horizontal escalation to defeat U.S. intervention. The authors call for 
“opportune counterattacks” to defeat a carrier strike group engaged in combat 
operations against Chinese targets at sea, in the air, or on the mainland coast. In 
such a scenario, the PLA would do everything it could to successively weaken, 
isolate, and ultimately sink the carrier. In addition to lethal strikes against aircraft 
carriers, the authors envision concerted efforts to infl ict massive damage on the 
military bases supporting carrier operations. According to Zhu Aihua and Sun 
Longhai, “To punish the external enemy and to accommodate world opinion, it 
is not enough to sink the external enemy’s aircraft carrier. . . . It is necessary to 
destroy the springboard of combat operations, to pulverize the operational bases, 
to cut off the enemy’s retreat . . . in order to render obsolete hegemonism and 
power politics.”46 
It is clear, then, that Chinese strategists have systematically examined the strat-
egies, doctrines, and operational concepts for dissuading, disrupting, and deny-
ing the use of U.S. military bases along China’s periphery. These studies suggest 
that the PLA is prepared to calibrate the scale and magnitude of its military exer-
tions against American forward bases across a spectrum that includes deterrence, 
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compellance, and high-intensity confl ict. It is equally evident that an extension of 
missile operations to the Japanese homeland is well within the bounds of Chinese 
planning. Should circumstances warrant, the PLA may not hesitate to escalate a 
crisis or confl ict radically with missile salvos directed at Japan, to demonstrate 
political resolve, preclude Japanese involvement, or unhinge U.S. intervention.
U.S. BASES IN JAPAN AND CHINESE MISSILES 
A decade ago, Western analysts would have been on fi rm ground in dismissing 
such Chinese discussions about crippling U.S. regional bases as entirely wishful 
or even illusory. Indeed, they would have been justifi ed in questioning Beijing’s 
operational capacity to target U.S. bases in Japan even if it had possessed the will 
to do so. China simply could not have pulled off long-range, nonnuclear strikes 
beyond Taiwan. However, recent technical developments in the PLA’s ballistic-
missile forces suggest that China is already in a position to fulfi ll at least the more 
limited missions elaborated above. If the pace of Chinese missile acquisitions 
continues, over the next decade Beijing will likely boast a formidable arsenal to 
shape events along the entire fi rst island chain.
The Pentagon’s latest annual report to Congress on Chinese military power 
confi rms the doctrinal writings surveyed in this study. According to the Depart-
ment of Defense,
PRC military analysts have also concluded that logistics and mobilization are poten-
tial vulnerabilities in modern warfare, given the requirements for precision in coordi-
nating transportation, communications, and logistics networks. To threaten regional 
bases, logistics, and support infrastructure, China could employ SRBM/MRBMs 
[short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles], ground-launched LACMs 
[land-attack cruise missiles], special operations forces, and computer network attack 
(CNA).47
The report identifi es the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile as an operational 
weapon system that could reach any location along the Japanese archipelago. 
Concurring, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center states that “China is 
. . . acquiring new conventionally-armed MRBMs to conduct precision strikes at 
longer ranges. These systems are likely intended to hold at risk, or strike, logistics 
nodes and regional military bases including airfi elds and ports.”48
The exact size of the DF-21 force is not known in the public realm. The Pen-
tagon estimates that there are sixty to eighty DF-21 missiles and from seventy to 
ninety associated launchers in the PLA’s inventory.49 (The document does not 
distinguish between missiles armed with nuclear and conventional warheads.) 
The 2007 issue reports forty to fi fty missiles and between thirty-four and thirty-
eight launchers; the most recent report, therefore, represents a roughly 30 percent 
increase in two years.50 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat counts conventional 
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DF-21 launchers as numbering fewer than thirty.51 The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies claims that thirty-six nonnuclear DF-21s are deployed, in two 
brigades.52 Interestingly, this fi gure is a new entry in the 2010 issue of The Mili-
tary Balance; the previous tally lists only the nuclear variant, suggesting a much 
more rapid expansion of the conventional version than previously thought. Since 
the missile’s debut in the 1980s, the PLA has improved its accuracy, extended its 
range, and diversifi ed the types of warheads it can carry.53 This emerging arsenal 
will likely play an important role in holding at risk or attacking U.S. regional 
bases.54 
Several intervening factors are likely to infl uence the future size of the DF-21 
inventory. First, China needs to build an arsenal large enough to overwhelm the 
ballistic-missile defenses fi elded by the U.S.-Japanese alliance. As noted above, 
some Chinese analysts forecast a capable sea-based BMD system that could inter-
cept theater ballistic missiles. Chinese strategists would almost certainly have to 
take into account some level of attrition arising from successful missile intercep-
tions. Second, some of the more destructive coercive options could trigger U.S. 
horizontal escalation, including conventional counterforce strikes against Chi-
nese missile brigades on the mainland. Thus, strategists in Beijing must antici-
pate potentially severe losses should the United States expand its target set. These 
numerical factors suggest that the Second Artillery Corps will almost certainly 
need a much larger DF-21 missile force to engage in the types of high-intensity 
operations outlined in the doctrinal writings. 
Observers may object that capabilities do not refl ect intent. In other words, 
missile range, accuracy, payload, and force size by themselves constitute insuf-
fi cient evidence of exactly what Beijing plans to hit. Some may even fi nd it im-
plausible that China would attack a staunchly anti-nuclear-weapons state bound 
by a pacifi st constitution, even if some of its real estate is occupied by a foreign 
military power. Nevertheless, the historical pattern of Chinese missile deploy-
ments since the Cold War suggests that U.S. bases in Japan have always been pri-
mary targets for nuclear strikes. In the 1960s the PLA extended the range of its 
fi rst operational nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, the DF-2, to ensure that it could 
reach all American bases in Japan. Beijing deployed the follow-on missile, the DF-
3, near the North Korean border to cover targets on the Japanese home islands 
and Okinawa. If China had always intended to violate its negative security assur-
ances—that is, pledges not to attack nonnuclear third parties—with city-busting 
warheads, it should not be surprising that Beijing would fi eld conventional mis-
siles for use against Japanese territory. Indeed, the DF-21 may represent a far 
less “blunt” instrument than its predecessors did and offer a somewhat “surgical” 
option to Chinese defense planners.55 
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINESE MISSILE DOCTRINE
There are compelling reasons for the Chinese to consider vertical and horizontal 
escalation in coercive campaigns against regional bases in Asia. At the same time, 
the PLA’s missile force appears poised to extend its reach far beyond China’s im-
mediate periphery. The alignment of Chinese aspirations and capabilities will 
complicate crisis management and stability, escalation control, and war termina-
tion in the event of confl ict. The gaps in Chinese doctrinal writings offer reasons 
to worry about these complications. 
First, Chinese analysts seldom consider the mechanisms or chain of events that 
link the use of precision fi re with the intended operational effects the PLA hopes 
to achieve. Most discussions assume or assert with certitude that the employment 
of certain missile tactics would induce a predictable set of American responses. 
But closer examination suggests that strategists may have underrated the ability 
of U.S. naval forces to sustain operations under severe duress, thus oversimplify-
ing the action-reaction dynamic. For example, the wholesale destruction of fuel 
depots and logistical facilities would not likely have a direct or immediate impact 
on a carrier strike group either en route to or actively operating in a combat 
zone. The U.S. Navy could surge additional carriers into the theater of operations 
and rush at-sea-replenishment vessels from Guam, Hawaii, and San Diego to the 
scene. Such work-arounds would cushion a devastating blow against logistical fa-
cilities in Japan, enabling U.S. operations to continue unimpeded. Indeed, many 
frontline units would not feel the effects of infrastructure damage in Yokosuka 
or Sasebo for many weeks. In this scenario, China would likely have to settle in 
for a more protracted struggle. This potential outcome runs directly counter to 
the PLA’s long-standing preference for quick, decisive victories at the operational 
level of war.
Second, doctrinal publications exhort PLA commanders to maintain an of-
fensive spirit and to seize the initiative in the opening stages of a military cam-
paign. Indeed, Chinese analysts insist that China should make the fi rst move in 
any confl ict. A crushing initial blow would throw the enemy off balance, enabling 
the PLA to dictate the tempo of the war. As the Science of Second Artillery Cam-
paigns asserts,
To “strike the enemy at the fi rst opportunity” mainly refers to the need for the Second 
Artillery conventional missile force to act before the enemy, take the enemy by sur-
prise, and attack the enemy when it is unprepared during its operational activities. It 
should be used fi rst during the initial phase or at a certain stage of the campaign. . . . 
Therefore, in terms of campaign planning, it is necessary to launch attack before the 
enemy, strike fi rst, and maintain the offensive intensity until the victorious conclu-
sion of the campaign.56 
Yoshihara.indd   53 5/11/2010   8:34:57 AM
59
War College: Summer 2010 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
 54 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
More troubling, Chinese strategists foresee the preemptive use of conventional 
ballistic missiles against the enemy’s rear areas: 
Using its advantages of concealment and surprise, active and intelligent response, and 
powerful penetration capability the missile force implements preemptive strike against 
the enemy’s important in-depth targets. . . . Therefore, speedily striking the enemy, 
striving to seize the initiative, and avoiding losses are issues with which the campaign 
commander must fi rst be concerned. It is necessary to strike the enemy at the fi rst 
opportunity, before the enemy has discovered our campaign intentions and actions, sur-
prise the enemy, act before the enemy, strike rapidly, catch the enemy by surprise.57 
Given these operational parameters, the Chinese might conduct a bolt-from-
the-blue missile strike against vulnerable carriers and warships anchored and at 
pierside to knock out the U.S. Navy.58 An attack on a fl eet in port would be akin to 
strikes against fi xed targets. The impact—in terms of vessels sunk or damaged—
would be direct, immediate, and relatively easy to measure. The Imperial Japa-
nese Navy’s surprise attacks against the Russian fl eet at Port Arthur and the U.S. 
Pacifi c fl eet at Pearl Harbor illustrate the logic of such a bold move. 
From a strictly operational perspective, preemption is highly effi cacious. At the 
same time, Chinese planners acknowledge the need to balance tactical advantages 
against the potential international backlash arising from foreign perceptions that 
China had launched an unprovoked attack. PLA writings are acutely attuned to 
such moral and reputational considerations. Yet they offer no concrete guidance 
as to how to reconcile the emphasis on striking fi rst with the broader strategic 
factors that would likely hold back policy makers in Beijing, the fi nal arbiters 
of the weighty decision to order a surprise attack. This tension between opera-
tional expediency and political imperatives is left unresolved. A policy/strategy 
mismatch looms. 
It is entirely conceivable that even at the height of a major crisis Chinese de-
cision makers might recoil from the missile options presented to them. They 
could very well reject preemption out of hand as overly incendiary and politically 
counterproductive. A precedent in Sino-U.S. Cold War history is illustrative. Dur-
ing the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, American civilian leaders rejected the military’s 
planned nuclear riposte to Chinese provocations, on the grounds that massive 
retaliation was out of proportion to the confrontation at hand. President Dwight 
Eisenhower fi rmly declined to consider recommendations by the Pacifi c Air Force 
to order tactical nuclear strikes against Chinese troops massed near Xiamen.59 
Whether PLA commanders are suffi ciently attuned to national policy to antici-
pate similar civilian pushback or to appreciate the political rationales for restraint 
is unclear. 
Third, escalation control will be a severe challenge for Beijing. Chinese writ-
ings exhibit an awareness of escalation problems associated with missile coercion. 
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Analysts worry that misapplication of missile tactics could dramatically reshape 
the dynamics of the war, provoking greater exertions by the intervening power 
while widening the confl ict, drawing in additional third parties. As Zhao Xijun 
warns, “In conducting close-in intimidation strikes, one must maintain a cer-
tain distance from the enemy’s border (sea area) line and select highly accurate 
missiles to prevent them from falling into enemy territory (or enemy occupied 
islands) or directly hitting the enemy’s aircraft carrier owing to imprecision or 
loss of fl ight control.”60
Zhao acknowledges that accidents or miscalculations that cross the bounds 
of intimidation could transform the nature of the confl ict, to China’s detriment. 
Suffering direct harm could harden an enemy’s resolve substantially, immuniz-
ing him against subsequent attempts at intimidation. Concurring, The Science of 
Second Artillery Campaigns cautions, “Commanders should cautiously make de-
cisions, choose the appropriate opportunities, select high-precision missiles for 
precision strikes against key targets, and prevent missile fi repower from deviating 
from the targets and giving others the excuse to permit the third country’s par-
ticipation in the military intervention.”61 An errant ballistic missile destined for 
the Yokosuka naval base could very well plummet into densely populated civilian 
areas surrounding the base or a major city along its fl ight path. It is conceivable 
that an aggrieved Japan would punish China by refusing to limit (or even agree-
ing to expand) U.S. access to military bases on the home islands. Indeed, contin-
ued Japanese acquiescence to American use of military facilities might be enough 
to foil China’s strategy. 
But Beijing faces even more daunting challenges than the writings let on. Chi-
nese defense planners seem to assume that the Japanese leadership and the public 
would make a clear, objective distinction between targeted attacks against strictly 
military installations and wanton strikes against civilian population centers. Mis-
sile launches against Yokosuka would be an act of foreign aggression against the 
homeland unprecedented since the Second World War. It is hard to imagine the 
Japanese quibbling about the nature and intent of Chinese missile strikes under 
such circumstances; the strident Japanese response to North Korea’s Taepodong 
missile launch over the home islands in 1998 is a case in point. In other words, the 
escalatory pressures are far stronger than the Chinese writings assume. Intimida-
tion warfare will be neither clean nor straightforward. Indeed, it could unleash 
the forces of passion intrinsic to any war far beyond China’s control. 
More broadly, PLA planners seem excessively confi dent that certain missile 
tactics would accurately telegraph Beijing’s intentions. They assume that the pre-
cise application of fi repower could send clear, discrete signals to the adversary 
in times of crisis or war. A small dose of well-placed missiles, they seem to be-
lieve, might persuade the enemy to back down or to cease and desist. This line of 
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reasoning in part explains the counterintuitive logic that China could engage in 
escalation in order to compel its opponent to de-escalate. The logic is as beguiling 
as it is potentially misleading. Missiles are not fi nely tuned weapons for those on 
the receiving end. The adversary may perceive what is intended as a warning shot 
or demonstration of resolve as a prelude to an all-out attack and then overreact 
rather than pausing or acting with caution. The result for the Chinese could be 
unanticipated vertical or horizontal escalation, or both. 
Equally worrisome, operational interactions between Chinese and American 
forces could prove highly escalatory and destabilizing. As Evan Medeiros and co-
authors astutely observe, the operational doctrines on both sides share a procliv-
ity for seizing the initiative at the outset of a confl ict through surprise, speed, and 
attacks against enemy rear echelons. Medeiros further argues:
Neither body of doctrine appears to consider how an adversary might react to such 
operations in a limited war—indeed, each seems to assume that it will suppress 
enemy escalation by dominating the confl ict. Consequently a Sino-American con-
frontation would entail risks of inadvertent escalation if military forces were permit-
ted to operate in keeping with their doctrinal tenets without regard for escalation 
thresholds.62
It is clear, then, that an attack against regional bases is neither a trump card nor 
a substantially risk-free option. If plans go awry, as they always do in war, China 
could fi nd itself in a protracted confl ict against more than one implacable, well 
resourced enemy as intent as the Chinese upon achieving escalation dominance. 
Whether Beijing would fi nd the stakes over Taiwan or over another dispute suf-
fi ciently high to run such a risk is unclear. 
Disturbingly, however, Chinese writings suggest that some segments of the 
PLA are inclined to accept the repercussions of a coercive campaign against U.S. 
bases in Japan. What explains this cavalier attitude about escalation? First, these 
writings may be symptomatic of a broad underdevelopment in coercion and de-
terrence theory. Chinese strategic theoreticians may still be grappling with the 
power and options that long-range conventional missiles confer on China. Bei-
jing’s analytical efforts to harness new military capabilities hitherto unavailable to 
it may be analogous to the growing pains that U.S. strategic thought underwent 
in the early years of the nuclear revolution. Second, the absence of hard-won 
experience from modern warfare and crisis could account for optimism about 
escalation control. The Chinese have not fought a war for over thirty years, since 
the Sino-Vietnamese border confl ict. Moreover, China has not yet confronted 
sobering incidents (comparable to the Cuban missile crisis) against which to re-
assess and radically revise prevailing assumptions. In short, it is easy to succumb 
to logical fallacies when operating in a theoretical vacuum.
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Alternatively, Chinese overconfi dence in managing escalatory pressures could 
refl ect the lessons that defense planners learned from the cross-strait confron-
tation in 1996. Some analysts in China have unequivocally concluded that the 
missile tests deterred the island from the road to independence while signaling 
clear redlines to the United States.63 The notion that a limited number of missile 
launches could produce far-reaching success in coercive diplomacy is a seductive 
narrative likely to attract adherents within the Second Artillery Corps. Indeed, 
such an uncritical story line could reinforce preferences, biases, and faulty as-
sumptions underlying the discourse within the missile community. Troublingly, 
The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns explicitly credits the missile tests in 
1995 and 1996 for generating multiple studies that “have fi lled in a blank in con-
ventional guided missile operation theories of the Second Artillery Corps.”64 A 
sample set comprising one case study is hardly a basis for universally applicable 
principles of war. 
Finally, the writings themselves may be a form of peacetime signaling. The 
studies clearly communicate to foreign audiences China’s willingness to gam-
ble in a big way in high-stakes disputes. If the doctrinal works convince outside 
powers that China may just be reckless enough to carry out the implied threats, 
they will have effectively cast a shadow of deterrence over potential adversaries. 
Mao Zedong’s cunning efforts to deprecate the power of nuclear weapons—by 
famously depicting atom bombs as “paper tigers”—in order to signal Chinese 
resolve are instructive. 
Any combination of these reasons should give pause to those inclined to dis-
miss the strategic signifi cance of the doctrinal writings. 
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
U.S.-JAPANESE ALLIANCE
Washington and Tokyo will encounter a more complex geometry of deterrence 
with the emergence of a robust Chinese theater-strike capability. The action-
reaction dynamic in the United States–Japan–China triangle will be far less 
straightforward than that of the alliance’s deterrent posture toward North Ko-
rea. The existential threat that U.S. conventional and nuclear superiority poses to 
Pyongyang is often presumed to be suffi cient to deter the North’s adventurism. 
Such is not the case with China. Boasting an increasingly survivable retaliatory 
nuclear strike complex, including a growing road-mobile strategic missile force 
and a nascent undersea deterrent, Beijing may be confi dent enough to conduct 
theater-level conventional missile operations under its protective nuclear umbrel-
la. The war scares in the South Asian subcontinent over the past decade suggest 
that nuclear-armed regional powers, less inhibited by fears of enemy nuclear co-
ercion or punishment, may feel emboldened to escalate a conventional confl ict.65 
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Japan and its many lucrative basing targets could well become a conventional, 
theater-level battlefi eld trapped between two nuclear-armed powers. 
Assuming that vertical escalation toward nuclear use can be contained, the 
alliance must still consider efforts at denying attempts to punish Japan. Allied 
missile defenses, as they are currently confi gured, will have great diffi culty cop-
ing with theater ballistic missiles like the DF-21. In the context of a cross-strait 
scenario, retired rear admiral Eric McVadon observes, “Being an MRBM with a 
much higher reentry velocity than SRBMs, the DF-21C is virtually invulnerable 
to any missile defenses Taiwan might contemplate.”66 While the alliance possess-
es a far more sophisticated, multilayered missile defense architecture than does 
Taipei, longer-range missiles pose similar stresses to the defense of Japan. If the 
missiles were fi red from launch sites in northeastern China, allied response times 
would be very compressed. Inexpensive techniques and countermeasures by the 
PLA, such as saturation tactics and decoys, could be employed to overwhelm or 
defeat missile defenses, which are designed for less sophisticated regional threats 
from North Korea and Iran. If the Second Artillery Corps launched successive 
missile salvos against the same strategic site, the alliance could quickly exhaust its 
ammunition, constraining its ability to defend other targets. 
Escalation control would also bedevil the alliance. One critical escalation 
threshold pertains to the initiation of hostilities were China to prepare for or 
launch its fi rst missile strike. The allies would be very hard-pressed to distinguish 
confi dently conventional missiles from nuclear-tipped missiles. Indeed, fi nding 
the missiles at all would be hard enough, since the road-mobile DF-21s would 
almost certainly disperse to a variety of concealed launch sites to diminish the 
threat of a disarming preemptive strike by enemy forces. To compound matters, 
Chinese conventional missiles might share the basing facilities with their nuclear 
counterparts. Space-based surveillance and reconnaissance would provide at best 
an incomplete picture of China’s wartime missile posture. In short, no one would 
know for sure whether a Chinese warhead hurtling toward Yokosuka was a nucle-
ar or a conventional weapon. The fog and friction that accompany any crisis or 
war would multiply this uncertainty. 
Would the alliance be willing to discount the possibility that the launch could 
be a nuclear strike? Or would it assume the worst? In the event of Chinese con-
ventional bombardment, what would be the appropriate military response from 
the United States? What might underlie and inform Japanese expectations of the 
U.S. reaction? Would the alliance be prepared to expand the war to the mainland? 
Would a besieged Japan demand more punitive strikes against China than the 
United States would be willing to infl ict? Would Tokyo lose confi dence in Wash-
ington if the latter refrained from what it considered disproportionate escalation? 
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What would be the consequences of such a breakdown in trust during and after 
the confl ict? These troubling questions make it imperative that Tokyo and Wash-
ington clearly recognize the operational temptations to overreact and the political 
consequences of underreaction. Though prudence calls for restraint, the stresses 
of crisis and war could radically skew rational calculations. 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that theater-level interactions involving 
conventional missile strikes against regional bases could be highly unstable and 
prone to miscalculation on all sides. The apparent underdevelopment of Chinese 
doctrine on missile coercion, littered as it is with questionable assumptions about 
the adversary, could exacerbate this latent instability. In the meantime, it seems 
that the U.S.-Japanese alliance has not moved far beyond rudimentary discus-
sions of extended deterrence, a concept that does not fully capture the complexi-
ties of the emerging missile threat in Asia.67 It thus behooves Washington and 
Tokyo to anticipate a far more ambiguous and stressful operational environment 
than has been the case over the past two decades. The alliance must come to grips 
with the advances in Chinese thinking about coercive campaigns while explor-
ing options for hardening the partnership, both politically and militarily, against 
Beijing’s emerging missile strategy. 
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THE ZUMWALT-CLASS DESTROYER
A Technology “Bridge” Shaping the Navy after Next
George V. Galdorisi and Scott C. Truver
The U.S. Navy’s decision to truncate procurement of the original fleet ofthirty-two guided-missile destroyers of the Zumwalt (DDG 1000) class to
just three ships does not diminish the value of the program to the United States
as a technology bridge to the “Navy after Next.” Rarely has the Navy had such an
opportunity to do just what the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (CNO), Admiral Gary Roughead, directed in
early 2009: “To take advantage of the technologies, to
learn from them” and to prepare the Navy for the un-
certain “hybrid warfare” strategic environment of the
future.1 Testing, refining, and retesting these technol-
ogies and systems in a major surface warship can ac-
celerate the Navy’s efforts to provide robust, flexible,
and agile forces for tomorrow’s roles, missions, and
tasks. Indeed, the lead DDG 1000 offers the potential
to leverage today’s technology investments so as to
help shape the characteristics and capabilities of war-
ships yet to come.
PERSPECTIVE
Ninety years ago, the British military strategist and in-
ventor Major General J. F. C. Fuller understood that
“tools, or weapons, if only the right ones can be discov-
ered, form 99 percent of victory. . . . Strategy, command,
leadership, courage, discipline, supply, organization and
all the moral and physical paraphernalia of war are
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nothing to a high superiority of weapons—at most they go to form the one percent
which makes the whole possible.”2
Having the “right” tools or weapons, as described by Fuller, is important for
the United States and its allies and friends as they confront an ambiguous period
of both asymmetrical, low-technology warfare and the possibility of high-
technology warfare with China, a rejuvenated Russia, or other developing states.
However, the link between the invention of a new technology and its impact on
warfare is never a straight line. What has proved crucial has been the aggressive-
ness with which nations develop, test, improve, manufacture, and field these
technologies as weapons of war. In Global Trends 2025, the National Intelligence
Council addressed the importance of shepherding new technologies to the point
where they transition to the end users, noting, “The pace of technological inno-
vation will be key. Major technologies historically have had an ‘adoption lag.’”3
As the pace of global technological change has accelerated, the United States
has been especially adept at inserting new technology to pace the threat. As
Bruce Berkowitz points out in The New Face of War, “Recent experience sug-
gests that the right technology, used intelligently, makes sheer numbers irrele-
vant. The tipping point was the Gulf War in 1991. When the war was over, the
United States and its coalition partners had lost just 240 people. Iraq suffered
about 10,000 battle deaths, although no one will ever really be sure. The differ-
ence was that the Americans could see at night, drive through the featureless
desert without getting lost, and put a single smart bomb on target with a 90
percent probability.”4
Continuous technological innovation, experimentation, and insertion will
have a significant impact on the future of warfare, particularly to address the
“unknown unknowns” regarding which future technologies will be needed for
America’s military decades hence. For example, the U.S. Joint Forces Com-
mand’s Joint Operating Environment 2008 addressed the issue of technological
uncertainty by describing the astounding changes that have taken place in just
the last quarter-century alone:
One might also note how much the economic and technological landscapes outside
of the military have changed. . . . On the technological side, the Internet existed only
in the Department of Defense; its economic and communications possibilities and
implications were not apparent. Cellular phones did not exist. Personal computers
were beginning to come into widespread use, but the reliability was terrible.
Microsoft was just emerging from Bill Gates’ garage, while Google existed only in the
wilder writings of science fiction writers. In other words, the revolution in informa-
tion and communications technologies, taken for granted today, was largely unimag-
inable in 1983.5
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The U.S. Navy has a legacy of technology innovation and insertion, embrac-
ing both evolutionary and revolutionary changes, tempered by the understand-
ing that a navy’s ability to carry out its missions effectively has often depended
on who inserts the best technology the fastest and most effectively.6 As Rear Ad-
miral Jay Cohen, then Chief of Naval Research, noted in 2004, “The Navy/Ma-
rine Corps of today and tomorrow are and will remain critically enabled by the
power of science and technology put to work for our Sailors and Marines.”7
In addition to formal research and development programs and the much less
formal experimentation along the waterfront, the Navy has at various times in
its history taken good advantage of in-service platforms to insert and develop a
“bundle” of technologies—many dependent on each other—to test break-
through, leading-edge capabilities that have the potential to alter the face of na-
val warfare. For example, the first U.S. surface-to-air missile ships were the
eight-inch-gun cruisers Boston and Canberra, which were converted for the new
mission. Likewise, the submarines Barbero and Tunny were converted to launch
Regulus land-attack missiles, making them (as SSG 317 and SSG 282) the
world’s first operational missile submarines.
But unlike these examples, in which ships approaching the ends of their ser-
vice lives have been converted to experiment with new missions, DDG 1000 pro-
vides the Navy an opportunity to take emerging technology to sea not in a “test
ship” but in a frontline, battle-force, major surface warship.8 In that regard, the
surface warfare community can build on the U.S. submarine force’s experience
with the USS Memphis (SSN 691). In 1989, Memphis was designated an experi-
mental submarine to test a variety of technologies and systems, including ad-
vanced hull materials and structures, unmanned underwater vehicles, advanced
sonars, and bottom-profiler navigation systems. In 1994 the Navy assigned SSN
691 to Submarine Development Squadron 12. But all the while, Memphis re-
mained an operational asset—in May 2006 deploying to support Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM—and was included in the active force structure.
Using a new design and not an older ship to “test out” a variety of new tech-
nologies provides the Navy opportunity for experimentation on a scale not pre-
viously possible. In announcing his decision to truncate the DDG 1000 program
at just three ships, CNO chose words that emphasized the importance of this
ship as a technology incubator: “That’s why I was more interested in truncating
than terminating, so we can get a couple of ships out and see what they can do . . .
see if the technologies we put on [DDG 1000] are going to pay off for us.”9
LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY “BUNDLES”
The “bundle” of technologies embodied in DDG 1000—as well as future tech-
nologies that could easily find homes in this ship—represents some of the most
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cutting-edge and transformational technologies ever adapted for naval uses: the
Integrated Power System (IPS); integrated electric drive; a stealthy tumblehome
hull and integrated topside (InTop) superstructure design; the 155 mm Ad-
vanced Gun System (AGS); the Mark 57 Peripheral Vertical Launching System
(PVLS); the Dual-Band Radar (DBR), which includes an S-band Volume Search
Radar (VSR) and X-band AN/SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR); and a host
of other advances related to network-centric warfare, stealth, survivability, and
dramatically reduced manning levels.
While some have criticized the Navy for embedding too many technologies
into DDG 1000, this perceived “weakness” is actually a strength, one that makes
this ship a credible host platform for the technologies that will accelerate the
leap to the Navy after Next.10 As DDG 1000 technologies continue to be tested
and matured, the ship should serve as the Navy’s surface platform—remember
Memphis—to evolve other advanced technologies as well into new warships.
But though the technologies currently embodied in DDG 1000 are on the
cutting edge, it is the ship’s potential to host even-farther-future, potentially
“game changing,” technologies that makes Zumwalt important. The fifteen-
thousand-ton ship has a 10 percent growth margin, equating to some 1,500 tons
of potential increase that would enable the ship to host new sensors and weap-
ons as technologies evolve.11 Inserting such systems into DDG 1000 throughout
the next decades and then improving on them, based on their operational effec-
tiveness and ability to deal with emerging threats, will define what the Navy will
look like—and how it can fight—in the future.
For example, as the Office of Naval Research has recognized, “Among the pos-
sibilities inherent in all-electric ships are the new weapons that become feasible
when virtually unlimited electric power is available on board.”12 Zumwalt’s ad-
vanced all-electric propulsion plant, generating seventy-eight megawatts of
power, allows such weapons as high-powered lasers and electromagnetic rail
guns to be used without significantly impacting the ship’s electronic surveil-
lance and weapons control systems or speed, a critical operational factor, given
the high electrical demands of these on-the-horizon weapons.
Such weapons are classified under the general heading of “directed-energy
weapons” (DEW), and they include high-energy lasers, radio-frequency weap-
ons (high-power microwaves or ultra-wideband weapons), and electromag-
netic rail guns.13 They are far from futuristic weapons that may or may not be
feasible; the Office of Naval Research is already developing (and working to
scale up the power of) free-electron lasers, chemical lasers and their associated
beam directors, radio-frequency weapons, and full-scale electromagnetic rail
guns capable of launching precision-guided projectiles at hypersonic speeds.14
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Indeed, independent assessments outside government have concluded that
solid-state lasers “are capable of making unique and important contributions to
U.S. military effectiveness.”15 The CNO has also directed that his Strategic Stud-
ies Group focus its latest deliberations on the impact that hypersonic and di-
rected weapons will generate on the future of naval operations in the 2020–25
time frame, noting that these weapons—both those employed by the U.S. Navy
and those of future opponents—have “the potential to profoundly influence fu-
ture maritime operations.”16
Modern rail-gun technology has been under development since the early
1980s and is projected to be a reality in the next decade. Ranges greater than two
hundred nautical miles are envisioned, using GPS-guided projectiles traveling
at six times the speed of sound. The fact that rail guns do not require powders or
explosives could free magazine space for strike and other mission areas.17
The potential impact of the electromagnetic rail gun on the support of forces
ashore likewise could be profound. The power supplied by an all-electric ship
like DDG 1000 is sufficient to fire up to twelve electromagnetic projectiles per
minute. A twenty-pound projectile could reach a target about three hundred
miles away in about six minutes. Initially traveling 8,200 feet per second and
striking its target at five thousand feet per second, that twenty-pound rail-gun
projectile will penetrate tens of feet of reinforced concrete through its kinetic
energy alone.
Directed-energy weapons could also become significant in terms of the way
the Navy after Next provides ship and task-force self-defense in the contested lit-
toral. A nation seeking to challenge the United States for control of local seas will
probably turn to cruise missiles, because these offer a relatively economical
method for conducting sophisticated attacks with a reasonable probability of in-
flicting damage on enemy ships off a coastline. Used to defeat a cruise missile
threat, directed-energy weapons could serve both as high-resolution sensors,
adding to capabilities provided by other Navy intelligence and surveillance sys-
tems, and as weapons, exploiting the advantages provided by a networked
force.18
Directed-energy systems provide several mechanisms for cruise missile en-
gagement and destruction. These weapons give the defender a speed advantage
of roughly six orders of magnitude, reducing the “time of flight” required to
reach an approaching missile. In the two to five seconds required to deposit laser
energy on a target, a Mach 4 missile will travel only about 3.5 nautical miles;
laser energy could destroy the attacker sixteen to eighteen nautical miles from
the defending platform—more than twice the best distance attained with con-
ventional systems.19 Embarked on mobile Navy warships, DEW could become
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the weapons of choice for defeating cruise missiles launched at naval formations
or for shooting down ballistic missiles launched against naval or other forces.
Swarming attack boats pose another significant challenge to naval ships oper-
ating in littoral waters. The severe damage inflicted upon the USS Cole (DDG
67) by one small, explosive-laden boat remains fresh in the minds of Navy plan-
ners. Directed energy offers the potential to disrupt the sensors of an attacking
small craft at the maximum line of sight. Even when fast attacking boats are dis-
cernible as threats, engaging them in the vicinity of friendly or neutral forces re-
quires more precision than is typically available with explosive ordnance.20 The
rapid responsiveness of directed-energy weapons makes them particularly use-
ful against high-speed patrol boats or surface-effect craft, which can effectively
outmaneuver conventional gun systems. The physical characteristics of directed-
energy systems give the defender greater control over the effects generated than
does any conventional weapon.21 Directed-energy weapons like the solid-state la-
ser and the high-power microwave are potentially superior to kinetic weapons
against swarming small boats—and the people who man them—for a number of
reasons, chief among them the ability to use these weapons in a graduated re-
sponse mode, where these swarming boats can be warded off with a succession of
effects, from nonlethal warning “shots” to lethal, accurate fire.
The prospect afforded by directed-energy weapons could represent for the
Navy and Marine Corps a potential paradigm shift in how the two services—as
well as the joint force—will conduct operations on and from the sea in the
twenty-first century. As the only feasible host platform for directed-energy
weapons for at least the next decade, DDG 1000 is the ship that will help pull
these technologies out of various laboratories and ground test sites and get them
deployed to sea, where they could revolutionize warfare at the tactical, opera-
tional, and strategic levels.
Hosting these directed-energy technologies on DDG 1000 offers the promise
of accelerating the development and refinement of these weapons in the opera-
tional environment. So doing will not only identify “the art of the possible” as to
what the Navy after Next can look like but also help determine if these technolo-
gies can deliver even a portion of their enormous potential. Directed-energy
weapons could be most useful in a future missile-defense role. They might be
able to target ballistic missiles in all phases of their trajectories—launch, boost
phase, and flight—thus helping to restore the odds for the defender. The long
range of directed-energy systems and their ability to target the sensitive sensor
and guidance systems of ballistic missiles make them particularly useful. If only
some of the full range of potential applications of directed-energy systems
proves effective, DDG 1000 will still have ably served as the prototype for the
high end of any “future surface combatant” family of ships.22
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THE TECHNOLOGY “BRIDGE”
U.S. military forces will have to operate and fight in a strategic environment
comprising a wide array of threats across the spectrum of violence, some of
which can only be imagined in 2010. Dealing with such a range of threats re-
quires that the United States avoid the technological surprise that will enable an
enemy to exploit military weaknesses and deliver an asymmetric blow that will
thwart what this nation seeks to achieve at the strategic, operational, or tactical
level. A former Vice Chief of Naval Research, Brigadier General Thomas
Waldhauser, U.S. Marine Corps, put this imperative in focus: “Given the current
national security challenges our nation faces and those we expect to face in the
future, we must keep our focus forward and push innovative technological solu-
tions to address those future threats.”23
But “pushing” those technologies out to the fleet and Fleet Marine Forces is
fraught with organizational and systemic challenges. “Transitioning” is an issue
of such concern that the Department of Defense asked the National Research
Council (NRC) to investigate the issues surrounding technology transition fail-
ures and the concomitant impact on the war fighter and to offer recommenda-
tions. The NRC provided a robust list of recommendations, but the title of its
final report—Accelerating Technology Transition: Bridging the Valley of Death for
Materials and Processes in Defense Systems—is a telling indicator of how difficult
this prospect remains. Significantly, the NRC concluded, “The adoption and ac-
ceptance of a new technology likely depends on the real or perceived impact of
that technology on high-level military goals.”24
The DDG 1000 program could overcome many of these transition challenges,
primarily because the ship represents an ideal platform for hosting still-emerging
technologies. For example, insertion of DEW technologies into DDG 1000 to
support future war-fighting requirements promises an orderly, evolutionary,
block-upgrade process, and it is consistent with the Defense Department’s em-
phasis on acquisition reform and with the Navy’s desire to exercise more stew-
ardship over its own acquisition programs.
This future has clearly captured the attention of Congress. The fiscal year
2010 National Defense Authorization Act calls for the Navy to develop several
plans and road maps, particularly for naval surface fire support—“to address
any shortfalls between required naval surface fire support capability and the
plan of the Navy to provide that capability”—and a technology road map for
future surface combatants and fleet modernization—“a plan to incorporate
into surface combatants constructed after 2011, and into fleet modernization
programs, the technologies developed for the DDG-1000 and the DDG-51 and
CG-47 Aegis ships, including technologies and systems designed to achieve
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significant manpower savings.”25 DDG 1000 provides important capabilities for
these and other requirements.
When the first DDG 1000 is delivered in 2013, the Navy should already have a
well developed technology-insertion and experimentation plan in place, if it is
to take advantage of this ship’s tremendous capabilities. In doing so, the Navy
will be able to leverage this ship fully and thereby accelerate the transformation
of tomorrow’s fleet into the Navy well after Next.
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THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF OBSCURANTS
History and the Future
Thomas J. Culora
Throughout history, smoke has been used in various forms to obscure navalforces at sea. During prominent naval battles in the twentieth century, from
Jutland inWorldWar I to the U.S. Navy’s clash with imperial Japanese forces off
Leyte in 1944, smoke literally contributed to “the fog of war” and added to the
complexity and confusion of battle.1 But is there a role for smoke or other
obscurants at sea in the radar-saturated, cyber-linked maritime environment of
the twenty-first century? And what, if any, are the strategic implications of
obscurants? This article will explore the latter question, leaving the tactical and
operational opportunities of “making smoke” for separate inquiry.
The application of obscurants on the modern battlefield has been widely
examined by U.S. Army strategists and operators for over a decade and a
half;2 obscurants are firmly imbedded in U.S. Army doctrine.3 Moreover, the
effectiveness of obscurants against a panoply of
terminal homing systems, from the visual to the
millimeter-wave spectrum, is proven. In simple terms,
the particles suspended in the medium of smoke can
be adjusted in size to absorb and diffuse radar waves
emanating from the seeker heads of incoming
antiship missiles, thereby denying any homing in-
formation to the missile. In the modern naval battle
space, where antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) are a
principal threat, adapting obscurant systems and de-
veloping tactics and operational schemes for their use
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at sea is prudent. Given the stark potential of antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
this adaptation may be essential.4
The challenge, then, for naval strategists, operators, and acquisition profes-
sionals is to “navalize” obscurants for use at sea, either developing new systems
or adapting existing ones. One such system that appears primed for adaptation
is the U.S. Army’s M56E1 Coyote smoke-generating system. The Coyote spews
out large, radar-absorbing, carbon-fiber clouds that can prevent a radar-guided
ASCM from detecting its target, thereby neutralizing the missile’s terminal
homing capability.5 It is an attractive system, since the cost of generating a single
obscurant cloud covering several square nautical miles is in the tens of thou-
sands of dollars. Also, depending on environmental conditions present, the Coy-
ote’s cloud can be quite persistent. Effective in virtually the entire spectrum,
such millimeter-wave obscurants show great promise in thwarting the terminal
radar seekers in many modern ASCMs.
The fundamental assumption underpinning this article is that regardless of
which system is acquired, thoughtful obscurant employment will significantly
reduce the risk to surface ships from missile strikes. With this in mind, there are
four key areas where obscurants have strategic implications: strategic competi-
tion, influence and balancing, deterrence, and escalation control.
STRATEGIC COMPETITION
Obscurants represent a relatively low-cost augmentation to current missile de-
fense strategies and have the potential to tip the cost-exchange ratio, which now
favors the offense, back to the defense.
Calculating the exact unit cost of offensive and defensive missiles is a chal-
lenge due to the multitude of direct and associated costs of bringing a missile
system on line. It becomes even more problematic when researching the cost of
missile programs in countries with opaque accountability laws and public infor-
mation standards. But the approximate, relative cost differences between offen-
sive and defensive missiles are sufficiently large enough to give a clear advantage
to the offense. For example, a comparison of the Navy’s primary defensive mis-
sile, the SM-2, against the service’s own ASCM, the AGM-84 Harpoon, reveals a
cost ratio of $2,560,000 to $474,000—an advantage to the offense of five to one.6
A “shoot doctrine” that takes into account a defensive probability of kill of any-
thing less than one (i.e., Pk < 1) requires, at a minimum, two defensive missiles
for every one incoming offensive missile, raising the cost ratio to almost eleven
to one, with a resultant cost disadvantage to the defense of $4,600,000 per
exchange.
Full comprehension of the “game changing” potential of the Chinese DF-21
ASBM and its impact on operations is slowly emerging among strategists and
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planners. Applying this analysis to the emerging threat posed by antiship ballis-
tic missiles yields somewhat different results. While it is problematic to estimate
accurately the cost of the DF-21, sources place the unit price, in U.S. currency,
between $5,000,000 and $10,500,000 per missile.7 This seems a reasonable esti-
mate in light of the cost of a similar weapon, the U.S. Pershing II, which adjusted
for inflation would be roughly twelve million dollars per missile. In comparison,
the ballistic-missile-defense-capable SM-3 costs roughly ten million dollars per
missile. At first blush, the nearly equal prices of interceptor (SM-3) and ASBM
(DF-21) suggest near parity in cost ratio, but a “shoot two to kill one” doctrine
means a differential of nearly ten million dollars per exchange. However, even
this is misleading, as the launch platform—essentially a big truck—of the DF-21
is far less expensive than that of the SM-3, a warship. This estimate also ignores
the operational and developmental challenges of intercepting an ASBM; nor
does it fold in the things like purchasing power disparity, labor costs, and gov-
ernment controls, which all favor China. Nonetheless, this simple cost compari-
son is striking.
The strategic challenge, then, is to reverse this disparity and tip the cost back
in favor of the defense. The application of obscurants can help with this in two
very significant ways. First, developing and deploying a navalized obscurant ca-
pability would be—especially if based on the M56E1—inexpensive in compari-
son to defensive missile systems. The entire mission package for the Coyote costs
from $130,000 to $150,000 per unit; the expendable obscurant boxes cost about
a thousand dollars per thirty-pound box, each capable of generating four min-
utes of radar-absorbing smoke. Place these mission packages on the Littoral
Combat Ship, on an SH-60 helicopter, or even on an unmanned aerial vehicle,
and for relatively little money both naval and merchant surface vessels can be
obscured from radar-homing ASCMs and ASBMs. Admittedly, for this to work
effectively, more testing and experimentation must be done; in any case, obscu-
rants in themselves represent not a panacea but part of a layered passive defense.
But in light of the challenging operational issues involved with intercepting
ASBMs, obscurants merit increased consideration.
As with any new system, there will be additional costs to ensure that other
shipboard and aviation systems will not be adversely impacted by the use of
smoke and millimeter-wave fibers. Also, resources would be needed to develop
operational and tactical doctrine and procedures to employ this capability effec-
tively. That said, it is hard to imagine that the combined unit cost per obscurant
system plus the very low expendable costs of making the smoke, even coupled
with any additional developmental and compatibility costs, would approach
anything near the two billion dollars spent on the SM-2/SM-6 program.
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A rational approach is to couple obscurant systems with current shipboard
passive and active defensive capabilities. The blanket coverage afforded by
obscurant systems would reduce the burden on defensive missile systems to in-
tercept every incoming missile. This would reduce the cost per kill of incoming
offensive missiles to a level that shifts overall costs in favor of the defense. An en-
dogenous strategic effect of this coupling would be an increase in capacity for
theater ballistic missile defense, as missiles and their launch tubes that would
otherwise be used for ship defense would be freed to intercept ballistic missiles
threatening targets ashore. Admittedly, that would not reduce the overall,
programwide costs of developing effective theater missile defenses, but it clearly
would lessen the cost of protecting the “protectors” in a missile exchange.
Second, employment of a relatively low-cost obscurant system would prompt
potential opponents to reexamine and adapt their current missile systems to en-
sure effectiveness in an obscurant-laden environment, thereby driving up the
real unit cost per offensive missile. This too begins to tip the cost differential
back in favor of the defense. Moreover, even if the technical and physics chal-
lenges of getting infrared and millimeter-wave homing systems to “see through”
obscurants are surmounted, it will have taken several years to do so. Potential
adversaries would therefore have to reexamine and reengineer current systems
and delay the introduction of future systems to ensure their effectiveness to re-
duce the risk of failure—which in itself would contribute to deterrence in the
short run.
It is important to appreciate the strategic disaster that would ensue if even
one antiship missile were to make it through. Here the strike of one $500,000
ASCM or twelve-million-dollar ASBM would result in hundreds of millions of
dollars in damage and significant loss of personnel. While a missile strike against
a relatively hard target like an aircraft carrier might not sink that ship, the de-
struction of multimillion-dollar aircraft parked on the flight deck by dispersed
munitions would instantaneously and drastically tip the cost-ratio exchange in
favor of the offense.8
When applying the logic used in both of the cases outlined above, an underly-
ing element should be understood. That is, current antiaccess strategies are based
on using relatively low-cost weaponry to counter high-cost expeditionary assets.
In this case, obscurants would need to be significantly less expensive to develop
and deploy than the missiles they are designed to counter to have any strategic im-
pact. That said, employing an asymmetric obscurant strategy provides a signifi-
cant amount of “headroom” to develop new, more effective kinetic or other
passive systems or to adapt current weapons continuously. Offsetting this concern
somewhat is that meeting symmetrically a sizable U.S. naval force would be im-
practical and costly enough to force nations to adopt an asymmetrical strategy.
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Nations may have no other option but to expend resources to ensure this asym-
metrical strategy is credible and effective. Thus low-cost obscurant systems that
make it more complicated and costly for a potential adversary to operationalize
his strategy affect the strategic competition.
In Beijing all of these factors are well understood. The Chinese have based
their entire antiaccess strategy on developing systems that are less expensive to
produce and operate than the U.S. expeditionary forces they are designed to
counter. Moreover, a considerable number of these systems are specifically de-
signed to counter the most potent persistent striking force possessed by the U.S.
Navy—the aircraft carrier. The introduction of fully operational obscurant sys-
tems, coupled with well-thought-out operational schemes, will start to flip this
asymmetry around.
INFLUENCE AND BALANCING
The leitmotif of arms sales is that nations who sell arms gain influence with na-
tions purchasing those weapons. The extent to which this is broadly true is be-
yond the scope of this article, but it is reasonable to assume that besides the
tangible benefit of generating capital, some positive relationship will emerge
from the arms transaction and some influence will be garnered. For this argu-
ment it is sufficient to note that for a country to gain any influence with another
from the sale of arms, two conditions must exist. First, the system or capability
being sold must produce some military effect relevant for the receiving country;
second, the system must actually work, or be perceived to work, as advertised.
Thus it can be anticipated that for any reduction in either the desirability or effi-
cacy of a given system, there would be some reduction in influence.
Granted, countries often provide a number of different weapons systems and
capabilities to client states in order to foster influence, and the impact of degra-
dation in the performance of one of them may be limited. But in the case of ob-
scurants, which would render significantly less effective an entire class of
antiship weapons, the implications for the delivering state cannot be ignored.
This is not just diminishing the role of an ancillary system but muting what is
perhaps the most prominent class of modern antiship weapons, the radar-
homing missile.
The implication for the United States is that delivering low-cost, low-tech
obscurant systems capable of providing significant protection for surface ships
may produce some increase in influence for Washington. (The effect would
likely be marginal, as obscurants are easily produced indigenously.) More signif-
icantly, whether through transfer or internal development, wide distribution of
obscurant systems would blunt the potent military capability of any aggressor
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country whose advantage rests with its ability to coerce or pressure its neighbors
through use of radar-guided missiles aimed at ships at sea.
In 2009 China extended its global influence through a variety of means, in-
cluding raising its profile in international arms sales.9 For example, the Chinese
recently delivered a Type 53H3 Sword-class frigate, PNS Zulfiquar, to Pakistan,
replete with eight C-802/CSS-N-8 antiship cruise missiles. This transfer in itself
represents only a marginal operational increase for the Pakistani navy, as the
four Type 53H3s involved replace six older, ex-British Amazon-class frigates
scheduled to leave the fleet in the next decade. However, the arrival of Zulfiquar
“marks the first time in Pakistan’s history in which it has received a new-build
major frontline warship.”10 An underlying strategic goal here for China is to
strengthen its influence with Pakistan to ensure that the relationship of the
United States with Islamabad does not go unchecked.
But perhaps as important, this sale affects China’s other strategic rival in the
region, India. The Indian Navy must acknowledge the increased capability the
arrival of these Type 53H3s and their C-802s represents by obtaining more plat-
forms or more capable systems, thereby exacerbating an already tense regional
arms race. Should the DF-21’s constituent technologies migrate to Pakistan or to
other countries in the region, that too would exacerbate regional competition.
Any country, not only India, that relies on its naval force as an element of its se-
curity would be threatened and thus prompted to seek either additional or more
capable systems or expand its operational plans to target this potent neutralizer
of its surface combatants.
Obscurants have the potential to reduce the strategic impact in both of these
cases. The overall strategic and operational value of Zulfiquar for Pakistan is
lessened, and the potential “game changing” nature of an ASBM is reduced.
There is a latent danger here. Obscurant systems must be effective enough, ei-
ther alone or in concert with other systems, to neutralize a sufficient number of
incoming missiles in the aggregate to make it obvious to a potential opponent
that increasing missile stockpiles would not result in a tactical advantage. Mar-
ginally effective obscurant systems could have the reverse effect of encouraging
an arms race, by prompting opponents to field large numbers of missiles in the
hopes of overwhelming defenses—much as is the case now. The whole point of
obscurants is that they will defeat nearly all incoming warheads, no matter how
many missiles are launched, the “leakers” to be handled with other defensive
systems.
With regard to balancing and influence, obscurants can affect the way allies
operate with the U.S. fleet and how they configure their forces. An explicit goal
of the Navy’s “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” is fostering co-
operation with other maritime nations. While the initiative is aimed at the
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quotidian task of strengthening maritime security, the ultimate expression of
cooperation is a nation’s decision to join a coalition. That decision is ultimately a
political one, based on an assessment of benefits and risks. Among the consider-
ations is the ability to operate effectively in the anticipated tactical environment
without undue exposure to damage or destruction. In a heavily saturated
antiship-missile environment, allied ships would be more survivable operating
with obscurants, producing a corresponding reduction in risk and of the politi-
cal pressure that inevitably results when a unit is lost or destroyed. Moreover, the
strategic risk to a nation with a relatively small fleet, for which the loss of even
one ship can have significant impact, is reduced.
There may be the undesirable second-order effect of making nearly all
radar-guided missiles less effective—including rendering U.S. weapons impo-
tent—which raises two salient considerations. First, if employment of obscu-
rants reduces the effectiveness of offensive antiship missiles and influence of
countries selling offensive missiles, then the influence gained by the United
States through the sale of those missiles would be lessened as well. Second, and
more important, the employment of obscurants could substantially affect the
current reliance on, and efficacy of, precision radar-guided missiles at sea to a
point where a major reformation in the way naval forces are structured and op-
erated would occur. Here the operational and strategic advantage is accrued by
those countries agile enough to adapt to the changed environment.
DETERRENCE
A central tenet of international relations theory, as echoed by the Department of
Defense, is that “deterrence operations convince adversaries not to take actions
that threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision-
making.”11 Increasing the level of perceived risk increases the ability of one
player to deter another. Obscurants can raise the risk an opponent perceives in
two principal ways.
First, while obscurants in themselves may not deter, their use injects a high
degree of uncertainty and unpredictability that in turn increases risk. Any
antiaccess strategy predicated on sea denial through the threat or use of antiship
missiles must estimate the numbers of missiles needed and types of targets to be
engaged. By making it harder to predict the number of missiles required for a de-
sired effect, obscurant systems will increase the risk for that opponent and, con-
comitantly, deterrence. Conversely, obscurants that create a tactical situation
where an offensive antiship missile strike will nearly always fail produces a near
certainty that in itself deters.
Second, obscurant systems and other kinetic or electronic defenses increase
the number of missiles needed per target. If this increased expenditure of
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missiles significantly draws down an adversary’s missile inventory, at some point
this reduction will have strategic consequences. In regions where the relative
balance of forces between nations is close, adversaries who rapidly deplete their
offensive missile inventory and yet fail to achieve the strategic benefits they were
seeking will degrade their relative strategic positions, regardless of whether this
conflict was with intra- or extraregional opponents.
The uncertainties that obscurants inject into calculations of the chance of
success and into the strategic risks of aggressive operations can be significant.
And uncertainty can deter. However, there are two instances in which obscu-
rants may have a neutral or negative impact on deterrence. First, as obscurant
systems are relatively inexpensive and low-tech, they are likely to proliferate. If
both sides employ this capability, obscurants can reduce the effectiveness of all
offensive missile systems. In this case, the side that can accrue tactical or opera-
tional advantages by other means—for example, through weapons that do not
rely on millimeter-wave or infrared homing, or through stealth or maneuver-
ability—will likely be more difficult to deter. Here, the deterrent effect of obscu-
rants is neutral.
However, in an ad bellum (approach to war) scenario where one side’s opera-
tional plan relies heavily on precision antiship missiles launched from transporter-
erector-launchers on land, a large first strike without warning would be tempting, as
the relative advantages of a land-based antiaccess plan would evaporate once off-
shore naval forces started using obscurants, resulting in a negative impact on deter-
rence. However, if obscurants are deployed on warning or used preemptively, as a
nonprovocative means of defense, deterrence is in fact increased. This is where es-
calation control plays a role.
ESCALATION CONTROL
Should deterrence fail, the use of obscurants can contribute to controlling esca-
lation and expanding the strategic options available. This is most evident in the
transition from an ad bellum to an in bello situation. Once an adversary strikes a
target, especially a high-value unit such as an aircraft carrier or “big deck” am-
phibious ship, there is tangible pressure to respond by striking an opponent’s
countervalue or a counterforce target. While conventional escalation does not
neatly conform to the notions of “countervalue” and “counterforce” options as
commonly understood in connection with nuclear deterrence, the conventional
challenges associated with each of these types of responses are useful to explore.
First, against an adversary who launches missiles from mobile transporter-
erector-launchers ashore, the direct counterforce options are limited to strikes
on fixed radars and supporting infrastructures—strikes that, these targets being
ashore in an opponent’s homeland and possibly having multiple uses, would
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likely be viewed as significantly escalatory. That is fine if it is the desired effect;
however, it becomes problematic when the effect is to respond in kind, without
significant escalation. Finding other conventional counterforce options would
mean expanding the target set to other military assets, preferably naval targets,
such as ships at sea or deployed submarines, or airborne aircraft operating over
land or water. If these assets are unlocated or untargetable and the only other
counterforce targets are on land, the risk of escalation will increase.
Second, against an adversary who has successfully struck a high-value naval
unit, finding an equivalent countervalue target would be a problem. However,
there are two options. One would be to strike unrelated military targets that are
of equal value in the aggregate. But dispersed naval assets like small boats, sub-
marines, and surface ships would be challenging and time-consuming targets to
strike and might not really add up to the value of the high-value unit originally
attacked. Most nations view strikes against naval combatants as lower on the es-
calation ladder than strikes against homeland targets, even though naval vessels
are considered sovereign territory. Thus responding to a strike against a naval
unit offshore with collectively equivalent countervalue strikes to military targets
onshore would likely be perceived as escalation. In the extreme case, where no
military target or groups of targets of equal value exist, other national assets
would need to be considered, including space-based military or commercial sys-
tems or certain military-related civilian facilities. Again, in either case the con-
flict would escalate.
Consider, then, a case in the transition to war where an adversary launches a
first strike using missiles against high-value targets at sea but fails, due in large
part to the effective use of obscurants. In this situation, strategic space is created
that lessens the need for an in-kind response and expands the range of options.
The targeted side can use this opportunity to give an adversary time to recon-
sider the chances of success, having failed in a first strike. This creates the oppor-
tunity for de-escalation.
Once in bello, controlling escalation without the use of obscurants becomes
particularly challenging, for three reasons. First, countering incoming antiship
missiles primarily with defensive missiles and other kinetic systems will
eventually deplete the defenders’ magazines, encouraging the adversary not to
de-escalate but to sustain or even increase its efforts. Second, moving beyond
the ranges of shore-launched missiles plays, in effect, into the adversary’s
antiaccess strategy. While such withdrawal may be viewed as de-escalatory, it is
de-escalation through capitulation. Lastly, tactics that target subsystems that
support the entire missile “enterprise,” such as surrounding and distant infra-
structure, command-and-control nodes, or satellites, prior to a missile launch
(the so-called left-of-launch options)—are all intrinsically escalatory.
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However, when obscurants effectively counter missile strikes by simply deny-
ing the incoming weapons’ homing ability, causing them to miss, there is less re-
quirement to expend defensive missiles, no need to reposition outside of
offensive missile ranges, and reduced justification for escalatory “left of launch”
options.
OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES
A full examination of how to bring obscurants to the fleet is beyond the scope of
this article. However, as with any new concept, there would be organizational,
cultural, and programmatic obstacles to overcome.
Organizationally, bringing any obscurant system to the fleet through a “pro-
gram of record” will require intense collaboration across multiple communities
and commands as integrating any new concept has always proved to be a chal-
lenge. Recently, the Chief of Naval Operations signed an instruction that codi-
fies how the U.S. Navy will generate and develop new concepts. Obscurants
appear ripe for examination under the process described in this document.12
Moreover, the U.S. Army’s experience with making obscurants safe for person-
nel and compatible with other fielded systems represents insights with encour-
aging potential for adaptation by the Navy.
Culturally, the Navy is oriented toward active defense. This can be seen his-
torically in destroying incoming B5N Kate torpedo planes with F4F-4 Wildcat
fighters and shipboard antiaircraft batteries off Midway in 1942, or in the con-
temporary practice of intercepting incoming ASCMs with the SM-2 and Mark
15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System in 2010. There have been many passive de-
fense systems—including electronic countermeasures, radar-spoofing chaff,
and electronic decoys—but the preference, as measured by program dollars, is
overwhelmingly in favor of active defense. There are several good reasons for
this preference, not the least of which is the value of a positive kill and the accu-
rate battle-damage assessment that allows.
But perhaps the most significant obstacle is programmatic. In the intense
competition for funds, programs live and die by the perceived salience and im-
mediacy of their necessity. At present, in the absence of pressing need for them,
there is scant chance that obscurants will receive the attention and funding
needed to make them operational. But this may be changing. With the increas-
ing recognition that key elements of conventional naval striking forces may soon
be held at greater risk, the recognition that obscurants could reduce this risk
may also increase, thereby prompting greater interest in developing a program
of record to bring obscurant systems to the fleet.
It is worth noting here that systems fielded to counter new threats are often
highly classified, known only to a limited number of planners and operators.
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Such systems clearly have their place, but they have no impact on deterrence or
influence. To deter, systems must be known, and to influence, they must be
transferable. Highly classified systems are neither.
However, even with these obstacles there are opportunities. In the near term,
obscurants can serve as a system of “last resort.” With modest compatibility and
impact testing and minimal adaptation to the maritime environment, existing
obscurants could be used as a balancer to the DF-21 threat. Cloaking major
combatants in obscurants at first warning, whatever the impact on other ship
and aircraft systems, would be justifiable given the grave strategic consequences
of losing a major combatant to an ASBM strike.
As obscurant systems are introduced and tactical procedures and operational
doctrines are developed, any potential adversary will have to respond, adjust,
and counter them. This represents a clear midterm opportunity, as keeping po-
tential adversaries “off balance” causes them to expend time and resources. A
critical element of achieving this “off-balancing” effect would be a thoughtful
strategic communication effort to highlight the operational and strategic impli-
cations of the obscurant system. Likewise, even committing a reasonable effort
to making obscurants operational and openly trumpeting their existence will
create uncertainty and induce a recalculation of risk. An example of this is the
“buzz” generated by the impending introduction of the DF-21. Though there
has been no at-sea, operational demonstration of this missile, so much uncer-
tainty has been created by the Chinese press, with a consequent dialogue by U.S.
navalists and arms experts, that concern over the “game changing” nature of this
missile is emerging. This public discourse extends even to the official military
television channel in China, where a discussion of the DF-21’s predicted
lethality includes an animated cartoon of the sinking of an aircraft car-
rier—complete with a hapless sailor and vexed commanding officer.13 This dis-
cussion targeted audiences on both sides of the Pacific. Notable is the absence of
any portrayal of passive defenses.
Perhaps the greatest opportunity for obscurants is in their long-term effect
on the evolving character of naval warfare. In a future operational concept
based on the speed, maneuverability, and stealth of small, numerous missile-
launching surface platforms, obscurants can add to the difficulty of striking
these platforms, contribute to uncertainty on the part of adversaries, and estab-
lish a “tipping point” in favor of U.S. forces. Fielding systems and formulating
tactical and operational doctrine today can lay the foundation for obscurant use
in the future.
While the obstacles are not trivial, the operational and strategic opportuni-
ties that obscurants represent merit increased attention and a greater effort to
explore all the ways in which they can be brought to the fleet. Obscurants will
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have come full circle from October 1944 when a twenty-first-century destroyer
captain gives the order to “make smoke.”
NOTE S
1. The indomitable Cdr. Ernest Evans famously
shouted the command “Make smoke!” as he
steered the destroyer USS Johnston toward
the approaching Imperial Japanese Fleet dur-
ing the battle of Leyte Gulf. USS Johnston
(DD557) Action Report, DD557/A 16-3, se-
rial 04, 14 November 1944, Subject: Action
Report—Surface Engagement off Samar, P.I.,
25 October 1944.
2. For the purposes of this article, the term “ob-
scurants” describes any material that blocks
any electromagnetic or visible-spectrum
wavelength; “smoke” is meant to describe a
medium that suspends obscurant material in
the atmosphere.
3. U.S. Army Dept., Battlefield Obscuration,
Field Manual 3-11.50 (Washington, D.C.:
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 31
December 2008).
4. Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “On
the Verge of a Game Changer,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings (May 2009), pp. 26–32.
5. Using the Army’s Coyote system was pro-
posed and examined by Brett J. Morash, “Na-
val Obscuration” (research paper, U.S. Naval
War College, Warfare Analysis and Research
Department, Newport, R.I., 2006). Lieuten-
ant Commander Morash effectively described
the applicability and adaptability of the
M56E1 system for use in the naval
environment.
6. The figure of $2,560,000 was derived from
www.defenseindustrydaily.com/raytheons
-standard-missile-naval-defense-family
-updated-02919/, taking the total listed pro-
duction costs from fiscal years 2005–10
($915,100,000) and dividing by the total
number of missiles produced (357). This is a
conservative estimate, as it does not include
research, development, testing, and evalua-
tion, costs of which drive the total per-missile
cost closer to $6,000,000.
7. Qiu Zhenwei and Long Haiyan, “A Discus-
sion of China’s Development of an Antiship
Ballistic Missile (Combat Scenario),” Modern
Ships, quoted in “Ballistic Trajectory: China
Develops New Anti-ship Missile,” Jane’s,
www.janes.com/news/security/.
8. For instance, costs for the F-18 range between
$29 and $57 million per aircraft, depending
on variant. From U.S. Navy sources,
www.news.navy.mil/.
9. Stephen Blank, “China’s Rising Profile in In-
ternational Arms Sales,” China Brief 9, no. 25
(16 December 2009), pp. 10–12, www
.jamestown.org/.
10. Usman Ansari, “First Sword Class Frigate
Arrives in Pakistan,” Defense News (13
September 2009), available at www
.defensenews.com/.
11. U.S. Defense Dept., Deterrence Operations
Joint Operating Concept, version 2.0 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Strategic Command,
December 2006), p. 3, available at www.dtic
.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/do_joc_v20
.doc.
12. Chief of Naval Operations, “Navy Concept
Generation and Concept Development Pro-
gram,” OPNAVINST 5401.9, Washington,
D.C., 24 February 2010.
13. This video can be viewed at www.youtube
.com/watch?v=R-nNVvtacXU&feature=
related.
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S-2
Options for the Pakistan Navy
Commander Muhammad Azam Khan, Pakistan Navy (Retired)
We have unresolved issues, a history of conflict and now the Cold Start
doctrine. Help us resolve these issues. We want peaceful coexistence
with India. India has the capability and intentions can change
overnight.
GENERAL ASHFAQ P. KAYANI, THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF, PAKISTAN
Around noon on 26 July 2009, Gurushuran Kaur, the wife of the Indian primeminister, broke a single coconut on the hull of a submarine in the fifteen-
meter-deep Matsya dry dock at Visakhapatnam (also known as Vizag).1 The oc-
casion marked the formal launch of India’s first indigenously built submarine, a
six-thousand-ton nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) known
as S-2—also as the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) and, more commonly, by
its future name, INS Arihant (destroyer of the enemy).2 The launch ended for In-
dia a journey stretching over three decades since the inauguration of the ATV
program and including an eleven-year construction period.3
The submarine is intended to form a crucial pillar of India’s strategic deter-
rence. Successful trials and integration of S-2’s systems will establish the final leg
of India’s nuclear weapons delivery triad, as articulated in the Indian Maritime
Doctrine and substantiated in the Indian Maritime
Military Strategy Doctrine.
The launch is an extraordinary development for
the littorals of the Indian Ocean region, including
Australia and South Africa, but especially for Paki-
stan. It is germane to the military nuclearization of
the Indian Ocean and noticeably dents the strategic
balance; it has the potential to trigger a nuclear arms
race.4 S-2 will also enhance India’s outreach and allow
New Delhi a comprehensive domination of the Ara-
bian Sea, the Indian Ocean littoral, and even beyond.5
Commander Khan’s twenty-three years of commis-
sioned service included thirteen years at sea as a surface
warfare officer and several command and staff appoint-
ments. He saw action in the first Gulf War, serving with
the United Arab Emirates navy. He is a graduate of the
Pakistan Naval Academy class of 1973 and of the Paki-
stan Navy War College and National Defense College,
Islamabad. He holds a master’s in war studies (mari-
time). Since his retirement in 1998 he has extensively
contributed to Pakistani as well as overseas periodicals
and media. He is currently a research fellow at the Paki-
stan Navy War College.
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Costing US$2.9 billion, the ATV project was a joint effort involving the Indian
Navy and several government agencies and private organizations.6 India’s nu-
clear submarine is the world’s smallest of its type yet will pack a megaton punch.
The boat is driven by a single seven-bladed, highly skewed propeller. Special
anechoic rubber tiles (to reduce the risk of detection by sonar) coat the steel
hull.7 A similar technology was previously used in the Russian Kilo-class subma-
rines.8 (Russian help in designing the ATV has long been an open secret; there
are also reports of Israeli, French, and German imprints on the project.)9
But more than design or fabrication of hull, it was the downsizing and mating
of the ninety-megawatt (120,000 horsepower) low-enriched-uranium-fueled,
pressurized light-water reactor that kept the submarine in the dry dock for more
than a decade.10 The reactor and its containment vessel account for one-tenth
(nearly six hundred tons) of the boat’s total displacement. The hydrodynamics
of a vessel with a tenth of its weight concentrated in one place posed a formida-
ble naval engineering challenge indeed, one that plagued the program.
Before being commissioned as INS Arihant in late 2011 or early 2012,
S-2—serving as a technology demonstrator, a test for future boats of the
class—will have to obtain appropriate certification in three crucial areas: stealth
features, adequacy of the reactor design, and missile range. The first key test will
involve meticulous calibration of S-2’s underwater noise signature, which will
determine the degree of its invulnerability to detection and therefore its suitabil-
ity as a ballistic-missile platform. This process may necessitate extensive trials,
adjustments, and design modifications—if not for S-2, certainly for its succes-
sors.11 The second vital area requiring attestation will be to determine the reac-
tor’s fuel cycle—that is, the frequency of replacement of the fuel rods. Being of a
first- or second-generation technology, with a shorter fuel cycle, the S-2 reactor
fundamentally affects the boat’s performance as an instrument of deterrence.12
The replacement of fuel rods is an intricate operation requiring a submarine to
be taken out of its operational cycle for an extended period. The net result will be
that either the submarine’s patrol areas will remain restricted (fairly close to
base) or its endurance (deployment period) will be curtailed.
The third assessment of S-2 will entail test-firing and validation of missile pa-
rameters. The platform is currently configured to carry a Pakistan-specific,
two-stage submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Sagarika (Oce-
anic), expected to become operational after 2010.13 This nuclear-capable missile,
powered by solid propellants, is a light, miniaturized system, about 6.5 meters
long and weighing seven tons.14 S-2 will have to accommodate missiles not only
of greater (intercontinental) range but in greater numbers if it is to have a deter-
rent value against China. That would require further underwater launches and
flight trials for the follow-on units of the class.15
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NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND THE INDIAN NAVY
The Indian Navy began strongly advocating nuclear-related programs at sea in
the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests, and for a valid and legitimate reason—the
need for an invulnerable nuclear capability to undergird a posture of “no first
use.” At a press conference in 2002, the Indian Navy chief held that “any country
that espouses a no first use policy (as India does) must have an assured second
strike capability. All such countries have a triad of weapons, one of them at sea. It
is significant that the Standing Committee on Defence of the twelfth Lok Sabha
[lower house of the Indian Parliament] had advised the government ‘to review
and accelerate its nuclear policy for fabricating or for acquiring nuclear subma-
rines to add to the (nation’s) deterrent potential.’”16
When in January 2003 the major elements of India’s official nuclear doctrine
were brought into the public domain, the Indian government stressed the build-
ing and maintenance of a “credible minimum deterrent,” along with a posture of
“no first use.”17 Nuclear retaliation to a first strike was to be “massive and de-
signed to inflict unacceptable damage.” Significantly, however, the 2003 state-
ment did not reiterate the 1999 draft nuclear doctrine’s aim of building a nuclear
triad, although all three armed services were keen to deploy nuclear-capable
weapon systems.18
If the Indian Navy was disappointed at the lack of official sanction for its
submarine-based nuclear deterrent, it tried hard not to show it. Still, the ATV
project was under way, with funding and guaranteed political support from the
government. It could therefore be concluded that this notable doctrinal silence
might have been an attempt not to alarm the international community about In-
dia’s multidimensional nuclear program.19
India’s Monroe Doctrine
More than ever, India today demonstrates a striving for regional and global emi-
nence. In elucidating India’s Maritime Military Strategy, the former Indian Navy
chief Arun Prakash pleaded with Indians to keep it “‘etched in [their] minds that
should a clash of interests arise between India and any other power, regional or
extra-regional . . . the use of coercive power and even conflict remains a distinct
possibility.’ Such ‘Kautilyan’ statements lend credence to [the] notion of a for-
ward-leaning India that increasingly inclines to hard power solutions to re-
gional challenges.”20
In their nation’s novel bid for sea power, Indians look for inspiration to the
Monroe Doctrine, the nineteenth-century U.S. policy declaration that the New
World was off-limits to new European territorial acquisitions or any reintroduc-
tion of the European political system.21 An identical philosophy for India was
first proclaimed by Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru in a speech in 1961
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justifying the use of force to evict Portugal from Goa: “Any attempt by a foreign
power to interfere in any way with India is a thing that India cannot tolerate, and
that, subject to her strength, she will oppose. That is the broad doctrine I lay
down.”22 Nehru’s statement was in fact a veiled warning to all external powers
against any action anywhere in the region that New Delhi might perceive as im-
periling the Indian political system. His injunction against outside interference
laid the intellectual groundwork for a policy of regional primacy, without med-
dling by or influence of external powers. Though at the time it was impossible
for India to confront the imperial powers militarily, each succeeding generation
in India has interpreted and applied this foundational principle, according to its
own appraisal of the country’s surroundings, interests, and power.
While the success or otherwise of India’s Monroe Doctrine can be debated, it
has remained an “article of faith for many in the Indian strategic community”
and now seems to have entered the Indian foreign-policy lexicon.23 The Monroe
Doctrine itself being an intensely maritime concept (the influential nineteenth-
century sea-power theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan was an outspoken disciple),
India has made huge strides in expanding its sea power in recent times. In the
process, New Delhi has largely shed its continental way of thinking and reori-
ented itself to look beyond the nation’s shores.24 Thus today, in the words of
President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, “The economic growth of this region depends on
the heavy transportation in the Indian Ocean particularly the Malacca strait.
Navy has an increasing role to provide necessary support for carrying out these
operations.”25
Advancing the Monroe Doctrine
Regional prominence requires India to develop a robust and self-sustaining do-
mestic military industrial and technological complex, one that removes de-
pendence on overseas sources. Such an infrastructure must be fully able to
sustain the fleet twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and 365 days a year.
In that direction, India’s strategic partnership with Washington, including the
civilian nuclear deal, is likely to be of great assistance over time. In the short
term, however, and taking advantage of the presence of the U.S. Navy, which ef-
fectively reduces its own burden, the Indian Navy projects a fleet comprising
three carrier battle groups.26 As Admiral Madhvendra Singh, chief of staff of the
Indian Navy, declared on 14 October 2003, “Fulfilling India’s dream to have a
full-fledged blue-water Navy would need at least three aircraft carriers, 20 more
frigates, 20 more destroyers with helicopters, and large numbers of missile cor-
vettes and antisubmarine warfare corvettes.”27 These battle groups could be or-
ganized into a single fleet, depending on New Delhi’s tolerance for risk and the
Indian Navy’s ability to keep the fleet in a high operational state.28 Six new and
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a few older-vintage destroyers, twelve new and a few old frigates, corvettes,
patrol craft, and five new tank landing ships (LSTs) are likely to feature in such
an order of battle.
All the new Indian Navy warships, including its projected carriers, will be
much more formidable than their predecessors.29 The Indian Defence Ministry
has furthermore recently approved three billion dollars to strengthen the navy’s
littoral war-fighting capabilities.30 The move represents a push for a larger pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean but may also be a response to a more active Chinese
presence there.
In the long term, a self-sufficient Indian Navy ably backed by a domestic de-
fense industrial complex may feature six to nine carrier task forces and more
than a dozen nuclear submarines. In the meantime, the Indian Navy is likely to
continue expanding its undersea nuclear deterrent, manifest in fleet ballistic-
missile submarines, with nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), though
able to operate throughout the Indian Ocean basin and beyond, taking lower
priority.31
IN PERSPECTIVE: PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR POLICY
Henry Kissinger argues, “The persistence of unresolved regional conflicts makes
nuclear weapons a powerful lure in many parts of the world—to intimidate
neighbors and to serve as a deterrent to great powers who might otherwise inter-
vene in a regional conflict.”32 Unlike India—whose nuclear program is widely
believed to be status driven—Pakistan’s nuclear policy is entirely security
driven, and it is India-centric. The national discourse on the direction, aims, and
objectives of nuclear policy are, however, veiled and mainly confined to official
circles. Accordingly, public debate is very generic, in contrast to India’s volumi-
nous material in print on the subject.33 The decision not to enunciate publicly a
comprehensive nuclear doctrine reflects in part the fact that Pakistan sees no
political or status utility in nuclear capability, but rather a purely defensive,
security related purpose.
“Pakistan’s threat perceptions stem primarily from India, at the levels of
all-out conventional war, limited war, and low intensity conflict. Within the nu-
clear framework, Pakistan seeks to establish deterrence against all-out conven-
tional war.”34 In other words, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is directed against
not only a possible Indian nuclear attack but a conventional one as well.35
Among key characteristics of Pakistan’s nuclear policy are maintenance of a
minimum level of nuclear deterrence, retention of a first-use option, and reli-
ance on ground and air delivery (aircraft and missiles).36 Sea-based delivery
means are appreciably missing.
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Like NATO, Pakistan continues to keep its options open on “no first use,” but
has declared willingness to use nuclear weapons as a weapon of last resort. “No
first use” declarations have never been the basis of determining the true posture
of any nuclear-weapon state. If they were, New Delhi would have accepted the
position of China on this issue as well as the latter’s assurances of nonuse of nu-
clear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.37
In late 2001, Pakistan declared four broad conditions under which Islamabad
might resort to use of nuclear weapons, as described by Lieutenant General
Kidwai of the Strategic Plan Division (the secretariat of the National Command
Authority):38 a “space threshold,” should New Delhi attack Pakistan and conquer
a large part of its territory; a “military threshold,” if India destroyed a large part
of Pakistan’s land or air forces; an “economic threshold,” were India to pursue
the economic strangulation of Pakistan; and finally, should India push Pakistan
into “political destabilization or [create] a large scale internal subversion.”39
The Pakistan Navy and Pakistan’s Nuclear Program
The May 1998 tit-for-tat nuclear tests by Pakistan in the Ras-Koh mountain
range in the Chagai district of Balochistan restored the strategic balance in
South Asia.40 The period that followed saw the quarrelsome neighbors expand
their respective arsenals, improve their command and control infrastructures,
and strive for better CEP (circular error probability), greater mobility and faster
reaction time for missiles, and higher yield as well as better yield-to-weight ratios
for the warheads.41
Significantly, no efforts to develop a sea-based nuclear capability and thus ex-
pand the survivability of nuclear forces have ever surfaced in Pakistan’s policy
making. The principal reason for this is perhaps historical “baggage”—a fixa-
tion on Afghanistan, in search of strategic depth as against a geographically
larger India. But 9/11 was a rude awakening that such a policy was not only un-
sound but no longer tenable. By then precious time (1998–2001) that could have
gone toward developing undersea deterrence had been lost.
The “military threshold” postulation in Pakistan’s declared nuclear philoso-
phy surmises the destruction of a large portion of Pakistan’s “land and air com-
ponents” as an inducement to go nuclear. The destruction of a major
component of naval forces, however, remains unstipulated. Three deductions
could be reached: that the navy continues in its usual low priority in the overall
national security calculus, that the possibility of international reaction has pre-
cluded a clear articulation of the naval component, and that the naval case is in-
cluded in the threshold of “economic strangulation.”
But the term “economic strangulation” is broad and can be interpreted in
various ways. Pakistan being an agrarian economy, a prolonged disruption or
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drastic reduction in the flow of cross-border rivers by India could impinge on
crop yield, triggering widespread unrest, destabilization, and a possible con-
frontation.42 But a far more perilous scenario, one that could cause economic
strangulation more quickly, resides at sea.
The Pakistan Navy: A Sentinel of Energy and Economic Security?
Pakistan’s commerce, like India’s, is intrinsically seaborne. More than 95 percent
of Pakistan’s trade by volume, 88 percent by value, is transported by sea.43 Three
sea lines of communication support Pakistan’s maritime trade, viz., from the Far
East, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. These arteries carry both imports and ex-
ports. The imports include edible oil, tea, sugar, wheat, and other value-added
foodstuffs. During the last fiscal year (FY), $3,662,000,000 was spent on food
imports alone.44 Much of Pakistan’s oil also comes over the sea. The Gulf,
through which the country’s annual oil imports are shipped, constitutes the na-
tion’s energy lifeline. With a 5 percent annual growth rate, Pakistan’s oil imports
are likely to reach 22.2 million tons during FY 2010–11.45
During FY 2008–2009, the ports of Karachi and Qasim collectively handled im-
ports of 24.4 million tons of dry cargo and 20.9 million tons of liquid-bulk cargo,
totaling some 45.3 million tons. The sum of exports at these ports during the same
period was 18.3 million tons. In addition, the ports handled 1.9 million TEUs’
worth of containerized cargo.46 All in all, Pakistan’s critical overall dependence on
sea-based imports is a good deal greater than India’s. India’s superiority over Paki-
stan being most pronounced in the maritime field, a blockade of Karachi could se-
riously imperil the country’s economy and the war-fighting potential in two or
three weeks.47 Given all this and the role the Pakistan Navy is expected to play, it is
not difficult to deduce where one must expect Pakistan’s economic and energy se-
curity sensitivities—nay, economic threshold—to dwell.48
THE THRESHOLD AND CREDIBILITY ISSUES
According to Indian analysts, of the four threats that Pakistan has identified as ca-
pable of invoking nuclear response, only two—territorial loss and military
destruction—have credibility. To them, it is difficult to make nuclear escala-
tion credible against the other two (economic strangulation and national
destabilization). Consequently, they maintain, India might now focus on the
latter two and opt for controlled military pressure across the Kashmir Line of
Control.49 The thinking of Indian leadership also reflects a presumption that
should there be an escalation in tension between India and Pakistan, New
Delhi would have the unconstrained support of the international community.
These postulations are deeply flawed. Tension related to water resources is al-
ready heating up; Pakistan has complained that India is holding back the waters
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of rivers flowing from Indian-administered Kashmir. Left unresolved, in due
course the issue will be clubbed together with the Kashmir dispute.50 Any re-
duced water flow would then be perceived as a ploy to put additional pressure on
Pakistan; the response would be equally unmeasured and misdirected.51 Like-
wise, tampering with Pakistan’s sea-lanes could work safely only to an extent.
Any large-scale internal unrest on account of food shortages or effective cessa-
tion of commercial activity due to blockage of fuel supplies through Karachi
would most certainly engender a response beyond a certain point. Once public
pressure mounted, Pakistan’s chief security stakeholders would be bound to re-
act. In a state of panic or nervousness, a freakish response could not be ruled out.
A destabilized state in Pakistan’s main urban centers would be a godsend for
the lethal cocktail of militant groups hoping to reenact “26/11” (as the 26–29
November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai is known). The existing imbroglio in
Karachi is an apt example. Perennially simmering with ethnic and sectarian vio-
lence, the metropolis now hosts one of the world’s largest Pashtun concentra-
tions. Scores of Taliban and al-Qa‘ida insurgents fleeing Malakand, South
Waziristan, and now Helmand have found sanctuary there.52 The recent arrests
in Karachi of some top leaders of Afghan Taliban and al-Qa‘ida (including those
of Mullah Baradar and Ameer Muawiya by Pakistani and American intelligence
forces) are demonstrations of this fact.53
The 26/11 attack lifted off from the shores of Karachi. Its alleged perpetrator,
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), is now a formidable terror enterprise, endeavoring to
compete with al-Qa‘ida. It has relations with factions of the Taliban and several
other jihadi outfits.54 The organization is also believed to have developed the ca-
pacity to launch sea-based operations. According to reports the founding leader
of LeT, Hafiz M. Saeed, wanted by India for involvement in the Mumbai attacks,
has suddenly resumed his activities, mouthing venomous anti-India slogans and
promising to liberate Kashmir.55 Also, with tens of thousands of fishing boats,
small craft, and other unregulated commercial traffic plying continuously along
the coasts of Sindh, Makran, Gujrat, and Maharashtra, coastal security in the
area is deeply exposed, despite efforts on both sides since 2008.56 Making the
most of volatility and coastal vulnerabilities, Karachi-based insurgents could or-
chestrate a new terror assault on India, to provoke a reprisal.57
That the international community will always back New Delhi against Paki-
stan is, however, a misplaced notion. India may well take a leaf from the recent
NATO Military Committee meeting in Brussels, where Pakistan not only scored
a military/diplomatic triumph but effectively truncated India’s strategic gains in
Afghanistan.58
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IS COERCION WORN OUT?
Since the overt exhibitions of their nuclear potentials in 1998, Pakistan and In-
dia have returned from the brink on three occasions. The years since then have
also been studded with diplomatic standoffs. The Kargil conflict in 1999 re-
mained a local affair, with the two armies and air forces battling it out on and
over the frozen peaks. The Indian Navy too played a role as an instrument of co-
ercion. In June 1999, its Western Fleet was reinforced with elements from the
Eastern Fleet, prompting Pakistan Navy to go on full alert. A beefed-up Indian
Navy force later conducted exercises in the northern Arabian Sea. Also—the
lone Indian carrier, INS Viraat, being in refit—trials of the use of a con-
tainership deck as a platform for Sea Harrier aircraft were carried out in Goa.
The aims of these exercises were to demonstrate the buildup of the Indian Navy’s
strength to the Pakistan Navy and to display its assets and readiness for all-out
conflict. Between 21 and 29 June 1999 the Indian Navy deployed missile ships
and corvettes in a forward posture. Expecting economic blockade, the Pakistan
Navy escorted national oil tankers and commenced surveillance sorties along
the coast.59 International pressure and a 4 July accord in Washington finally con-
strained Pakistan to withdraw to its original position.60
In December 2001 an attack on the parliament in New Delhi induced India to
amass four-fifths of its armed forces along the borders with Pakistan. Islamabad
reacted in kind.61 The two sides remained “eyeball to eyeball” for almost ten
months before India decided to stand down.
In the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the Indian leadership was seen
spitting fire, threatening Pakistan with a punitive action. News of possible surgi-
cal strikes by the Indian Air Force deep inside Pakistan, against the major urban
center of Lahore and nearby Muridke, site of the headquarters of LeT, was rife.
The incident also brought to a halt the peace process that had begun in June
1997. The tense period saw Indian generals enunciating provocative new mili-
tary doctrines and its army conducting “Cold Start” exercises on the borders. Yet
all this failed to draw the intended concessions from Pakistan.62 India may have
received a nudge from Washington, but by now, after fourteen long months, the
prolonged face-to-face was having a telling impact on both sides. Coercion had
run out of steam, reached a tipping point. New Delhi indicated willingness to re-
sume parleys.63
It is clear that repeated application of coercion is rendering the instrument
ineffective. Both sides maintain their critical territorial-cum-ideological stand-
points, stemming mainly from the Kashmir issue. Pakistan is not going to allow
its own subjugation, and the Pakistan Army is not going to yield to Indian de-
mands on issues that it deems central to the nation’s ideology.64 For its part, and
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for reasons of politics and regional clout, India must point to Kashmir unrest as
externally abetted and all terror attacks as radiating from Pakistan. The persis-
tence of the respective stances of each side is further reinforced by the fact that
the risks and consequences of nuclear escalation have not yet sunk into the col-
lective minds of the two societies; nuclear devastation still remains largely an ab-
stract concept. As a result there is no effort to deal with the issue of nuclear-war
risk, independent of the Kashmir issue.65 There was no comparably dangerous
territorial stake for the nuclear adversaries of the Cold War.
THE OPTIONS
Pakistan’s security situation is precarious, and the future is not bright. On one
hand, the differences between Washington and Islamabad that lately irked and
angered the latter now seem to be thawing.66 But on the other, New Delhi’s stra-
tegic interests being “exactly aligned” with those of Washington, India is getting
extensive mileage out of Pakistan’s current predicament.67 Despite the recent
diplomatic successes, then, Pakistan’s choices, if it is to address strategic asym-
metry and ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces, are contracting rapidly.
Pakistan’s existing means of delivering nuclear strikes are susceptible to air
and missile attacks. The Indian air defense system—potentially including the
Prithvi Air Defence capability and the upcoming U.S.-Israeli-Russian Ballistic
Missile Shield—reduces the possibility of penetration by either missiles or fight-
ers.68 The option of missiles with multiple warheads also is open to debate. For
now, the dispersal of the nuclear arsenal poses a question mark. The cutting-
edge technologies in the Indian inventory—surveillance means like IRS satel-
lites and the MiG-25, the day/night-capable Israeli surveillance satellite RISAT,
along with platforms like the Phalcon AWACS, Su-30 aircraft, etc.—put its value
in question.
Nonetheless, the recent parleys in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) threaten to freeze the imbalance in
the stocks of these materials of Pakistan and India to the distinct advantage of
the latter. New Delhi gains from the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and a consequent
Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver that has allowed India to conclude agreements
with countries Russia, France, and more recently the United Kingdom to supply
it with nuclear fuel.69 Pakistan’s resource imbalance, geographic disproportion
(differences in landmass), and now the launch of S-2 provide India a convincing
capacity to strike all over Pakistan from the deep south while ensuring the sur-
vivability of its own forces.70 In the absence of Pakistani potential to deliver a nu-
clear riposte, an economic threshold would certainly be reached in days if
Pakistan’s sea-lanes, particularly from the Persian Gulf, were to be obstructed.
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Second Strike on board Conventional Submarines: The Agosta 90B
In October 2008, the chief of staff of the Pakistan Navy claimed that his service
was capable of deploying strategic weapons at sea.71 The details as to how strate-
gic or nuclear weapons would be deployed and whether Pakistan had developed
a capability to launch missiles from submarines were not disclosed. But it is
widely speculated that work on arming the Pakistan Navy’s conventional sub-
marines with nuclear-tipped missiles has been going on now for quite some
time. A sea version of the Babur cruise missile is thought to have been developed
by the country’s strategic organizations. If that is true, Pakistan would not be the
first country to arm conventionally powered submarines with such a capability.
Israel’s 1,900-ton Dolphin-class, German-origin submarines are believed to be
part of the country’s second-strike capability. They provide Tel Aviv the crucial
third pillar of nuclear defense complementing the country’s much vaunted land
and air ramparts.72
Pakistan Navy’s Agosta 90B, or Khalid-class, attack submarines (SSKs) carry
crews of highly skilled and professionally trained officers and men. The subma-
rines, designed by DCN (now DCNS) of France, are a version of the Agosta
series, with improved performance, a new combat system, and AIP (air-
independent propulsion) for better submerged endurance. A higher level of au-
tomation has reduced the crew from fifty-four to thirty-six. Other improve-
ments include a new battery, for increased range; a deeper diving capability of
320 meters, resulting from the use of new materials, including HLES 80 steel;
and a reduced acoustic signature, through the installation of new suspension
and isolation systems.73
Three Agosta 90Bs were ordered by Pakistan in 1994. The first, Khalid (1999),
was constructed in France; the second, Saad (2003), was assembled at the Naval
Dockyard (Karachi); and the third, Hamza (2008), was constructed and assem-
bled in Karachi. These submarines are equipped with diesel-electric propulsion
and the MESMA (Module d’Énergie Sous-Marin Autonome) AIP system.74 The
diesel-electric plant consists of two SEMT-Pielstick 16 PA4 V185 VG diesels,
providing 3,600 horsepower, and a 2,200-kilowatt electric motor driving a single
propeller.
Pakistan is the only country bordering the Indian Ocean to have acquired AIP
submarines. The two-hundred-kilowatt MESMA liquid-oxygen system in-
creases significantly the submerged endurance of the submarine at four knots.75
It consists essentially of a turbine receiving high-pressure steam generated by a
boiler that uses hot gases from the combustion of a gaseous mixture of ethanol
and liquid oxygen.76 The AIP suite causes an 8.6-meter extension of the original
67.6-meter hull, increasing the boat’s submerged displacement from 1,760 tons
to 1,980.77
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The Agosta 90B is equipped with a fully integrated SUBTICS combat system.
SUBTICS processes signals from submarine sensors and determines the tactical
situation by track association, fusion, synthesis, and management, as well as
trajectory plotting. This track management allows appreciation of the surface
picture by the commander and consequent handling of weapons-related com-
mand and control functions.
The Agosta 90B submarine has four bow-mounted 1Q63 A Mod 2 torpedo
tubes, 533 mm in diameter, and carries a mixed load of sixteen torpedoes and
missiles. The boat can also fire tube-launched SM39 Exocet subsurface-to-
surface missiles, capable of hitting targets out to twenty-seven nautical miles
(fifty kilometers) away. The sea-skimming missile has inertial guidance and ac-
tive radar homing and travels at 0.9 Mach.78 Target range and bearing data are
downloaded into the Exocet’s computer via SUBTICS. The boat can also launch
the DM2A4 wire-guided, active/passive, wake-homing torpedo, adding a new
dimension to its firepower. Targets up to forty-five kilometers away can now be
engaged.
In the short term (within five years), Pakistan Navy Khalid-class submarines
with their cutting-edge technology could be armed to carry nuclear-tipped
cruise missiles. Several formidable challenges would, however, have to be over-
come. Missile installation and subsequent integration with the onboard combat
system, as well as with the nuclear command-and-control infrastructure (C4I
network), could be daunting tasks.79 The combat system, meant for conven-
tional weapons, may require major changes to accommodate nonconventional
weapons. During operational deployments a Pakistan Navy submarine carrying
nuclear weapons would be under the operational control not of Commander
Pakistan Fleet, as in existing practice, but of the National Command Authority.
Perhaps a greater challenge would be ensuring foolproof communications
between the submerged submarine and the shore-based command. An elec-
tromagnetic pulse following a nuclear burst would disrupt the earth’s elec-
tromagnetic spectrum, resulting in a partial or complete breakdown of com-
munications, including shore–submarine. The problem is compounded by the
absence of domestic communications satellites. A very-low-frequency (VLF)
communications system can provide an answer, to some extent.80 A sustained
program of tests and trials would be needed to develop a robust communica-
tion system that can sustain such a contingency.
The submarine’s crew, obviously specially selected, would also require exten-
sive training in handling all kinds of unforeseen events, developing standard op-
erating procedures and planning ways to minimize uncertainty on board in the
absence of communications.81 Test firings of missiles will be required to ensure
crew confidence as well as weapon-systems credibility.
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Numerous issues of a technical as well as an operational nature will thus have
to be addressed at each tier to integrate the vessel fully into national strategic
forces. Close cooperation and coordination between the Development and Em-
ployment Control committees under the National Command Authority and
strategic organizations like the Kahuta Research Laboratories, the National En-
gineering and Scientific Commission, the Space and Upper Atmosphere Re-
search Organization, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the Maritime
Technology Complex, and the National Development Complex will also be es-
sential at every step. These organizations will have to rise above intra-
establishment rivalries and jealousies that could get in way of smooth and timely
achievement of milestones.
A word of caution may be in order here. The Pakistan Navy once enjoyed a
sharp edge over the Indian Navy’s conventional submarines, like the Soviet-
designed Foxtrot-class boats, which were noisier than the French submarines
operated by Pakistan. But the Indian Navy has not only been catching up but is
now on the verge of surpassing Pakistani submarines. Its French Scorpènes are
supposedly a generation ahead of the Agosta 90B.82 On a positive note, however,
the recent introduction of advance platforms like the SAAB Erieye airborne
early warning and control system and Il-78 refuelers by Pakistan Air Force, be-
sides bolstering Pakistan’s strategic capability both on land and at sea, will sig-
nificantly strengthen the nation’s air defenses.83
Employing the P-3C
The P-3C Orion long-range maritime-patrol aircraft (LRMP) has a proven mar-
itime surveillance and reconnaissance record that dates back to the Cold War.
Several old and new versions of the aircraft continue to serve in more than eigh-
teen countries, including the United States. It is a turboprop, multidimensional
aircraft commonly known to the naval community as an “airborne destroyer.”
The Pakistan Navy first acquired P-3Cs in 1991. The present inventory is suit-
ably modernized and equipped with cutting-edge sensors and weapons to track,
identify, and hunt surface and subsurface targets. The aircraft can carry a mixed
payload of eight Harpoon missiles and six torpedoes, besides mines and bombs.
It has endurance in excess of eighteen hours and can operate as low as three hun-
dred feet, making its detection quite difficult.
In the recent past, the Pakistan Navy brokered a fresh deal with the United
States for eight refurbished P-3Cs. In addition to improved sensors, a digital
tracking system, electro-optical and infrared sensors, a chaff dispenser, an elec-
tronic support measures (ESM) suite, and sonobuoy detection system, the new
batch of P-3Cs is to be fitted with inverse synthetic-aperture radar (ISAR). ISAR
is a state-of-the-art radar that provides a dual advantage. First, it eases the
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identification problem by displaying a target’s silhouette, a physical image,
which improves the overall effectiveness of tracking and attacking. The other
advantage is variable power output, which makes ISAR difficult to identify via
ESM.
Following the Mumbai terror attacks, the Indian Navy too concluded a deal
with the United States for eight of a new type of LRMP—the Multi-Mission
Maritime Aircraft (MMA, or P-8 Poseidon, the successor to the P-3C). The In-
dian Navy is currently operating older-generation LRMPs, Russian Il-38s and
Tu-142s. The jet-driven Poseidon will be suitably converted for anti-surface-
vessel and antisubmarine roles. The prototype is, however, not likely to roll out
before 2012, after which its true capabilities would be known.
The P-3C is a mainstay of the Pakistan Navy’s offensive arm. With its ad-
vanced weapon and sensor outfit, it gives the Pakistan Navy a clear qualitative
edge over the Indian Navy’s LRMP capability—at least for now. Thanks to its
load-carrying capacity, altitude advantage, and other aerodynamic character-
istics, the P-3C could be armed with land-attack missiles or strategic weapons.
This modification, however, would require specialized equipment—currently
a grey area in the Pakistan Navy. A suitably equipped P-3C could serve as a
powerful backup to an undersea second strike on board Agosta 90Bs. A
well-thought-out employment strategy could render the P-3C a potent con-
stituent of the nuclear triad.
The Medium and Long Terms (beyond Five Years)
The absence of any opposition by the United States or the rest of the interna-
tional community to the prolonged and sustained Russian assistance to India in
the development of a sea-based nuclear deterrent potential was conspicuous.
That is not all; the now-shaping Indo-U.S. nuclear deal has never caused any up-
roar in the West or among the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Besides raising con-
cerns on proliferation, the deal significantly undercuts the efficacy of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.84 This provides Pakistan enough justification
either to lease nuclear submarines or eventually development its own, or both.85
It is not a question of matching nuclear weapon for nuclear weapon but about
preserving stability and ensuring the survivability of nuclear forces. The na-
tional maritime objectives and tasks assigned to the Pakistan Navy may not war-
rant a nuclear submarine in its inventory, but maintenance of deterrence,
particularly in the evolving geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region, certainly
does merit consideration of it.
In China, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is currently involved in
one of the world’s most ambitious submarine expansion and construction pro-
grams. It includes acquisition of conventional submarines, like the Russian Kilo
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(SS), and the construction of the Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN and the Shang-class
(Type 093) SSN. These submarines are expected to be much more modern and
capable than China’s aging older-generation boats.86
In 1983 the PLAN built an eight-thousand-ton Xia-class SSBN, reportedly
armed with twelve JL-1 missiles with a range of a thousand miles. The subma-
rine twice test-fired its missiles but never ventured beyond China’s regional wa-
ters. The new Type 094 Jin, which will replace the single Xia, will carry between
ten and twelve JL-2 SLBMs.87 However, the PLAN has major handicaps in its
limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea or expose these plat-
forms on strategic patrols.88
The once slowly expanding military ties between Beijing and Islamabad have
now matured into a strategic partnership, as is evident from local production of
the JF-17 Thunder multirole fighter, the Al-Khalid tank, and F-22P frigates. This
partnership is further evidenced by the PLAN’s regular participation in the large
multinational AMAN series of exercises hosted by the Pakistan Navy. Pakistan’s
strategic community and Beijing could plan the training and subsequent lease
of a nuclear-powered submarine. The PLAN’s Xia submarine could be an appro-
priate start. A pool of selected Pakistan Navy officers could be trained to operate
an SSBN, with theoretical/academic work ashore followed by operational train-
ing at sea and finally a strategic deployment. Though such a plan seems ambi-
tious and the PLA Navy’s SSBNs rarely prowl far, this remains a viable choice
that would serve the two countries well strategically.89
{LINE-SPACE}
Deterrence is not a passive concept; it must be stepped up in proportion to an
adversary’s increases in arsenal or delivery means. For reasons all too well
known, Pakistan’s principal security perceptions will remain India-centric. To
keep deterrence credible, the indispensability of continuously bolstering Paki-
stan’s nuclear assets, including delivery means, cannot be overstressed. The in-
ternational community would react sharply were Pakistan to field a sea-based
nuclear deterrent, given the country’s security situation and fears of radicaliza-
tion (real or imaginary) in Western minds.90 Timing, therefore, is crucial. Paki-
stan is currently too dependent on the American and multilateral financial
institutions for keeping its economy afloat, and that situation is not likely to al-
ter for the next few years. But if the issue is not addressed, Pakistan’s hard-earned
nuclear stability may erode beyond recovery.
The role of armed forces was once to win a war if diplomacy had failed; in the
nuclear age their role is to prevent warfare from breaking out.91 Despite being on
the wrong side of history, Pakistan has no option but to take some hard
decisions.
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NOTE S
The views expressed are those of the author
and not of the Pakistan Navy or Pakistan
Navy War College, Lahore.
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PROSPECTS FOR INDIAN AND PAKISTANI ARMS
CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
Feroz Hassan Khan
The regional dynamic in South Asia is both extravagant and complicated. Forcenturies various empires have risen, thrived, and fallen, as numerous wars
and clashes for control over resources spread across the geography. South Asian
history writ large has seen hypothetical borders redrawn several times, leaving
in question the viability of state control and perpetuating ethnic tensions.
Though the great partition of India in 1947 ought to have politically resolved
communal disharmony, the haste of British withdrawal created a geopolitical
quagmire that has resulted in an “enduring rivalry” between the nations of India
and Pakistan, one that has lasted for more than sixty years.1
The contemporary security climate in the region has exacerbated this histori-
cal precedent of protracted conflict, which has in turn nurtured an environment
that remains resistant to the building of trust and con-
fidence. Since their demonstrations of nuclear capa-
bilities, both India and Pakistan have increased the
risk of war, with cross-border arms buildups and fail-
ure to sustain a peace dialogue. Moreover, the regional
security environment breeds broader strategic anxi-
eties in both India and Pakistan, which makes the like-
lihood of conventional war between the two nuclear-
armed neighbors higher than it is anywhere else in the
world.
Thus the ensuing regional culture leans more to-
ward military competition than to strategic restraint
Feroz Hassan Khan is a lecturer and senior researcher in
the Center for Contemporary Conflict in the Depart-
ment of National Security Affairs at the Naval Post-
graduate School, Monterey, California. He is a former
brigadier general in the Pakistan Army, with experience
in combat and in command on the Line of Control in
Kashmir and at Siachin Glacier, as well as service in nu-
merous assignments in the United States, Europe, and
Asia. Brigadier Khan holds an MA from the School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, Washington, D.C. He is the author or coauthor
of numerous articles and contributions to edited collec-
tions; his book Eating Grass: Pakistan and the Bomb is
forthcoming next year.
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and conflict resolution (the logical course for strategic stability). Clearly, to con-
sider the prospects of arms control and confidence-building measures (CBMs)
in the midst of this climate is problematic in itself, but the various grievances be-
come even more convoluted when strategic imbalances are further influenced
by the singular perceptions of the predominating powers in the region.
In the face of these geopolitical calamities, this article examines the realistic
prospects of sustainable arms control and CBMs in South Asia over the next de-
cade. The first section examines the strategic anxieties of India and Pakistan, re-
spectively; the second section reviews the treaties and CBMs that have been
attempted in the past (some of them still applicable today), drawing out a trend
of crisis and bilateral missteps. Later sections analyze the Strategic Restraint Re-
gime (SRR) proposed in 1998, as well as the Lahore Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) of 1999, and how such measures can be more effective in the
future. Finally, the article presents three possible trajectories that the region
might take and suggests new ways forward that could create an environment
amenable to pragmatic CBMs and limited arms-control measures.
STRATEGIC ANXIETIES
As previously suggested, the dynamics associated with the endemic rivalry be-
tween India and Pakistan must be viewed through the broader lens of regional
politics and security. This becomes more apparent when considering India’s
perception of Chinese strategic objectives in South Asia. If any realistic CBMs
are to be proposed for the future, such perceptions must be factored into the
overall security equation.
India’s Strategic Anxieties
In general, India believes that China is encircling the country, by establishing
special partnerships with many of India’s smaller neighbors. Specifically, India is
irked by the evolving relationship between China and Pakistan, a relationship
that India believes has the singular purpose of thwarting its own natural rise as
an aspiring global power.
One of the more onerous issues is a perception that has come to be known as
the “string of pearls.”2 To provide a frame of reference, Pakistan’s Makran Coast
has strategic importance, in that it offers Pakistan options to counter India’s
projection of power in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has already shown signs that
it is moving to develop broader air and naval capabilities. The buildup of the
Gwadar commercial port along this coast—assisted by China—exacerbates In-
dia’s anxieties and provides Pakistan with broader strategic utility. For the Chi-
nese, it provides a potential access to energy pipelines that would “unlock trade
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routes to the market and energy supplies of Central Asia,” with less risk than at
present.3
This is important because India is geographically restricted in its access to
both the east and west, due to the physical presence of Bangladesh and Pakistan,
and in the north by the Himalayas. In this regard, India’s access to Southwest
Asia runs into a geopolitical barrier, because of its rivalry with Pakistan. Simi-
larly, India suffers constraints with respect to East Asia imposed by Bangladesh
and Burma, which physically block India’s access to those markets. With China
entering the scene with a growing presence along the Makran Coast, the situa-
tion from India’s perspective becomes even more tenuous. This strategic handi-
cap, taken as a whole, forces India to rely on its maritime capabilities in order to
maintain trade routes and logistics between its continental shores and the rest of
the world.
As a part of this expanded naval presence, India has launched ballistic-missile
submarines and produced other naval capabilities that can act as an extended
security arm for its various trade routes, as well as a third strike capability (that
is, in addition to its land-based and air assets). India’s growing presence in the
maritime environment, in conjunction with its overall strategic rise, makes its
smaller neighbors nervous. This strategic apprehension creates a ripple effect
across the region whereby the smaller countries move closer to external alli-
ances in order to balance India’s rising power.
Additionally, India believes, China is propping up Pakistan’s nuclear and mil-
itary capabilities in areas where Western technologies are not meeting the need.
In particular, India is under the impression that Pakistan is taking advantage of
America’s involvement in Afghanistan, which places it in a unique position to
acquire strategic capabilities and political remuneration.
Whatever its concerns, however, India’s strategic calculus of structural and
conventional force advantages over Pakistan was neutralized (to an extent)
when Pakistan demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1998. Many Indian strate-
gists believe that this nuclear hedge enables Pakistan to conduct asymmetric
warfare against India, without fear of reprisal. This perception reinforces India’s
belief that as long as Pakistan can keep India engaged inwardly through insur-
gencies and build its own strategic alliances with the United States and China,
India’s rise to power will be curtailed.
Pakistan’s Strategic Anxieties
Generally speaking, Pakistan’s strategic anxieties in the region are a mirror re-
flection of those of India, vis-à-vis the other half of the “enduring rivalry.” For
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Pakistan, however, the objective is threefold but simple: national survival, rele-
vance as an actor in the region, and refusal to be marginalized by India.
Pakistan wields vast manpower, with a population of 170 million; possesses
strong strategic assets, in the shape of nuclear weapons and natural resources;
fields a conventional army of a half-million; and is a proactive player in the Mus-
lim world. The latter point not only connects Pakistan with the Muslim commu-
nity in a bilateral sense but also helps in bridging the gaps between Islamic
countries and China and with the United States. Despite the credit it has re-
ceived for such macro-level factors, its intense rivalry and competition with In-
dia over the past sixty years have made Pakistan India-phobic and paranoid
about a variety of issues.
Much as India worries over the geographic firewall that restricts its land ac-
cessibility to the east and west, so does Pakistan interpret Indian foreign-policy
maneuvers as aimed at geopolitically encircling Pakistan itself. As India
increases its influence and presence in Afghanistan with a slew of consulates,
Pakistan considers these developments hostile to its interests. India has also
established a strategically located air base in Tajikistan (Ayni Air Base in
Dushanbe), which also adds to these suspicions. Further, India’s investment in
the Iranian port of Chabahar—fifty miles west of Gwadar Port—and construc-
tion of roads through Zahedan into Afghanistan add additional tension in an
area that is essential for the transportation of goods and energy to a host of
countries. All these moves are seen as encircling Pakistan.
There are also operational issues that hinder Pakistan’s strategic balance on
its eastern and western borders. India’s strategic orientation remains toward Pa-
kistan, where the bulk of its armed forces are deployed. As a result, Indian and
Pakistani troops remain deployed—“eyeball to eyeball”—along the Line of
Control (LoC) in Kashmir; this has been the case since 1948. On its opposite
border along the frontier territory with Afghanistan, Pakistan’s anxieties are
manifest in the complex internal strife and multiple insurgencies and instabili-
ties. In sum, Pakistan must balance dealing with India, multiple insurgencies,
and retaining interests in Afghanistan.
The ultimate nightmare for Pakistan would be to live between two hostile
neighbors, India in the east and Afghanistan in the west. Pakistan believes that
unless issues are resolved with India, it will have no choice but to seek arrange-
ments with an ethnically diverse and friendly government in Kabul—a govern-
ment that would not do the bidding of powers hostile to Pakistan or further
destabilize already troubled border areas. On the contrary, if Afghanistan be-
comes a strategic instrument of Indian geopolitical outmaneuvering, that,
added to the ongoing problems in Jammu and Kashmir, would produce a per-
petual state of tension and crises among the three countries.
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Overarching these regional issues is Pakistan’s fear that its long-term ally the
United States may eventually turn against it, under Indian influence. The
U.S.-Indian nuclear deal reached in 2005 exacerbated these anxieties, viewed as
it is by Pakistan as skewing the balance even more greatly in favor of the already
powerful India.4 In fact, since 9/11, there has been a slow erosion of overall inter-
national sympathy with Pakistan’s grievances, especially with regard to Jammu
and Kashmir, the socioeconomic costs of three decades of Afghan wars, and
daily episodes of terrorism within Pakistan.
The prospects of such growing political and economic disparities with re-
spect to India, coupled with these mounting internal problems (especially per-
sistent terrorism, ranging from Quetta to Swat), will continue to endanger
Pakistan’s aggregate national power. Consistent pressure from India, instability
in Afghanistan, and a fragile domestic structure are likely to render Pakistan as a
state significantly weak and unstable. Its aforementioned strengths could very
well become vulnerabilities, stirring broad, international upheaval. These cir-
cumstances make Pakistanis all the keener to obtain a strategic peace with India,
one that allows them the space and time to recover from these challenges.
BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK
Given these strategic anxieties, it is no wonder that both India and Pakistan suc-
cumb to gridlock rather than seeking a path of reconciliation and confidence
building. Further, because of blatantly conflicting objectives between the two
countries—one global, the other regional—security competition and asymme-
try of interests continue to grow between the two. Despite negativity and pessi-
mism, however, there is in fact potential for both new confidence building and
arms-control measures. A brief overview of CBMs from 1947 to date will illus-
trate the nature of the problem; a conceptual consideration of past initiatives is
especially necessary in that they have been directly connected to crisis and mired
in ulterior motives. The lessons of these unsuccessful attempts can strengthen
efforts to frame such policies in the future.
Major Agreements and Treaties, 1947–2004
Every major treaty or CBM between these countries has its origin in crisis reso-
lution. Historically, Pakistan preferred outside mediation in disputes with India;
as a smaller and weaker party with a strong sense that morality was on its side, it
was convinced that it could win justice through international organizations like
the United Nations or alliances with major powers. That proved to be a fallacy.
Instead, during the Cold War Pakistan became a geopolitical pawn between the
superpowers. Rather than strengthening itself by alliance and international as-
sertions of its relevancy as against its archrival India, it found itself in strategic
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competition with India in frameworks where trajectories favored India and alli-
ances did not mitigate its own security concerns. This became a fundamental
reason for Pakistan to seek a nuclear weapons program.
India, for its part, has always despised outside intervention in its subconti-
nental affairs and sought to address all problems on a bilateral basis—because of
an asymmetry of power tipped in its favor. In general, bilateralism has suited In-
dia for strategic reasons and conforms to its traditional nonaligned stance of
keeping the superpowers away from the region. Nevertheless, despite this insis-
tence, not a single problem has been resolved on a bilateral basis. Moreover, since
9/11 Pakistan has come under scrutiny from the international community in re-
gard to its use of asymmetric force to settle the dispute over Jammu and Kash-
mir. In that context, outside intervention does not necessarily favor Pakistan but
could strengthen India’s position. That aside, however, treaties and agreements
brokered by outside intervention have had a generally good record of imple-
mentation on the parts of both India and Pakistan.
The first agreement after the 1947–48 war over Kashmir, through bilateral
talks between India and Pakistan, came about as an extension of a UN Security
Council resolution. Under the 1948 resolution the 1949 Karachi Agreement was
constituted. This initial agreement should have served as a framework for other
measures since then.5 To date, the Karachi Agreement has been the guideline for
the conduct of troops deployed along the LoC in Kashmir, monitored by UN ob-
servers. Both India and Pakistan have deployed forces along the LoC adhering
(by and large) to the parameters set by the UN-approved agreement.
The next major agreement, the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, was also a response
to crisis and was brokered by a third party, in this case the World Bank. This
agreement, over water distribution, had its origin in the Kashmir crisis. While an
“out of the box” interim solution from former president Pervez Musharraf to the
Kashmir dispute went nowhere, negotiations continued to drag on behind the
scenes. At the same time, India began constructing new dams in Kashmir, divert-
ing water resources authorized for Pakistan; this was in clear violation of the
Indus Waters Treaty. (Kashmir is not just an ideological and territorial dispute
but a water-resource issue as well.) Though both India and Pakistan have devel-
oped reasonable complaints about it, the basic tenets of the treaty have func-
tioned despite many wars and military crises. Yet if India’s strategy to use dam
construction and water diversion as leverage against Pakistan persists, it could
well lead to the eventual collapse of the Indus Waters Treaty altogether.
The Tashkent Agreement of 1966 was brokered by the Soviets after the 1965
war between India and Pakistan, with the indirect support of the United States.
Once again, it came about as a result of crisis and war. Though the Tashkent
Agreement provided no framework for resolution of the disputes between India
1 1 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWCR_Summer2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Summer2010\NWCR_Summer2010.vp
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 8:49:04 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
116
Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 3, Art. 25
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss3/25
and Pakistan—at least for the following twenty-five years—it put the dispute
over Jammu and Kashmir on the back burner.
After the ensuing Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, however, the approach to dia-
logue changed. With India’s primacy established, no further agreement was im-
plemented on a third-party basis. Subsequent agreements would be conducted
bilaterally, or with mere pressure from, rather than direct involvement of, the in-
ternational community. Three major agreements can be attributed to Indian
and Pakistani bilateral relations. Again, each of these agreements had crisis as a
backdrop:
• The Simla Agreement of 1972, directly in response to the 1971 war
• The Lahore Agreement of 1999, in reaction to the crisis spawned from the
1998 nuclear tests and the ongoing Kashmir crisis
• The 2004 Islamabad Accord, resulting from 9/11 and the 2001–2002 mili-
tary crisis and Kashmir issues.
All the bilateral agreements had an effective framework to resolve conflict but
no effective longevity. One after another they were violated by one side or the
other, each time resulting in deep military crises. For example, in the mid-1980s,
India was undergoing a Sikh crisis in Punjab when the Indian Army assaulted
the Sikh holy shrine in Amritsar (Operation BLUESTAR), exacerbating the Sikh
insurgency. Simultaneously, in a planned military operation, India decided to
occupy the Siachin Glacier (Operation MEGHDOOT) in the disputed northern
area of Kashmir. This event once again brought Jammu and Kashmir to the fore-
front of the India-Pakistan dispute. Two years later, the Indian Army chief, Gen-
eral Krishnaswamy Sundarji, planned a major military exercise code-named
BRASSTACKS, incorporating a secret plan for a preventive war to neutralize Paki-
stan’s nuclear program.6 These two crises occurred at a time when Pakistan was
deeply involved in an asymmetric war (with the support of the United States)
against the Soviet Union.
The next crisis, in 1990, resulted from a Kashmir uprising that escalated to
such a point that India and Pakistan were once again at the brink of war. This cri-
sis was particularly significant in that both India and Pakistan had covert nu-
clear weapons capabilities, which was known to both sides. This factor
prompted the United States to intervene in such crises from then onward.
The history of trust-damaging episodes in the midst of such crisis has had far
more weight than has the record of keeping faith in treaties. Again, while India
has been able to project its position to a global audience, Pakistan has typically
had a smaller, regional venue. All of these elements help explain the rise and fail-
ure of various agreements, treaties, and accords. Yet another lens with regard to
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progress on the diplomatic front is the introduction of strategic confidence-
building measures.
Strategic CBMs
The notion of “strategic CBMs” implies that nuclear and conventional-force
CBMs are in a symbiotic relationship. One of the foremost issues regarding
CBMs between India and Pakistan is of a conceptual nature. The premise behind
strategic CBMs is that nuclear measures on their own are meaningless if conven-
tional force restraints are not applied. There are four distinct areas where India
and Pakistan differ in terms of structuring and harnessing CBMs, where arms
control becomes problematic.
First, India finds abhorrent anything that binds it to regional limits. From the
outset India has taken global disarmament as the necessary context to project its
own position on disarmament with regard to nuclear weapons. Pakistan, in con-
trast, insists that everything is regional and India-specific. India does not want
to be tied down to Pakistan alone but recognizes problems with other countries
(specifically China) that must also be considered; it wants only nuclear military
CBMs, to keep its conventional-force supremacy intact. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s
insistence on regional nuclear CBMs is a result of Western pressure to forgo its
nuclear ambitions; its nuclear program was nurtured under obstacles, sanctions,
and other reprisals imposed by the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, these
sanctions have affected Pakistan negatively, whereas India has sustained them
with little or no effect.
Second, India considers any CBM that inhibits its use of force within the re-
gion as contradicting its force posture; this is Pakistan’s fundamental problem.
Third, India insists that nuclear CBMs begin with a declared doctrine; Pakistan
simply believes that real doctrines are classified, that declared doctrines are sim-
ply “verbal posturing” meant for diplomatic consumption only.7
Last, India believes that its declared second-strike doctrine and civilian su-
premacy over the armed forces sufficiently explain its articulation of command
and control over nuclear weapons. For Pakistan, clear delineation of command
channels and explicit assignment of decision-making bodies are necessary for a
system responsible for managing nuclear weapons in peace, crisis, and war. This
emphasis on command and control reflects Pakistan’s own checkered history of
civil-military relations.
With all this as background, Pakistan began to make regional proposals be-
ginning with India’s first nuclear test, in 1974. It made seven regionally based
proposals, each automatically rejected by India.8 This allowed Pakistan to
show—that is, to show the region—that India did not want to cooperate, thus
placing the burden of defending its position on India. Pakistan knew that the
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proposals were not realistic, and the international community did as well
(though not all were disingenuous, and there might have been a different out-
come had world powers not dismissed them). Pakistan also used these regional
proposals to create the diplomatic space for the development of its own nuclear
program, while simultaneously shifting the responsibility for proliferation to
the bigger power.
New military and nuclear CBMs, similar to the treaties previously discussed,
came in the wake of nuclear developments and military crises. Most of them
were, once again, bilateral. For example, the prohibition in 1988 against attack-
ing nuclear installations and facilities was a response to information, which was
widely analyzed, showing that India would attack Pakistani nuclear installa-
tions; precedent was also established by Siachin and the bombing of Iraqi nu-
clear facilities.
India and Pakistan once again adopted bilateral agreements following the
major crisis in the 1980s, when political leadership under Zia-ul-Haq and subse-
quent civilian leaders, like Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, created initiatives
with India’s Rajiv Gandhi and other congressional leaders. Additional agree-
ments would follow.
Notification of military exercises and airspace violations actually arose from
BRASSTACKS and other, minor incidents in which the Indian Army contemplated
making war on Pakistan. The agreement would oblige each side to provide ad-
vance notification of military exercises.
Another example is the bilateral, joint declaration in 1992 of the complete
prohibition of chemical weapons, a result of allegations by both sides that the
other was building a chemical weapons program. This joint agreement was also
a way to deflect pressure from the international community, which was then ne-
gotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which was eventually
signed in 1993. When India declared possession of chemical weapons as re-
quired by the CWC, however, Pakistan protested, alleging violation of the bilat-
eral, joint declaration against chemical weapons.
Last is the hotlines agreement between the directors-general of military oper-
ations (DGMOs), foreign secretaries, and maritime security agencies. It came
about as an agreed mechanism by which military and diplomats could commu-
nicate in order to prevent emergence of a crisis and manage escalation. Though
this is a reasonable purpose and a practical means of communication, it has not
been used in such a manner; instead, the hotlines have typically been used for
deception, at worst, and postcrisis management, at best. There are plenty of ex-
amples of such misuse of this otherwise productive tool: hotlines were useful af-
ter the Kargil crisis, but not during it;9 hotlines between the DGMOs did not
work when the 1999 Indian plane hijacking crisis was at its peak; the foreign
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secretaries line did not prevent the Mumbai 2008 attack from derailing the en-
tire peace process; and the maritime security hotline has not prevented the daily
seizure of fishermen by each side but has been used only after the fact when the
governments decide to return them.
All of these agreements reflect thoughtful ideas but incredibly poor imple-
mentation. Neither side has built upon such measures; instead, each has used
them as means to counteract the other.
The Lahore MOU and the Strategic Restraint Regime
The Lahore MOU is, in contrast, by far the most significant agreement between
India and Pakistan, one that has not just created a framework for new arms con-
trol and CBMs but offers the prospect of conflict resolution as well.
The Lahore MOU came about at the famous summit between the prime min-
isters of India and Pakistan in February 1999. The agreement was a result of an
intense eight-month process, beginning after the nuclear test in May 1998, in
which American diplomats led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot were
actively involved. UN Security Council Resolution 1172, of June 1998, con-
demned both India and Pakistan, placing stringent conditions on both coun-
tries and addressing the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
In fact, many ideas flowed between Indian and Pakistani diplomats during
this period.10 India and Pakistan decided to “triangulate” their bilateral dia-
logues, making the United States a third party. Theoretically, this was a good way
forward, with each side speaking separately to the United States; however, suspi-
cion ensued. Another entanglement was that the United States approached the
issue based on its experience in Europe; that did not necessarily conform to the
strategic realities of South Asia. For example, most CBMs and agreements of the
Cold War had been fashioned for a bipolar world, but the Lahore agreements
happened after the East-West conflict had ended.
Despite these incongruities, “strategic restraint” became the term du jour.
The American expert team presented Pakistan a paper called “Minimum Deter-
rence Posture,” offering such recommendations as geographical separation of
major components of nuclear arsenals and their delivery means; segregation of
delivery systems from warhead locations; declaration of nonnuclear delivery
systems, with their specific locations (e.g., which squadrons of aircraft, at given
locations, would be nuclear or nonnuclear); establishment of finite ceilings for
fissile-material production and monitoring of nuclear testing; and last, limita-
tion of production and ballistic flight tests. All this was meant to produce what
was referred to as a “strategic pause.”
These proposals were alien to South Asian security experts. Again, they had
been derived from Cold War concepts that were not applicable to the regional
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security environment. India and Pakistan, obviously, did not accept them; how-
ever, the Pakistan side did recognize these concepts in principle, with a promise
to reconsider those proposals it presumed to be within its security interests. Sub-
sequently, Pakistan transformed these U.S. proposals into its own, regionally
based concept, the SRR.11 The SRR was conceptually based upon the principle of
nuclear restraint, with conventional force restraint as well—hence, it was a
strategic CBM. It was simply not practical for a small country like Pakistan to
“segregate” delivery systems, as suggested by the United States. That was unac-
ceptable, because it undercut the necessary ambiguity of Pakistan’s strategic de-
terrence, while allowing India to wage conventional war against it. Finally,
Pakistan and India were not subscribers to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), though they were in essential agreement with the United States
that they should not conduct more tests.
What Pakistan proposed was a comprehensive conventional-force restraint
agreement. This proposal had three major elements: identification of the offen-
sive forces of each country, with their locations and postures; designation of
geographical border areas as Low Force Zones (LFZs), from which offensive
forces would be kept away; and a long-term mutually balanced force reduction,
as conflict resolution and peace prevailed in the region. The Pakistani side pro-
duced several alternative proposals and designated each side’s offensive forces.
Identifying forces that are dangerous to each other would allow measures to sep-
arate them geographically in order to prevent tension and armed conflict.
The LFZs would be the hallmark of this intended policy. The border areas and
the towns close by would be defensive only, the sizes of forces in their garrisons
to be agreed upon by both sides. In the event of changes, each side would notify
the other. The proposed eventual force reduction would be “mutually balanced”
because India has a much larger military structure; conventional force reduc-
tions would be proportional, involving equal ratios.
On the question of “nonmating” nuclear weapons from their delivery sys-
tems, Pakistan acknowledged this to be an existential issue of nuclear posture.
Pakistan was amenable to formalizing regional nondeployment of nuclear
weapons in conjunction with conflict resolution and conventional force re-
straints. The SRR also proposed mutual missile restraints, including range and
payload ceilings, flight-testing notification, and prohibition of destabilizing
modernization, such as missile defense or submarine-launched ballistic
missiles.
However, the United States accepted India’s position in not agreeing to these
terms. This derailed the whole process. The dialogue lost its energy, as the United
States began to mirror India’s position, and Pakistan lost interest. Pakistan’s
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fundamental problem was India’s conventional threat, which remained unad-
dressed in every proposal by the United States. Any CBMs not related to conven-
tional force would be irrelevant. The failure of SSR to be accepted in South Asia
set the tone of U.S. policy toward the region, and a new strategic competition be-
tween India and Pakistan began. American ignorance of the SSR was a historic
failure; a general peace and stability framework could have been produced, as
against a trajectory of competition and conflict.
Nevertheless, the Lahore MOU framework had come about as a result of po-
litical will from the leadership in both India and Pakistan. The bureaucrats were
pressured to reach an agreement within a span of ten days—and they did. This
not only illustrates that there is no dearth of ideas as far as CBMs are concerned
but emphasizes the importance of political will. The Lahore MOU still stands as
the best way to pick up the threads of a peace and security architecture for South
Asia.
BAD, UGLY, AND GOOD: TRAJECTORIES IN THE REGION
India and Pakistan could take any of three possible trajectories in the second de-
cade of the twenty-first century, given their current courses. The stability of the
region would depend on the dynamics generated by the scenario that emerges—
ideally, one that promotes peace and security through strategic CBMs.
Bad. This scenario already exists: today the region as a whole stands in a “bad”
position. The choice is to go down either a path that leads to a good scenario or
one that plummets the situation into a multitude of ugly developments.
The status quo between India and Pakistan is fraught with tension, where
trust has been lost (as has been shown throughout this article). No third-party
influence can change this inertia. The only positive influence is the United
States; however, even under its nudging, India and Pakistan continue to only
“talk the talk,” not “walk the walk.” In each failed dialogue process the stronger
side learns the weaker side’s negotiating positions and finds vulnerabilities that
it can exploit when tension and crises return. Therefore, whenever Pakistan has
tried to concede points in the past, India, instead of converting the development
into a sincere, honest proposal, has come back with an alternative proposition
that it knows full well would be unacceptable for Pakistan.
The result is a gradual arms race that continues to push the region closer to
conventional force deployments. India continues to apply coercive diplomatic
pressure and suggestive doctrines like Cold Start, with threats implicit in public
statements by civilian and military leaders alike.12 In fact, Indian Army chief
Deepak Kapur recently stated publicly that India could deal with Pakistan
within the first ninety-six hours of engagement and then immediately turn to
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China.13 This is a merely one example of the aggressive posturing by the Indian
military in recent years. Because Pakistani forces are deployed on multiple
fronts, where potential political crises exist, the likelihood is that Pakistan will
push toward strategic weapons deployment or shift to an ambiguous nuclear de-
ployment—in two or three years, if trends persist.
Every major power is working with India on nuclear agreements, making
India the only country in the world that is a nonmember of the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is at the same time recognized as a de facto nuclear-
weapons state. This appeasing of a state that has challenged the nonproliferation
regime and is not subject to the NPT is creating in Pakistan a sense of Western
duplicity and discrimination. These issues, coupled with the U.S. agenda to
jump-start the global arms-control process (CTBT, etc.), will force Pakistan into
a position where it no longer has any incentive to cooperate.
Ugly. If this bad trend continues, an even direr scenario will ensue. Increasing
tension between India and China, as well as India and Pakistan, will develop.
This will lead to a heightened security environment in the region, leading mili-
tary forces to be on the alert, if not fully deployed on the borders. Warfare could
easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Technological innovation would be focused on the acquisition or deploy-
ment of missile defenses, with the transfer of such technologies as the Israeli Ar-
row antiballistic missile. China may not deploy its strategic arsenal, but Pakistan
cannot be expected to remain nondeployed if it does. In response, India would
deploy a strategic arsenal made more robust by nuclear submarines, or a mix of
strategic weapons. If a situation of this sort happens, the possibility of hot pur-
suit across the LoC by Indian ground or special forces, cross-border attacks by
the Indian Air Force, or Indian naval coercive deployment in the Arabian Sea to
exploit Pakistan’s vulnerabilities cannot be ruled out.
Alternatively, the Cold Start deployment organization—involving “inte-
grated battle groups”—could be implemented. This would be a clear fortifica-
tion of the border and a flagrant attempt to escalate. In response, Pakistan would
break loose from all arms-control discussions. This could lead to a general melt-
down of the regional situation, with the United States no longer in a position to
intervene positively.
Good. The “ugly” scenario can be prevented if the current trajectories are re-
versed through cautious influence by the powers to end the India-Pakistan
deadlock. If the dialogue process does lead in a positive direction and in a mean-
ingful way, there can certainly be a “good” option, with a potential for strategic
CBMs.
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India must make a conscientious policy shift toward Pakistan, recognizing
the two positive trends that have recently emerged: first, the success of demo-
cratic political processes, and second, the focus of the Pakistani military on op-
posing violent extremism. India must reach out through the dialogue process to
strengthen and support these trends. India should also revise its current security
doctrine of coercion (Cold Start), exploitation (e.g., backing away from a per-
ceived negative role in Afghanistan), and aggressive diplomatic isolation of Pa-
kistan, which is in vogue at the time of this writing.
The best course for India is to pick up the threads of the Lahore MOU and
Islamabad Accord. If India takes up the Lahore framework and gives fair consid-
eration to the SSR (through the lens of strategic CBMs) that Pakistan offered,
progress can be made.
By way of easing the relationship and initiating people-to-people contact,
four separate endeavors should be agreed upon between India and Pakistan:
• Promote religious tourism. Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims, and members of other
religious sects should be afforded an opportunity to visit shrines in India,
as well as in Pakistan.
• Increase cultural tourism and sports exchanges. India has used sports as a
cultural and political tool in the past in ways ranging from threatening not
to send cricket teams for competition to openly supporting Hindu extrem-
ists threatening Pakistani players and cultural performances. Such acts
should cease and be replaced with more positive exchanges.
• Ease trade relations. There are concerns on both sides, but there can be
some linkages.
• Cooperate on the Indus Waters Treaty. For the first time, there is a sense
that India is using its position to bolster the water rights of Pakistan at its
own expense, by erecting dams, etc. If the Indians move in a direction that
embraces cooperation on such important strategic issues, the prospects of
CBMs can sow seed in this fertile soil.
A WAY FORWARD
In the next three to five years, there are four key areas in which prospects exist for
confidence-building measures, even rudimentary arms control—all of which
can be attributed to the tragic Mumbai incident in 2008. They are mentioned
here only briefly; further analysis and elaboration can be the subject of a later
discussion. Yet it is important to provide an overview of such potential measures
in proposing a new way forward.
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First and most immediate is a CBM by which India and Pakistan revive the
Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism that was agreed in 2006, as a follow-on to the
2004 Islamabad Accord. This mechanism failed as a result of the Mumbai inci-
dent. It is important that both countries draw lessons from the failure and im-
prove the mechanism so as to prevent the derailment of relations as a result of a
terror attack. It is unlikely that terrorism in the region will disappear anytime
soon, and it is important to not allow terrorists to hold two nuclear-armed states
hostage.
Next, India and Pakistan should establish a national risk reduction center.
Communications were deadlocked at both political and military levels after the
horrific Mumbai event. This indicated the fragility of relations between the two
countries. An institutional mechanism for communication about and resolu-
tion of such risks—over a spectrum from a Mumbai-type terror incident up to a
nuclear-related accident—is now essential.
The third CBM is maritime in nature. The Mumbai incident involved mari-
time transit, which is all the more reason for developing maritime CBMs be-
tween the two countries. India and Pakistan can, under the spirit of the Lahore
MOU, begin an incidents-at-sea agreement, delineate maritime boundaries to
prevent incursions by fishermen, and develop maritime cooperation in other ar-
eas, like piracy. The maritime hotline should be put to better use than it is at
present, as to prevent another Mumbai-related event or abduction of innocent
fishermen.
Finally, though it may appear premature, India and Pakistan must conduct a
sober analysis of their ballistic-missile inventories. As widely reported and un-
derstood, their shortest-range ballistic missiles—the Prithvi-I in the case of In-
dia, the HATF-I for Pakistan—have little strategic utility and pose technical
problems. It may be wise for India and Pakistan to eliminate these two capabili-
ties as a first step. This would be symbolic, not impacting military stature or ca-
pabilities for various contingencies. In the long term, however, there may be a
realization that the next category of ballistic missiles, Prithvi-II and HATF-II,
may also be of less military utility. (The technical and strategic aspects are left
for further analysis at a later time.)
Nonetheless, if the current deadlock over dialogue changes into a sustained
peace process, it puts the region on the “good” path. India and Pakistan can then
commence meaningful confidence-building measures, for which there are clauses
existing within the Lahore MOU that can be resurrected. Examples would be bi-
lateral consultations on security, disarmament, and nonproliferation issues; a re-
view of the existing communications links; and periodic assessments of the
implementation of existing CBMs. The Lahore MOU also promised that
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agreements would be negotiated at a technical-expert level. In general, it would be
wise of India and Pakistan to begin a program of arms control and CBMs in the
next decade, under the rubric of the Lahore MOU.
The first decade of the twenty-first century has been plagued with tensions in
South Asia, from the war on terror in response to 9/11 to the lasting rivalry be-
tween India and Pakistan. This decade has shown that India and Pakistan remain
on the path of competition and nonresolution, a path steeped in historical pre-
cedent. The next decade should reverse this trend and shift from competition to
a cooperative security framework, one in which resolution of new security
threats and nontraditional security issues—water, energy, food security, and
cross-border terrorism—take precedence over old military disputes. India and
Pakistan share a history of competition and failure to follow through in the reso-
lution of disputes. Matters will worsen in the next decade—unless the countries
take advantage of positive elements that exist and adopt forward-looking,
cooperative-security outlooks.
NOTE S
Views expressed herein are solely the author’s
personal views and do not represent either
the Pakistani government, or the U.S. De-
partment of Defense. The author is grateful
to Nick M. Masellis—NSA research associate,
MS in defense analysis—for his research
assistance.
1. The term “enduring rivalry” is borrowed
from T. V. Paul, ed., The India-Pakistan Con-
flict: An Enduring Rivalry (New York: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 2005). Paul defines an
“enduring rivalry” as a conflict between two
or more states, lasting more than two de-
cades, with several militarized interstate dis-
putes punctuating the relationship in
between, and characterized by a persistent,
fundamental, and long-term incompatibility
of goals.
2. Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meet-
ing the Challenge of China’s Rising Power
across the Asia Littoral, Carlisle Papers in Se-
curity Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strate-
gic Studies Institute, July 2006), available at
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/.
3. Robert Kaplan, “Pakistan’s Fatal Shore,” At-
lantic (May 2009).
4. A bilateral accord, jointly declared on 18 July
2005 by President George W. Bush and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and signed in Oc-
tober 2008, by which India would separate its
military and civilian nuclear facilities and
subject the latter to International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and the
United States would work toward full civilian
nuclear cooperation with India. See “Back-
grounder: The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,”
Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/
publication/9663/.
5. The actual dates of the resolutions were 13
April 1948 and 5 January 1949. See Sumit
Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan
Tension since 1947 (New York: Columbia
Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 20–22.
6. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Re-
newed (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), pp.
92–95.
7. See George H. Quester, Nuclear Pakistan and
Nuclear India: Stable Deterrent or Proliferation
Challenge? (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic
Studies Institute, 1992), p. 12.
8. The regional proposals are as follows: the
South Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,
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November 1974; Joint Renunciation of Ac-
quisition or the Manufacture of Nuclear
Weapons, 1978; mutual inspections of nu-
clear facilities, 1979; simultaneous acceptance
of IAEA “full scope safeguards,” 1979; simul-
taneous accession to the NPT, 1979; bilateral
nuclear test-ban treaty, 1987; multilateral
conferences on nonproliferation in South
Asia in 1987 and 1991.
9. For this May–July 1999 conflict along
the LoC, see “Kargil Conflict 1999,”
GlobalSecurity.org.
10. The author was involved as part of the
expert-level dialogue with both the United
States and India. UN Security Council Reso-
lution 1172 (1998) is available at www.un
.org/.
11. The author was personally responsible for the
preparation of the paper that developed this
concept. The paper was presented to the U.S.
team on 15 September 1998 in New York. See
Feroz H. Khan, “Reducing the Risk of Nu-
clear War in South Asia,” in Pakistan’s Nu-
clear Future: Reining in the Risk, ed. Henry
Sokolski (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2009), pp. 70–71.
12. For the Indian “Cold Start” doctrine, see
Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot
Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War
Doctrine,” International Security 32, no. 3
(Winter 2007/08), pp. 158–90.
13. Deepak Kapur, quoted in Nirupama
Subramanian, “General Kapoor’s Remarks
Generate Heat in Pakistan,” Hindu, 5 January
2010, available at www.thehindu.com/.
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NAVAL VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES
Enhancing the Safety of Merchant Shipping in Maritime Security
Operations
Lieutenant Dr. Ir. F. J. Sluiman and Commander Ph. H. de Koning, Royal
Netherlands Navy Reserve
Vessel traffic services (VTSs) ensure the safe and efficient handling of trafficon busy waterways like the English Channel and the approaches to New York.
This technique, wherein electronic sensors and communication systems are
used to manage traffic actively, can also be used in maritime security operations
(MSOs) to enhance safety in areas with risks related to asymmetric threats.1
Nowadays a limited form of VTS is deployed for MSO situated in international
waters. These services, provided by naval cooperation and guidance for shipping
(NCAGS) organizations, are focused on building maritime domain awareness
(MDA) and providing naval-related safety information to merchant shipping.
Structuring and monitoring of vessel traffic, unfortunately, is supported only
poorly, or not at all, by NCAGS.2 This is a serious omission, as structuring and
monitoring vessel traffic make earlier detection of dangerous situations possi-
ble, render ships harder to attack, and minimize possible cascading effects to
ship traffic from harassment or attack. Moreover,
compared to alternatives such as escorts and convoys,
there would be less delay to shipping, while the need
for military assets may be reduced through improved
efficiency.
This idea has led the authors to develop a new con-
cept, which is termed “Naval VTS.” This approach
combines a voluntary VTS monitoring system with a
traffic organization and information service aimed at
Lieutenant Dr. Ir. Sluiman holds, in addition to his
doctorate, a master’s degree (cum laude) in computer
science from the Technical University of Twente. He
and Commander De Koning are both assigned to the
Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping organi-
zation of the Royal Netherlands Navy. In civilian life,
Dr. Sluiman runs a consultancy company called eXpert
ICT; Commander De Koning coordinates safety opera-
tions at the port of Amsterdam. All analyses and views
expressed in this article are those of the authors.
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providing military commanders responsible for MSOs a level of vessel safety
that makes security tasks easier to plan and perform. Navigational risks and risks
related to asymmetric threats cannot always be separated, which means that Na-
val VTS may have to deal with both risks and that it requires flexibility in how it
is established.
As proof of concept, three detailed examples will illustrate how Naval VTS
would enhance the safety of merchant shipping and contribute to a more efficient
use of military assets. The development of the International Recognized Transit
Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden is extensively discussed in one of the exam-
ples, as it clearly shows the progress in MSO toward the organization of maritime
traffic, an important part of Naval VTS. Following the examples, the main find-
ings are discussed and recommendations for further research are presented.
VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES AND MARITIME SAFETY
OPERATIONS
Merchant shipping today carries an estimated 80 percent of world trade on a
fixed number of maritime routes, the sea lines of communication (SLOCs).3 Ar-
eas of heightened shipping density on these SLOCs—like the straits of Bab
el-Mandeb, Hormuz, and Gibraltar—form choke points. Merchant ships pass-
ing these choke points are vulnerable to collision, piracy, and terrorism.
Collisions between ships could practically close a busy choke point like the
Strait of Malacca. Such an accident would necessitate rerouting a significant
number of merchant ships through the Lombok or Sunda straits. Rerouting
causes delays and raises freight rates. This could affect many countries, as the
Strait of Malacca, for instance, is the main SLOC between East Asia and the
West.4 A traffic separation scheme and a mandatory reporting service (called
STRAITREP) were implemented in 1981 and 1998, respectively, to enhance the
safety of navigation in the Strait of Malacca, but the ever increasing volume of
maritime traffic remains a source of concern.5
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden has led to higher insurance premiums, crew costs,
and security costs for ships sailing through this approach to the Strait of Bab
el-Mandeb. The heightened piracy risk has even caused shipping companies to
reroute ships around the Cape of Good Hope, despite the distance and expense.6
Though it occurs on the main SLOC between Asia, Europe, and the east coast of
the United States, piracy in the Gulf of Aden did not cause much stir until the
roll-on/roll-off ship Faina, carrying thirty-three T-72 tanks and other heavy
weaponry, was hijacked there. After this incident, which followed a sharp in-
crease in piracy activity, NATO, the European Union (EU), Russia, India, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, and others intensified their naval presence in the region.
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In June 2009, an IRTC and a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) were es-
tablished by the Combined Maritime Forces in the Gulf of Aden in support of
United Nations Security Council resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838
(2008), and 1846 (2008).7 The IRTC enables naval forces to concentrate their re-
sources, while the MSPA is overlaid on the IRTC to coordinate and deconflict the
efforts of task forces. EU Naval Force ATALANTA encourages merchant vessels to
pass through the IRTC in groups, based on their transit speed. These group tran-
sits should enhance mutual protection and optimize the deployment of military
assets even further. Unfortunately, however, attacks continue, even on ships in
group transits through the IRTC.8
Terrorist attacks on the USS Cole (DDG 67) in October 2000 and the French
oil tanker Limburg two years later raised the insurance premiums on ships
bound for Yemen.9 The threat of terrorism also caused international concern
over the security of choke points, where ships present easy targets and the conse-
quences could be enormous.10 Concerned about the possibility of the Strait of
Gibraltar becoming a site for terrorist attacks, NATO in March 2003 started es-
cort operations there to ensure the safe transit of nonmilitary ships from alli-
ance member states requesting protection.11 These escort operations were part
of the maritime antiterrorism operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, which covers the
Mediterranean. A total of 488 ships took advantage of the NATO escorts before
reduced threat levels made it possible to suspend them on May 2004. ACTIVE
ENDEAVOUR produced insurance rate reductions of approximately 20 percent
for commercial shipping transiting the Mediterranean.12
Given the vulnerability of merchant shipping in choke points, it is remark-
able that VTS is not already included in maritime security operations. VTS traf-
fic organization techniques were used to establish the IRTC in the Gulf of Aden,
but in general it has not been given proper thought in connection with MSO.
That is a pity, as merchant ships have significantly changed over the past de-
cades; today, the variations in size, speed, and maneuverability are enormous.
This diversity within dense traffic flows, in the face of asymmetric threats, de-
mands active traffic management to reduce risks.
In particular, the absence of VTS activities in MSOs causes the following
problems in choke points with asymmetric threats and large volumes of traffic:
• Vessel traffic in choke points with no existing VTS center is not organized.
The navigational risks inherent to merchant-ship traffic in a confined and
congested environment may become unnecessarily high.
• The throughput of merchant ships through a choke point is not optimized.
Fast vessels may be exposed to danger longer than necessary.
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• Factors affecting the safety of vessels with regard to cascading effects in the
event of harassment or attack of other ships are not managed.
It is to overcome these problems that the Naval VTS concept is proposed. Like
any vessel traffic service, Naval VTS is a traffic-monitoring system designed to
provide support to mariners in busy waterways where risks are deemed greatest.
Its main focus, however, would be on the risks related to asymmetric threats.
THE CONCEPT OF NAVAL VTS
As noted above, Naval VTS is a voluntary vessel traffic service designed to en-
hance the safety of vessel traffic through confined and busy areas at increased
risk, of either a general or specific nature (other than war). It comprises a traffic
organization service and an information service.13 It is not, however, envisioned
as providing navigational assistance, because of potential liability issues and the
fact that the infrastructure that would be required in the Naval VTS area for such
a service may be absent or damaged (either by lack of maintenance or by the ac-
tions of violent nonstate actors).14
The main purposes of Naval VTS are
• To minimize the risk from harassment or attack on merchant ships
• To minimize the cascading effects on ship traffic from harassment or attack
• To optimize the throughput of merchant ships transiting choke points
• To deconflict merchant-ship movements with military operations
• To enhance vessel safety with regard to the risk inherent to traffic in a con-
fined and congested environment.
Secondarily, in meeting these purposes the concept has the potential to stabilize
insurance costs and improve the effectiveness of naval patrols and escorts.
All vessels navigating through a Naval VTS area would be encouraged to par-
ticipate. Participation would be beneficial to vessels, as it would enhance their
safety, and it is beneficial to the Naval VTS organization, as it would contribute
to the compilation of the traffic picture. Decisions concerning ships’ actual navi-
gation and maneuvering remain with their masters. Naval VTS guidance would
never relieve them from their responsibility to exercise good seamanship and
comply with the Collision Regulations.15 To minimize the liability element of
Naval VTS, each message directed to a vessel would have to state clearly whether
it concerned a question, item of information, advice, or a warning and would
use International Maritime Organization (IMO) “standard marine communi-
cation phrases” where practicable.16 Nonparticipating vessels would be briefed
on dangers that existed and would be monitored.
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A Naval VTS organization in a maritime security operation would consist of a
commander and one or more units. These units would be teams of military VTS
operators, with specialized equipment, possibly cooperating with existing vessel-
traffic centers. These units could be ashore or afloat (embarked on either naval
or civilian vessels), located at the discretion of the Naval VTS commander. Units
would have areas of responsibility, subareas of the Naval VTS area, which are
slightly overlapping for contact pass-off and redundancy. All units would have
to be equipped with Automatic Identification System (AIS) equipment—re-
ceiver, radar, and communications—connected to automated systems to store,
update, modify, retrieve, and display collected traffic-picture data. Such equip-
ment, which must be compatible between units and the commander, would give
each unit full information about each participating vessel and its intentions. The
number of units and level of service provided would depend on the local situa-
tion and threat level, and could be adjusted as a situation developed.
Cooperation can be a force multiplier for Naval VTS. Cooperation between
the navies participating in MSO could increase the assets and personnel avail-
able for Naval VTS. Additionally, cooperation with existing VTS would be par-
ticularly valuable when their service areas overlap with that of Naval VTS; use of
their surveillance and communication facilities could decrease the assets re-
quired to establish Naval VTS. Cooperation with the maritime industry, finally,
would make it possible to obtain quickly and cost-effectively all information
necessary to maximize maritime domain awareness—such as vessel movements
in ports, vessel conditions, hydrographic conditions, and the operational status
of aids to navigation.
Commanders of maritime security operations would have authority to acti-
vate Naval VTS in their areas. Naval VTS could fit into the normal course of
MSO, as participation would be voluntary for all ships and shipmasters would
remain responsible for the crews, safe navigation, and handling of their ships.
The Naval VTS command-and-control structure and its place within the overall
command structure would vary according to the objectives of the operation and
the forces participating. Naval VTS commanders, however, would always be re-
sponsible for the activities of their organizations.
ESTABLISHING NAVAL VTS
Implementation of this concept requires a Naval VTS area, traffic organization,
Naval VTS units, and communication and emergency procedures. Assembly ar-
eas might have to be designated as well.
The Naval VTS area is a zone within an area where naval forces are operating
in which naval vessel traffic services are to be provided. It must be large enough
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to cover the waters in which there is an actual threat to shipping, but not so large
as to become unmanageable. Factors affecting the size of the area are geographic
configuration, the asymmetric attacks expected, and the density and diversity of
traffic. The size of a Naval VTS area would be adjustable and could be altered as
the situation develops.
To prevent dangerous traffic situations and to provide for the efficient move-
ment of vessels, traffic in the Naval VTS area must be organized. Traffic organiza-
tion can be achieved by a combination of traffic organization and management
techniques, including:17
• Geographical division—to separate traffic streams. This is achieved by using
existing “traffic separation schemes,” when available and clear of risks. Oth-
erwise, traffic streams can be separated by recommending distinct,
noncrossing routes for ships going in opposite directions. Slow and fast
traffic moving in the same direction can be separated this way too, so as to
minimize transit time.
• Time separation—to give a vessel exclusive use of a certain area, or a re-
stricted passage, for a given time. Time slots would be allocated to vessels as
part of their sailing plans. Time separation requires advance planning, if
the use of (possibly crowded) assembly areas is to be avoided.
• Distance separation—to minimize the cascading effects of harassment or at-
tack. Minimum differences between vessels transiting the Naval VTS area
would be specified (after consultation with experts) for each type of ship,
and cargo carried. The separation distances maintained would be moni-
tored by the Naval VTS.
When overtaking and passing within lanes is not possible, distance separation
requires planning so that fast vessels are not exposed to danger longer than nec-
essary due to slower vessels in front of them. When there are no overtaking re-
strictions, passing distances may be recommended as well.
In deciding the number and location of the Naval VTS units to which ships
will be requested to report, the size, traffic density, and the geographical config-
uration of the Naval VTS area must be considered. The key technical factor is the
relationship of the radar and communication ranges of the units to the surveil-
lance and communication requirements of the area. A good match is needed, as
the quality of accident prevention depends on the units’ capability to detect de-
veloping situations and their ability to give timely warnings.
Communication procedures are needed for prearrival information, entry of
vessels into the Naval VTS area, transit, and departure. Depending on the local
situation, other communication arrangements, such as for vessels in berths and
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at anchor, may be needed as well.18 These procedures should stipulate what com-
munications are required and which frequencies should be monitored.
Emergency procedures are needed to deal with incidents that may result from
the risks present in the Naval VTS area. These procedures may include alerting
the Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Center, promulgating information on the
incident to vessels in the Naval VTS area, and restricting traffic. Multiple com-
munications frequencies would be advisable: one for emergencies, a second for
standard position checks, and a third on which transiting vessels report suspi-
cious activity. How to deal with high-threat situations with low response times
would require advance consideration. In addition, the advantages and disadvan-
tages of having merchant ships restrict or cease transmissions of signals like AIS
should be weighed.
Assembly areas may be designated in the Naval VTS area for emergencies,
cross-traffic, convoy operations, and so on. When feasible, assembly areas
should be situated where the likelihood of asymmetric attacks is remote and dis-
ruption of traffic flow is minimal. Assembly areas would have to be large enough
to hold all ships expected. Finally, to gain the cooperation of the merchant ship-
ping industry, the coordinates of the Naval VTS area, the services it would pro-
vide, and its reporting procedures would be promulgated using the World-Wide
Navigational Warning Service. The wording of this notice would require careful
thought, so as not to raise concern needlessly in the shipping industry.
HOW NAVAL VTS MIGHT BE USED
Naval VTS offers military commanders responsible for conducting MSOs a
broad palette of options to enhance the safety of merchant shipping and im-
prove the effectiveness of military activities. The following examples illustrate
how this palette can be used.
Example 1: Terrorism in the Sunda Strait
Consider the following scenario: terrorists block the narrow Strait of Malacca by
sinking a very large crude carrier by causing a deliberate collision with a hi-
jacked 25,000-deadweight-ton (dwt.), kerosene-laden product tanker. The colli-
sion and the following inferno raise international concern and cause shipping
companies to divert their ships through the Lombok and Sunda straits. In the
expectation of other terrorist attacks on shipping in the Indonesian archipelago,
a multinational maritime force is deployed to conduct MSO in the Java Sea. The
Sunda Strait, being the shortest diversion for ships up to 100,000 dwt., becomes
heavily used, and fears grow that a similar terrorist attack might occur there (see
map 1).19
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In response, Naval VTS is activated in the Sunda Strait. The site where most
congestion is expected and that is most vulnerable to deliberate collisions is the
passage between Sumatra and Java, where the small island of Pulau Sangiang
lies; this zone needs radar surveillance and must be included in the Naval VTS
area. There are no existing VTS centers in the Sunda Strait, and according to the
en route sailing directions for Borneo, Java, Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara, there
is only one track through the risk area.20 To reduce liability and gain the coopera-
tion of the merchant shipping industry, this track is endorsed. This decision ex-
cludes the use of geographic-division traffic-organization techniques.
The deliberate ramming in the Malacca Strait had been possible because of
the poor maneuvering qualities of the victim, a large tanker. Naval VTS can ap-
ply time-separation techniques to enhance the safety of such ships in the Sunda
Strait—for example, giving all tankers over 60,000 dwt. going in the same direc-
tion the exclusive use of the risk area for a certain time. This prevents the danger-
ous situations with more maneuverable vessels (like the hijacked product
tanker) and minimizes the time the larger participating tankers are exposed.
Terrorists, however, can be expected to adapt their modus operandi as their tar-
gets become harder to attack. In anticipation of such changes, Naval VTS can ap-
ply distance separation, further contributing to the prevention of dangerous
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maritime situations and minimizing cascading effects to ship traffic in case of
attack.
The risk area stretches approximately twenty-two nautical miles. Radar sur-
veillance of this area is achieved by two Naval VTS units afloat, embarked on
chartered civilian ships, one in the north and one in the south (see map 1). Ves-
sels are requested to report to and maintain very-high-frequency (VHF) radio
watch with the nearer of these units thirty minutes prior to entering the risk
area. The areas of responsibility of these two units overlap along a line drawn
from Java to Sumatra, over Pulau Sangiang. At this point participating vessels
shift their reports and VHF watch to the other unit.
As some ninety ships a day are expected to be diverted through the Sunda
Strait, time separation could cause severe congestion in the approaches; in addi-
tion, assembly areas cannot be used, due to the threat of deliberate collisions.
Therefore, advance planning of vessel movements is imposed. To obtain the nec-
essary data, the Naval VTS organization—that is, the Naval VTS commander—
requests vessels to send prearrival reports confirming their participation, as
soon as practicable. Position updates are also requested, at prescribed times and
locations. The Naval VTS commander intends, if traffic flow without congestion
cannot be achieved by planning, to give priority to ships in the northern ap-
proaches, as maneuvering space there is restricted by islands, reefs, rocks, oil
fields, and shallows exposed at low tide.
Naval VTS activated in the Sunda Strait in this scenario enhances the safety of
merchant shipping without drawing upon military assets. Participation is seen
as a matter of common sense and, having been properly announced, is recom-
mended by the various maritime-industry bodies. No liability is assumed, as Na-
val VTS participation is voluntary and participation does not compromise the
responsibility or authority of masters for the safe navigation and handling of
their ships.
Example 2: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden
On 22 August 2008, to discourage piracy attacks on commercial vessels in the
Gulf of Aden, an International Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC) was estab-
lished. This corridor (depicted on map 2) originally ran through the northern
part of the gulf, as far from the Somali coast as possible.21 That route enabled na-
val forces to concentrate their resources but had three flaws: it allowed the pi-
rates to use the Yemeni coast in their operations; it crossed fishing areas, where
pirate skiffs and fishing boats are hard to tell apart; and it did nothing to prevent
collisions between eastbound and westbound traffic. To overcome these prob-
lems the IRTC was moved south, and traffic streams were separated. A revised
IRTC came into effect on 1 February 2009, consisting of two lanes (eastbound
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and westbound) separated by a buffer zone.22 This corridor, which is generally
(but not entirely) clear from known fishing areas, separates traffic but is not a
formal traffic-separation scheme, where vessels would have to comply with Rule
10 of the Collision Regulations. (Rule 10 makes special provisions for vessels
transiting, operating in, and crossing such schemes.) The geographic shape of
the revised IRTC is shown in map 2, indicating the eastbound and westbound
lanes. Neither the original nor the revised IRTC is marked or defined by visual
navigational aids.
Aside from the traffic organization imposed by the IRTC, a voluntary report-
ing scheme has been established for commercial vessels transiting the Gulf of
Aden.23 Owners, operators, and managers of vessels planning to transit or enter
it are requested to register the details and intended movements of their vessels
on the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa website.24 This registration,
which should be completed as soon as possible, allows vessels to be signed up for
group transits through the IRTC. In addition, masters of vessels transiting or en-
tering the region are requested to send position updates to both the UK Mari-
time Trade Operations office in Dubai and the U.S. Maritime Liaison Office in
Bahrain. These updates and reports are beneficial to vessels as they will receive
guidance, recommended routing, and updated threat assessments, and they are
beneficial as well to the Combined Maritime Forces.
Naval VTS is designed for confined areas, where direct interaction with ves-
sels is possible. That is not the case in the Gulf of Aden, which is too large for the
surveillance and communication requirements of Naval VTS to be met
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cost-effectively. Even here, however, activation of Naval VTS offers options to
enhance the safety of merchant shipping and improve the effectiveness of mili-
tary activities. In particular, it can improve information services and collect the
identifications and intentions of vessels in fishing areas crossed by the revised
IRTC. This would allow early detection of dangerous situations and therefore
timely warnings. Active traffic management in such fishing areas can be
achieved by a limited number of Naval VTS units. These units may be deployed
on chartered civil ships carrying armed security detachments for protection.
Alternatively, Naval VTS could improve the traffic organization service. So-
mali pirates typically lie in wait along shipping lanes for targets of opportunity.25
Therefore, while the IRTC enables naval forces to concentrate their resources, it
also assists pirates in finding their targets.26 To overcome this undesirable side
effect, Naval VTS could establish two or three corridors through the Gulf of
Aden, together with a corridor-rotation scheme. The coordinates of these corri-
dors (which should include separate eastbound and westbound transit lanes to
prevent collisions) could be promulgated via the World-Wide Navigational
Warning Service, but the corridor-rotation scheme would be known to the naval
forces only. On entering the Gulf of Aden, participating vessels would receive
electronically a sailing plan from a Naval VTS unit ashore. This plan would in-
clude the corridor through which individual ships are advised to conduct their
transits and the recommendation to switch the AIS off and maintain radio si-
lence so as to deny pirates information as to which corridor is being used. As-
suming sufficient distance between the corridors and an appropriate rotation
scheme, naval forces would be able to concentrate their resources on the one
corridor currently in use, while pirates would have to spread their efforts over
them all. This traffic organization would be likely to reduce the number of at-
tacks. Moreover, more predictable attack patterns could arise from corridor ro-
tation, leading to earlier detection and military intervention.
Example 3: A Terrorist Threat in the Strait of Gibraltar
Consider a further scenario: a terrorist threat against merchant shipping
transiting the Strait of Gibraltar in both directions. Intelligence reports are
warning that terrorists might use explosive-laden dinghies to commit suicide at-
tacks off Morocco and Spain. The NATO-led antiterrorism operation ACTIVE
ENDEAVOUR has been tasked to provide an appropriate response.
Activation of Naval VTS in the Strait of Gibraltar is that response, an espe-
cially appropriate one since a high throughput of merchant ships is to be main-
tained. As suicide attacks are likely to occur close to the coast, the safety of the
vessel traffic through the traffic-separation scheme in the Strait of Gibraltar and
the precautionary areas on the eastern side and off the Moroccan cargo port of
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Tanger-Med needs to be enhanced. (The port of Tanger-Med is about twenty-
five miles from Tangier and has been operational since 2007.) This area of higher
risk, which must be included in the Naval VTS area, is under the radar surveil-
lance of Tarifa VTS in Spain, a mandatory VTS whose cooperation is sought for
the present contingency.
Because a dinghy has more time to approach a slow-moving ship than a
fast-moving one, slow-moving ships are more vulnerable to suicide attacks.
Hence, Naval VTS divides each lane of the traffic separation scheme into an out-
side lane (depicted in map 3) for vessels operating at speeds above sixteen knots
and an inside lane for slower vessels. This traffic organization is beneficial to
slow-moving vessels, as it minimizes the window of opportunity of the terror-
ists, who have to cross the outside lane first before a slow-moving vessel can be
approached. It is also beneficial to fast-moving ships, which do not have to re-
duce speed for, or overtake and pass, slower vessels, lessening their exposure to
danger. To minimize delays in the precautionary areas, where cross-traffic must
be expected, Naval VTS also uses distance separation. This provides cross-traffic
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more opportunities to cross safely the traffic flow between the Mediterranean
and the Atlantic Ocean, and it gives vessels more space for evasive maneuvering
in case of attack. The border between the inside and outside lanes is not marked
or defined by navigational aids.
Radar surveillance is achieved with one Naval VTS unit. Depending on the
level of cooperation, there are two options to locate that unit. One is to station it
on a ship in the vicinity of the precaution area off Tanger-Med; the other option
is to deploy it at Tarifa VTS. Vessels are requested to send electronic prearrival
reports to the Naval VTS organization confirming their participation, well be-
fore entering the Naval VTS area, to allow timely data processing and planning.
In addition, vessels are requested to report to the Naval VTS unit and maintain a
VHF watch with it. This is to be done at the reporting points shown on map 3
and when leaving ports or anchorages in the Naval VTS area. It allows the mili-
tary VTS operators to interact directly with the participating vessels, which is of
vital importance in this potentially dangerous situation.
In this way Naval VTS is able to enhance the safety of merchant ships
transiting the Strait of Gibraltar without seriously reducing its throughput. This
implementation of Naval VTS in the Strait of Gibraltar requires very few naval
assets, if any. Participation by merchant vessels is voluntary and may be declined
at any time.
CLOSING THE RESOURCE GAP
The foregoing introduction to, and outline for implementation of, the Naval
VTS concept clearly illustrates how, by structuring and monitoring vessel traffic,
it could enhance the safety of merchant shipping and improve the effectiveness
of military activity. To minimize liability, participation in Naval VTS would have
to be voluntary. This has the disadvantage that not all vessels in the Naval VTS
area might cooperate, which could cause irregularities in traffic flow. These ir-
regularities, however, would affect safety only minimally—sound traffic organi-
zation and direct interaction with participating vessels in critical zones should
provide enough robustness.
Naval VTS could play an important role in the international MDA security ef-
fort.27 MDA strengthens the ability of nations to conduct search and rescue and
to disrupt crimes at sea by collecting data on shared networks. Unfortunately,
this sharing of maritime domain awareness has its risks.28 Coastal states with ex-
cessive maritime claims, as well as violent nonstate actors, may be able to access
and misuse MDA data. Moreover, economic interests may be affected when
commercially sensitive information is compromised (such as the positions of oil
tankers, in the context of spot-market energy prices). Hence military command-
ers responsible for conducting maritime security operations must carefully
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weigh the positive and negative aspects of Naval VTS involvement. Vessels may
not want to participate in Naval VTS when the commercial sensitivity of the in-
formation supplied by the merchant shipping community is not respected and
protected.
All the same, through close liaison with intelligence Naval VTS could make a
significant contribution to the detection, identification, classification, and moni-
toring of possible threats. Additional staffing would be needed to cope with these
intelligence tasks, as the main responsibility of the Naval VTS operators them-
selves would be to interact with ships and respond to traffic situations developing.
Additional sensors may be needed as well, as AIS and radar alone cannot, for in-
stance, detect small, fast attack craft in an accurate and timely way. Such additional
sensors can be obtained through cooperation efforts. A final caveat is that all at-
tention should not be focused on vessels that are not participating in Naval
VTS—the threat could be the vessel that is more compliant than others.
Aside from maritime security operations, Naval VTS could be activated for
any situation in which vessel traffic needs to be managed quickly, such as in di-
saster areas. In such a context, the use of AIS virtual aids to navigation would be
recommended.
Naval VTS has the potential to close the significant gap between the resources
required for MSO and the resources available to violent nonstate actors. As such
it merits further investigation and elaboration. Naval VTS tactics, techniques,
and procedures would need to be developed into guidance and doctrine for Na-
val VTS support in maritime security operations. In addition, simulations,
training, and exercises will be needed to improve procedures and gain experi-
ence and insight in the possibilities and limitations of Naval VTS.
NOTE S
1. Maritime security operations are military op-
erations other than war conducted to ensure
freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce,
and the protection of the ocean.
2. NCAGS procedures support real-time moni-
toring and interaction of vessel traffic poorly,
and traffic organization not at all. See also
North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO],
The Naval Co-operation and Guidance for
Shipping Manual (NCAGS), ATP-2(B)
(unclassified).
3. United Nations, Review of Maritime Transport
2008 (New York: United Nations Conference of
Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2008).
4. Mokhzani Zubir, The Strategic Value of the
Strait of Malacca (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime
Institute of Malaysia, 2004); U.S. Energy
Dept., World Oil Transit Chokepoints (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Energy Information Adminis-
tration, January 2008).
5. Marcus Hand, “Malaysia Calls for Limits on
Strait Traffic,” Lloyd’s List, 22 October 2008,
www.lloydslist.com.
6. The hijacking of the very large crude carrier
Sirius Star on 15 November 2008 showed that
even on the longer route around the Cape of
Good Hope, pirate attacks cannot be avoided.
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7. Jim Wilson, “Warships for Piracy Patrol,”
Safety at Sea International 42, no. 476 (Octo-
ber 2008).
8. The bulk carrier Victoria was hijacked 5 May
2009 in the Gulf of Aden at lat. 13° 22' N,
long. 049° 23' E. It was sailing in the IRTC
and was picked out of a group transit within
only a few minutes. The helicopter from the
closest warship (some ninety nautical miles
away) was too late to prevent the hijacking.
9. Ali M. Koknar, “Terror on the High Seas,”
Security Management 48, no. 6 (June 2004), p.
75.
10. U.S. Energy Dept., World Oil Transit
Chokepoints; Jean-Paul Rodrigue, “Straits,
Passages and Chokepoints: A Maritime
Geostrategy of Petroleum Distribution,” Ca-
hiers de Géographie du Québec 48, no. 135
(December 2004).
11. “NATO to Escort Shipping in Straits of Gi-
braltar,” NATO Press Release, 4 February
2003.
12. Gen. James L. Jones, press conference at
SHAPE following the Allied Command Eu-
rope Commanders Conference, 18 June 2003.
13. VTS services are defined in Guidelines for
Vessel Traffic Services, IMO Resolution
A.857(20), adopted 27 November 1997.
14. A navigational assistance service assists the
decision-making process on board.
15. See International Maritime Organization,
Convention on the International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
(COLREGs), adopted 20 October 1972, en-
tered into force 15 July 1977.
16. Standard Marine Communication Phrases
(SMCP), IMO Resolution A.918(22), adopted
29 November 2001.
17. International Association of Marine Aids to
Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities
[IALA], IALA VTS Manual (St.-Germain-
en-Laye, Fr.: 2002), p. 35.
18. Ships at anchor are very vulnerable to asym-
metric attacks, but anchoring cannot always
be avoided at ports in the Naval VTS area
with limited quay capacities. The security of
anchorage areas in the Naval VTS area there-
fore deserves attention.
19. The figure of 100,000 dwt. is taken from Sail-
ing Directions (Enroute): Borneo, Jawa, Sulawe-
si, and Nusa Tenggara, Publication 163
(Bethesda, Md.: National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, 2007), p. 97.
20. Ibid., pp. 97–98. There is also an archipelagic
sea lane (ASL) through the Naval VTS area.
The axis line of the ASL, however, does not
indicate the deepest water or any recom-
mended route or track.
21. Maritime Administration, “Gulf of Aden
Suggested Waypoints for Transit,” MARAD
Advisory 2008-05, U.S. Transportation Dept.
22. Maritime Administration, “Indian Ocean:
Gulf of Aden: Piracy Countermeasures,”
MARAD Advisory 2009-04, U.S. Transporta-
tion Dept.
23. Hydrographic Department, “Navarea IX (Per-
sian Gulf, Red Sea, NW Arabian Sea) Naviga-
tional Warning 092/2009,” Pakistan Navy.
24. The Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa
website (www.mschoa.org) consists of a
public-access area and a registered-users area.
The former offers press releases and general
information on Operation ATALANTA. The
latter, which can be accessed only after regis-
tration and verification, contains more sensi-
tive content, like alerts and transit guidance.
25. Sailing Directions (Planning Guide): South At-
lantic Ocean and Indian Ocean, Publication
160 (Bethesda, Md.: National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, 2008), p. 294.
26. This idea is supported by map 1 in UN Insti-
tute for Training and Research, Analysis of
Somali Pirate Activity in 2009 (New York: Op-
erational Satellite Applications Programme,
23 April 2009).
27. U.S. Navy Dept., Navy Maritime Domain
Awareness Concept (Washington, D.C.: Chief
of Naval Operations, May 2007), available at
www.navy.mil/.
28. James Kraska, “The Dark Side of Maritime
Awareness,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
135, no. 12 (December 2009); James Kraska
and Brian Wilson, “Off Course: The Dark
Side of Tracking All Shipping—Pirates Can
Do It Too,” Armed Forces Journal (November
2009).
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MARITIME INFORMATION-SHARING STRATEGY
A Realistic Approach for the American Continent and the
Caribbean
Commander Alberto A. Soto, Chilean Navy
Information sharing is a fundamental requirement for meeting most of thecurrent challenges of international maritime security. During the gather-
ing of naval and maritime authorities at the nineteenth International Sea
Power Symposium, held during October 2009 at the U.S. Naval War College,
this topic captured the attention of most of the international representatives.
It has become obvious that, together with globalization, the multiple threats
and challenges of the maritime environment have assumed a transnational na-
ture and require a coordinated effort to address them. It is difficult to argue
against the ideas that these problems cannot be faced by any single state and
that multinational collaboration is mandatory if ad-
equate maritime domain awareness (MDA) is to be
achieved. The U.S. “Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower” recognizes these facts and conse-
quently is “rapidly gaining worldwide currency.”1
The American continent and Caribbean region do
not seem to be an exception.
In this context the notion of a regional maritime
partnership in the American continent and Carib-
bean demands effective information-sharing capabil-
ities in order to become a reality. The objective of this
article is to demonstrate that such an idea, although
reasonable, seems to be too ambitious to implement
in the regional context. Some of the potential partners
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tional fellow at the U.S. Naval War College. He is a
surface naval warfare officer, specializing in gunnery
and missiles, with an engineering degree from the
Chilean Naval Polytechnic Academy in weapons sys-
tems, as well as a master’s in operations research from
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Cal-
ifornia. In 2005 he graduated first in his class from the
Staff Course of the Chilean Naval War College. He has
served on board a variety of combatant and logistic
vessels of the Chilean Navy, including as commanding
officer. He has been involved in such multinational ex-
ercises as UNITAS, TEAMWORK SOUTH, and the first
PANAMAX (in 2003). In 1993 he served as a United
Nations Naval Observer in Cambodia. He can be con-
tacted at alberto.soto.ci@usnwc.edu.
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have differing or conflicting interests, in addition to the traditional challenges
that any complex network faces. First, the article describes the concepts related
to information sharing and discusses how the need is reflected in various levels
of doctrine of the United States, the main actor and promoter of this initiative.
Second, it demonstrates through the use of strategic concepts how difficult the
varying goals and conflicting interests involved make the notion of implement-
ing a strategic partnership in the American continent and Caribbean—so much
so that the future existence of a robust information-sharing network at sea may
be a utopian dream. Finally, before stating conclusions, the article presents prag-
matic criteria for prioritizing regional countries’ efforts in fulfilling the gaps in
information-sharing capabilities.
PARTNERSHIP AND INFORMATION SHARING
The idea of global maritime partnerships has captured the attention of most na-
tions that depend heavily on the sea for survival. Some have strongly supported
it, but others have been skeptical about the real intentions of the United States.
The Need for Information Sharing
In Latin America and the Caribbean, distrust can be explained by historical rea-
sons, the belief that the “new strategy may be seen as a contemporary revision of
Mahan’s theory of naval power and a new form of American imperialism.”2 It
could also be argued, however, that the United States has no other viable option
than to look for equal partnerships in Latin America—that if there was an era of
U.S. hegemony in this part of the world, “that era is over.”3 In any case, it is diffi-
cult to argue that the current threats and challenges of the region (such as drugs,
trafficking in weapons and humans, organized crime, illegal fishing, and natural
disasters) are not transnational or that they do not require the coordinated ef-
fort of nations. Besides, there is a clear possibility that terrorists will use the sea
to achieve their goals, with possibly devastating consequences. The threats were
present before, but some of them became more evident after September 11,
2001. Given that traumatic event, the only reasonable response of states is to get
involved, at least in some degree, in multilateral cooperation, in order to be con-
sidered part of the solution and not of the problem.
The strategic goal of this partnership is to maintain the safety and security of
the world’s oceans for the use of every nation.4 One of the core elements of doing
so is effective maritime domain awareness. Obviously, information sharing
among countries is a basic requirement if MDA that can benefit those countries
is to be developed. This article will use the U.S. Department of Defense defini-
tion of “information sharing”: “Making information available to participants
(people, processes, or systems). IS [Information sharing] includes the cultural,
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managerial, and technical behaviors by which one participant leverages infor-
mation held or created by another participant.”5
This definition establishes a very ambitious framework, but several efforts in
the Latin American region can be categorized as valuable information-sharing
initiatives. Some of them started long before 9/11. For instance, in 1983 the Op-
erative Network for Regional Co-operation among Maritime Authorities of the
Americas (ROCRAM) was created. This organization is composed of Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú,
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Cuba. One of its main objectives is “promoting the co-
operation among the regional maritime authorities through the exchange of in-
formation and documentation.”6 It is notable that even Cuba—recognizing that
it too shares the regional challenges in the maritime domain—is part of this
organization.
In another context, the Caribbean nations and the United States signed on 22
March 2006 an Initiative to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light
Weapons, to address one of the main issues in that area. Again, one of the core
objectives was to improve the sharing of information, specifically on entities
and individuals involved in illicit trafficking and the maritime route that many
of them use.7 Also, since 2007 the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)
has conducted a multiyear program in the Caribbean, ENDURING FRIENDSHIP,
to lay the groundwork for a regional security network of maritime patrols by
providing seven nations with improved communications systems and high-
speed interceptors.8
Since 2007, Chile has been hosting annual Western Hemisphere Maritime
Domain Awareness Workshops. These events are organized by the Office of Na-
val Research Global Americas (ONRG Americas) and USSOUTHCOM, in con-
junction with the director general of the Chilean Maritime Territory and
Merchant Marine, in order to “facilitate a regional dialogue among Western
Hemisphere nations to improve maritime information sharing.”9 Finally, a
concrete example of cooperation in information sharing promoted by the
United States is the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center–Americas
(VRMTC-Americas), which is an interagency and multinational demonstration
project that proposes to leverage and integrate existing regional efforts that con-
tribute to developing MDA.10
All these initiatives, as well as several others, aim in the right direction, but
they have not yet generated regional capabilities effective enough to meet the
threats that are being faced. Certainly, these threats often demand urgent reac-
tion. At sea, the main tools are ships and aircraft, often of different nationali-
ties—operating in conjunction, contributing their respective capabilities,
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coordinating their decisions and actions, avoiding mutual interferences, and
achieving efficient employment of resources. A network-centric-warfare capa-
bility, where every participant is included in a net of information, would be well
suited to such an operational framework. Some argue, however, that those who
fail to join the network would not be able to contribute effectively and would be
relegated to the sidelines, left the most menial tasks and encouraged to stay out
of the way or simply stay home.11 The most developed nations should logically
assume leading roles in solving this technological barrier in the regional context.
Improvisation is not an option; permanent doctrines and plans are called for,
which reflect this desire for integration and teamwork. If that is not the case,
information-sharing initiatives will be fragile and easily lost among the priori-
ties of every nation.
Information Sharing and Effects on Doctrine and Planning
The United States, the main promoter of information sharing, has recognized
the importance of doctrine and planning tools to establishing effective partner-
ships with other states. Many documents, at different decision-making levels,
have been issued.
At the presidential level, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, of 21
December 2004, recognizes that the “security of the maritime domain is a global
issue.”12 Additionally it indicates that integration of U.S. allies and international
and private-sector partners must be enhanced in order to protect the nation’s in-
terests in the maritime domain.13 The National Strategy for Maritime Security
(September 2005), goes farther, stating that “full and complete national and in-
ternational coordination, cooperation, and intelligence and information shar-
ing among public and private entities are required to protect and secure the
maritime domain.”14 In May 2007, the Department of Defense (DoD) published
the Department of Defense Information Sharing Strategy. This document indi-
cates that “trusted information must be made visible, accessible, and under-
standable to any authorized user in the Defense Department or to external
partners except where limited by law or policy.”15 It also lays down that the
mind-set must change from information “ownership” to “stewardship.”16
A DoD instruction of 2004 establishes procedures for implementing multina-
tional information-sharing networks and directs combatant commanders to use
the MNIS (multinational information sharing) CENTRIXS* network standard
for networks that exchange classified DoD information, up to the Secret level,
with foreign nations.17 Finally, the United States Southern Command Strategy 2018,
in the context of securing the United States from threats, expands MNIS pro-
grams.18 These documents were not generated in a perfect logical sequence.
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However, they clearly evidence a will to share information through all govern-
ment decision-making levels and also with international partners.
Nevertheless, the fact that the United States or any other country wants to
create a partnership for global and regional cooperation does not necessarily
mean that other nations will respond with an urgency fitting the challenges to be
faced. Understanding the fundamentals of constructing partnerships is useful
for creating realistic expectations.
GOALS, INTERESTS, AND TOOLS: FOUNDATIONS FOR
INFORMATION SHARING
Thucydides wrote that nations get involved in wars because of honor, interest, or
fear.19 This ancient principle applies today for many regional countries in the
sense that support for the maritime partnership promoted by the U.S. maritime
strategy and for the international effort involved can be seen as a problem of
honor and prestige.
Creating a Realistic Partnership
It is certainly reasonable that if a nation wants to be recognized as a constructive
member of the international community, as being part of the solution of com-
mon maritime challenges, it ought to be involved to some degree in such initia-
tives. It would be the right thing to do, an option that is not difficult to defend,
especially after 9/11. This explains the participation of 104 nations in the recent
International Sea Power Symposium, the most ever. However, it should be clear
that recognition and support of this idea does not necessarily imply real or im-
portant commitment; it is a long step to involvement of naval assets, personnel,
materiel, and especially funding. In the American continent and Caribbean not
every country has the capabilities required to make this step and, even more im-
portant, not every country necessarily feels that it is a real priority to do so. The
idea that more powerful and developed countries must assume bigger responsi-
bilities, in every sense, makes sense for many regional actors. However, the same
stakeholders sometimes feel discriminated against and relegated to secondary
roles, and they regularly demand greater influence in regional decisions. Any ef-
fort to establish a partnership in the American continent and Caribbean has to
deal with this fact.
Second, participating in this idea of partnership is a matter of interest and
common goals. It is difficult to deny that such problems as drug or human traf-
ficking, illegal immigration, or terrorism must be faced by every country in the
region, because the majority of them could be affected by the consequences of
these threats. However, these common goals do not override the strongly held
interests of individual nations, and this truth affects one of the foundations of
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every possible partnership—the creation of trust. The American continent
countries bring different and usually conflicting visions to bear upon specific
issues.
Brazil, for instance, which is considered a key ally for the United States in cer-
tain economic areas, such as the ethanol industry, is also a clear exemplar of in-
ternational cooperation in terms of information sharing in maritime security.
The Brazilian maritime-domain-awareness system (SISTRAM) was recently in-
tegrated with one of the emblematic efforts in Europe, the Virtual Regional
Maritime Traffic Center (VRMTC). In the global arena, Brazil is also considered
a rising power, one that in recent years has shown a marked independence in in-
ternational relations. In that field, however, some of its goals are in clear conflict
with those of the United States. It is likely, for example, that the way Brazil is con-
ducting its relationship with Iran does not meet the expectations of Washing-
ton. Whereas President Barack Obama’s administration has firmly criticized
Iran’s nuclear program and its standing conflict with the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the government of Brazil has “reiterated [its] support for Iran’s
right to develop its nuclear technology for use in energy production.”20 In the
Honduran political crisis during 2009, Brazil declared that it would not recog-
nize the election held in November 2009, but the United States did so, as the only
viable exit to the impasse.21 Such decisions by Brazil and the United States are
controversial for some states, but they reflect the political and strategic goals of
these countries and should be fully respected. Similar examples of conflicts of
goals among important countries in the region could be offered: Venezuela and
Colombia, Chile and Perú, Brazil and Argentina, and some members of the Ca-
ribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). But even respecting
sovereign decisions does not prevent distrust among countries. Hesitation by
countries to share information is understandable.
Therefore, it must be asked, how much information, and of what quality,
would the countries of the American continent and Caribbean agree to share,
bilaterally or multilaterally? Also, assuming a good level of partnership were ob-
tained, how long would it last? Are these conflicts of goals and interests severe
enough to break the trust among nations, the basic foundation of a partnership?
How much risk are the countries willing to assume? Each country is a different
case, and relations among nations are dynamic. Continual analysis is necessary
if realistic expectations for sharing information among countries and navies are
to be established.
Finally, though commitment in a regional partnership or alliance is a natural
reaction to fear, as understood by Thucydides, not every country is affected to
the same degree by fear regarding security issues in the maritime domain. For
instance, not every country considers itself a potential target of terrorism, as the
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United States may be. Terrorists can choose targets anywhere in the region, but
the likelihood of being attacked or affected is greater for some countries than
others. In the same way, gang problems are much more evident and grave in
Central America than in the Southern Cone, and the effects of drug trafficking
and related violence are much more apparent to Mexico and Colombia than they
are to Ecuador or Uruguay. Consequently, it only makes sense that the commit-
ment to a partnership of certain countries is less intense than that of others, with
respect to different threats. Clausewitz recognized this problem: “One country
may support another’s cause, but will never take it as seriously as it takes its
own.”22
Once the countries have understood why they should share information and
of what quantity and quality, the next important question is how they should
share it. In this region the disparity in available means for sharing information is
evident and hard to solve. This is especially true at sea. However this fact does
not necessarily mean that an adequate level of interoperability cannot be
achieved.
Information Sharing at Sea: Leveraging the Technical Problem
The availability of a cooperatively created tactical picture has long been a
“dream of naval commanders who wanted to be able to see what was over the ho-
rizon.”23 This is the same end state that was imagined by Admiral Mullen when,
as Chief of Naval Operations, he suggested a “thousand-ship navy” that would
integrate the capabilities of the maritime services to create a fully interoperable
force.24 If every nation of the American continent and Caribbean accepted and
became part of this initiative, the next main challenge would probably be techni-
cal. Regional navies have disparate capabilities, with major differences in terms
of C4ISR.* Even the longest-standing U.S. allies do not acquire or develop
command-and-control systems or surveillance and reconnaissance assets with
the main goal of exchanging information with other potential allies. Most
American continent and Caribbean countries are still focusing on becoming
more integrated within their own armed forces or services. Many have second-
hand equipment, which they transform or adapt on very limited budgets. As a
consequence, an effective and common real-time tactical or operational picture
is not available in most combined operations of regional navies. Few of these na-
vies have access to such systems as Link 11, and the majority have only limited
Internet protocol bandwidth capabilities, which would make possible e-mail,
chat, FTP file sharing, and video teleconferencing. Considering that collabora-
tion among the United States and its close European allies increasingly relies
on such assets, the more extensive the interoperability among those allies gets,
S O T O 1 4 5
* Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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the deeper the gulf separating the United States from its American continent
and Caribbean partners becomes.25
But does this technological barrier imply that effective interoperability and
information sharing are unachievable in the region? Certainly that is not the
case. There have been combined naval operations among American countries
for a long time, even without the U.S. Navy, and some of them have focused on
maritime security issues. The INTEGRACION exercises between Chile and Argen-
tina and FRATERNO between Brazil and Argentina represent very important at-
tempts to achieve interoperability in key areas. Experience shows that when
Latin American countries need to share maritime information urgently, they al-
ways find ways. Even that requires detailed advance planning, but when that is
done the information is shared by alternative methods quickly enough, even if
not in “real time,” according to U.S. standards.
Among countries in the American continent and Caribbean region, information-
sharing efforts are stimulated in situations where response is not “optional.”Mari-
time emergencies and environmental disasters fit that category, and in issues of
that sort the lack of real-time networks has not been an impossible obstacle. Of
course, better capabilities and tools are desirable; even without them, however,
even if this objective is not quickly met, Latin American countries will be able to
interoperate and exchange information to the degree they have been used to, at
least among themselves. Meanwhile, until technological gaps are solved, if that
ever happens, any country that becomes technologically advanced in information-
sharing tools compared with potential regional partners should keep up its capa-
bilities and training in current, less complex and sophisticated methods, and the
employment of currently available regional tools must be optimized. This will al-
low the best possible interoperability with less-equipped partners that want to be
involved in cooperative efforts, are the source of information, or are in the best
position to respond.
However, asymmetries in capabilities create other problems. One of those is
that before giving access to its own information, every country has the right to
know how it will be protected by its partners. If legitimate questions to this end
are not precisely answered, a natural reaction will be overclassification.
Information Disclosure and Overclassification
Any regional partnership or cooperative effort among nations has to deal with
the fact that releasability policies are oriented to information security, not effi-
ciency. Information disclosure is typically a tedious and complicated proce-
dure;26 this is especially the case if some members of a potential partnership are
unable to demonstrate adequate ability to protect information released by oth-
ers. There are also barriers created by internal commercial interests or by the
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lack of trust among partners.27 In the American continent and Caribbean area,
several countries have failed to establish cooperation, for political or historical
reasons. In many of these countries, overclassification could be seen as a cultural
issue. Certainly, it is difficult to release what has always been treated as secret in-
formation, even when that categorization no longer reflects relations between
two nations.
The obstacles generated by these problems are not easy to solve but need to be
addressed among countries and also among stakeholders within every nation.
With regard to internal obstacles, the United States has assumed this challenge
and has implemented several initiatives that are good examples for regional
partners. One of them is the Maritime Domain Awareness Data Sharing Com-
munity of Interest, developed in 2007. Mainly focused on technical solutions for
sharing information among departments of the U.S. federal government, it also
addresses “cultural” barriers between these entities and offers valuable guidance
for developing agreements.28
Additionally, the Defense Department has established the Information Shar-
ing Implementation Plan. One of its purposes is to remove barriers created by
improper classification.29 In the case of the United States the main trigger of the
initiative was the multilateral conviction that information sharing and collabo-
ration are essential to mitigating the effects of catastrophic events, a conviction
born of DoD’s difficulties in responding to Hurricane Katrina and 9/11. These
reasons should be enough for the Latin American countries and the Caribbean
as well. The search for mutual arrangements, either multilateral or bilateral, that
break down barriers and overcome distrust could be considered a sign of re-
gional maturity, responsibility, and commitment.
Certainly, developing tools for information sharing is a much faster process
in a group of countries with a long history of commitment to common goals.
Predictably, the United States has established its best partnerships with groups
of countries that have unconditionally supported its policies and campaigns
through its history. Latin America and the Caribbean do not seem to be in this
group.
Are Latin American and Caribbean States in the Club?
It could be argued that the U.S. government is doing its best to develop satisfac-
tory information sharing with its regional partners. For example, the U.S. De-
fense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has established and funded a
multinational information-sharing program that establishes CENTRIXS, Grif-
fin, and CFBLnet as the main capabilities and services for information sharing
among coalition partners and “communities of interest.”30 Subsequently
USSOUTHCOM has stated that it will expand such MNIS initiatives as
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Participating Sharing Networks and CENTRIXS to facilitate information shar-
ing and the development of information-sharing agreements utilizing technol-
ogy in place.31 Such efforts suggest that regional criticism may be unfair.
However, several U.S. initiatives during recent years to explore new concepts
and capabilities for multinational and interagency operations have excluded re-
gional partners. One of these is the Multinational Experimentation series, led by
U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). These experiments have regularly in-
volved many allied countries of Europe and Asia but unfortunately none in
Latin America or the Caribbean region. Additionally, since 2002 the Technical
Cooperation Program (involving Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) has focused the efforts of its Maritime Systems
Group (MSG) on “Networking Maritime Coalitions” and “FORCEnet and Co-
alitions Implications.” The MSG has become an important link among national
naval C4ISR acquisition programs “so the nations can coevolve their systems in
a way that will enable them to seamlessly network at sea.”32 In contrast, most
(though not all) Latin American and Caribbean nations cannot yet make an ef-
fort like this. For that very reason, these nations should tenaciously strive to be-
come involved in initiatives like the MSG, at least as observers. This would open
a flow of information about new trends, tools, and technology to Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean partners that want to participate or to assume a higher level
of commitment in future regional or global initiatives.
A country that desires to be part of an initiative on information sharing
should be rewarded for that attitude, as an example and incentive for other po-
tential partners. This has been done before. For instance, during RIMPAC 2004,
a special version of CENTRIXS was created, known as CENTRIXS-R. This sys-
tem was developed specifically for this exercise to increase information-sharing
capability for countries without access to the regular version (Chile and South
Korea). For Chile, the result was an unprecedented success in interoperability in
the exercise and, of course, increased desire within the Chilean Navy to be part
of the “information-sharing club.”33 It also set the standard for the Chilean Navy
in future multinational operations. Certainly, a country that once tastes the ad-
vantages of the technology will make every effort to keep doing so. There is
much more room for advancement in this area, and regionally there are very im-
portant gaps to fill. It will take a long time, and priorities should be established.
FILLING THE GAPS: CRITERIA FOR PRIORITIZING
There is much to do in increasing the quality of the information-sharing partner-
ship in the American continent and Caribbean. In fact, the needs exceed the avail-
able resources. No miraculous results in regional initiatives should be expected.
Even the members of this regional partnership with strong commitments to
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advancing integration and overcoming distrust and political constraints are
obliged to prioritize efforts and resources. The following basic criteria are sug-
gested as part of the decision-making process of any particular country.
Level of Risk (Urgency). What potential partners are directly involved? If a coun-
try is the source, victim, or potential protagonist of a maritime security threat or
challenge, it belongs to the “risk group” for that challenge or threat. For instance,
Chile and Argentina see a real and urgent challenge in the South Pacific and South
Atlantic and the Antarctic continent. Because of physical proximity, the Chilean
and Argentine navies will regularly be the first to provide assets in case of a mari-
time emergency in that area, and accordingly they have formed a mutual commit-
ment to the problem. This commitment was tested in the summer of 2007, when
the MV Explorer sank in the Antarctic, forcing the rescue of 150 passengers and
crew members. Ergo, Chile and Argentina belong to the same risk group for mari-
time emergencies in the South Pacific/South Atlantic/Antarctic area; they will
necessarily be protagonists in these situations. Because there is a high likelihood
that this sort of disaster will occur, effective and permanent information-sharing
systems between Chile and Argentina make a lot of sense.
In counterdrug operations and counterterrorism, there are countries on the
American continent that have an urgent need to cooperate, especially those that
are on possible transit routes or are targets. In the face of such a grave vulnerabil-
ity, efforts toward better information sharing must be persistent, even if the
countries do not have strong political ties. Political concessions and a certain de-
gree of tolerance must be accepted if the security of one’s country is threatened.
Achieving an information-sharing partnership is a long-term effort that cannot
depend on the government or administration that rules a particular country.
This is especially so in the American continent and Caribbean.
A possible criterion for resource allocation could be the expected value of the
threat in terms of the number of casualties. This implies assessment of the prob-
ability that the threat will become a fact, multiplied by its possible consequences
measured as the number of casualties. Resources should be allocated to the
threat with the highest expected value.
Likelihood of Success in an Agreement. Among the states that a country lists in
its risk group, it should approach first those for which the efforts for obtaining
agreements have a greater likelihood of immediate success. Let us suppose that
country A has already identified countries B and C as in its risk group. If A has
previously signed agreements with B but has political differences with C, it
should give priority to B, where it is more likely to obtain a new agreement for
improving information-sharing capabilities. That does not mean country A
should stop attempting to integrate with C.
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Bilateral versus Multilateral Agreements. Let us suppose that several countries
have been categorized as in one’s own risk group and a substantial likelihood of
reaching successful agreements with them individually exists. Even then, negoti-
ating a multilateral agreement may still be very difficult. In the American conti-
nent and Caribbean, although most agree that the maritime security goals and
threats are broadly shared among countries, they do not appear to find that rea-
son enough to achieve multilateral consensus agreements in information shar-
ing, as it is for other issues. Interests, assets, conflicts, and ideologies are still
difficult to overcome, and these factors are present in many multilateral organi-
zations in the American continent and Caribbean. Some of these entities are se-
verely criticized for lack of effectiveness in dealing with sensitive security issues.
For instance, in 2009 the countries of the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) could not reach multilateral consensus on a response to the new
U.S. agreement with Colombia on military bases. The discussion inside that or-
ganization was highly politicized, and the agreement still divides opinion in the
region.
Consequently with the three suggested criteria, information-sharing initiatives
in the American continent and Caribbean should be promoted by first building
potential blocs of countries that belong to the same risk groups. That would lead
to planning and developing capabilities within groups of countries that need to
work together. Then, inside each risk group, the agreements with higher likeli-
hoods of success should be sought, ideally among sub-blocs of countries. If mul-
tilateral agreements inside sub-blocs involve assuming unreasonable risk,
bilateral agreements should be sought without delay.
THE PRICE OF SECURITY
Information sharing is a key to increasing the likelihood of success against the
challenges and threats facing the American continent and the Caribbean. How-
ever, achieving an adequate degree of multilateral cooperation will be a
long-term effort. Distrust, technological gaps among nations, reluctance to dis-
close information, and overclassification are only some of the barriers to be
overcome.
Despite important efforts that have been made to achieve a better level of in-
formation sharing and interoperability among regional nations, the resources
available are not adequate for some of the most ambitious goals. It will probably
be very difficult to achieve practical networking capabilities in the short term,
especially at sea. A degree of realism is required to avoid frustration among re-
gional partners, especially the less capable and developed. Constructive and
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committed attitudes on the part of these nations should be always rewarded by
the countries that lead the information-sharing effort.
Every regional partnership will have to deal with the fact that countries usu-
ally behave according to motivations of honor, interest, and fear. These factors
affect countries in different ways. Considering the diversity of political and stra-
tegic goals, ideologies, and interests in the Americas and the Caribbean, it is very
unlikely that a satisfactory information-sharing agreement that involves every
country in the region will be achieved in the short term. Efforts and resources
should be prioritized in order to advance in the direction desired and as threats
evolve.
Despite the obstacles, no country should be completely left out of information-
sharing efforts, because that nation could become the Achilles’ heel of the region
in terms of maritime security. Therefore, political differences should be seen as
obstacles to be overcome, and divergent interests and concessions should be tol-
erated. That is part of the price that will have to be paid to defeat threats and
guarantee the security of our nations.
The United States has a key role in leading the regional effort for information
sharing. Most Latin American and Caribbean nations realize that they have to
cooperate more than ever in order to achieve their goals and guarantee the secu-
rity of their peoples. However, this cooperation and effort must be persistent
and based on facts, not just words or documents, if they are to be credible. Trust
is very difficult to develop, and it is very easy to destroy.
NOTE S
1. George Galdorisi, “Speaking the Same Lan-
guage,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
(March 2008), p. 57. “A Cooperative Strat-
egy” is reprinted in Naval War College Review
61, no. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 7–19, available at
www.usnwc.edu/press/.
2. Antonio C. Teixeira Martins, “A Brazilian
View of U.S. Maritime Initiatives,” in Per-
spectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the
Americas, ed. Paul D. Taylor, Newport Paper
31 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press),
p. 59.
3. Charlene Barshefsky, James T. Hill, Rand R.
Beers, Alberto R. Coll, Margaret E. Crahan, et
al., U.S.–Latin America Relations: A New Di-
rection for a New Reality, Task Force Report
60 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,
May 2008).
4. George Galdorisi, Stephanie Hszieh, and
Terry McKearney, “Networking the Global
Maritime Partnership” (paper, 13th ICCRTS:
“C2 for Complex Endeavors,” 17–19 June
2008), p. 2.
5. U.S. Defense Dept., Department of Defense In-
formation Sharing Strategy (Washington,
D.C.: Chief Information Officer, 4 May
2007), p. 3, available at cio-nii.defense.gov/.
6. Red Operativa de Cooperación Regional de
Autoridades Marítimas de las Americas—
ROCRAM, www.rocram.net/.
7. “Fact Sheet: Caribbean Community and the
United States Initiative to Combat Illicit
Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weap-
ons,” DISAM Journal (March 2008), pp.
27–28.
S O T O 1 5 1
NWCR_Summer2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Summer2010\NWCR_Summer2010.vp
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 8:49:06 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
157
War College: Summer 2010 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
8. Michael Wimbush, “Command Delivers
High-Tech Patrol Boats to Dominican Re-
public,” United States Southern Command:
Partnership for the Americas, www.southcom
.mil/.
9. “Press Releases 2008: United States, Chile and
10 Other Countries to Attend Global Mari-
time Awareness Conference in Valparaiso,”
Embassy of the United States: Santiago, Chile,
3 December 2008, chile.usembassy.gov/.
10. Elmer L. Roman, Global Maritime Domain
Awareness Conference: 2nd Western Hemi-
sphere Maritime Domain Awareness Work-
shop—Summary Report, February 2009,
www.mar.mil.br/.
11. Paul T. Mitchell, “Small Navies and Network-
centric Warfare: Is There a Role?” Naval War
College Review 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), p. 83.
12. U.S. Homeland Security Dept., National Se-
curity Presidential Directive NSPD 41/Home-
land Security Presidential Directive HSPD 13
(Washington, D.C.: 21 December 2004), p. 2,
available at www.dhs.gov/.
13. Ibid., p. 3.
14. U.S. Defense Dept./U.S. Homeland Security
Dept., The National Strategy for Maritime Se-
curity (Washington, D.C.: September 2005),
p. 13, available at www.dhs.gov/.
15. U.S. Defense Dept., Department of Defense
Information Sharing Strategy, p. 7.
16. Ibid., p. 10.
17. U.S. Defense Dept., “Multinational Informa-
tion Sharing Networks Implementation,” De-
partment of Defense Instruction 8110.1, 6
February 2004, p. 6, available at www.dtic
.mil/.
18. U.S. Southern Command, United States
Southern Command Strategy 2018 (Miami,
Fla.:, December 2008), available at
www.southcom.mil/.
19. See Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A
Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War,
ed. Robert B. Strassler, trans. Richard Crawley
(New York: Free Press, 1998), Book One, p. 43.
20. Alexei Barrionuevo, “Obama Writes to
Brazil’s Leader about Iran,” New York Times,
24 November 2009, p. 1.
21. Editorial, “Honduras’s Democratic Solution,”
Washington Post, 28 November 2009.
22. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans.
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989), p. 603.
23. Networking the Global Maritime Partnership
(San Diego, Calif.: SPAWAR System Center,
June 2008), p. 5.
24. John B. Hattendorf, ed., Seventeenth Interna-
tional Seapower Symposium: Report of the Pro-
ceedings 19–23 September 2005 (Newport,
R.I.: Naval War College, 2006), p. 7.
25. Networking the Global Maritime Partnership,
p. 8.
26. Mitchell, “Small Navies and Network-centric
Warfare,” p. 89.
27. For instance, in Chile maritime information
related to the capabilities and locations of
vessels involved in the fishing industry is
treated as confidential. It is known by the
Chilean Coast Guard, for security reasons,
but is not shared with any other entity, be-
cause it is considered “strategic” by fishing
companies.
28. Michel Todd, “Sharing Information Today:
Maritime Domain Awareness,” Cross Talk:
The Journal of Defense Software Engineering
(July 2007), p. 28.
29. U.S. Defense Dept., Department of Defense
Information Sharing Implementation Plan
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, April 2009), p. 14, avail-
able at cio-nii.defense.gov/.
30. “Multinational Information Sharing,” DISA:
Defense Information Systems Agency, www
.disa.mil/.
31. U.S. Southern Command, United States
Southern Command Strategy 2018, pp. 11–12.
32. Networking the Global Maritime Partnership,
p. 10.
33. D. C. Curtis and Dawn M. Maskell, “Coali-
tion Interoperability Achieves Unprece-
dented Success in RIMPAC 2004,” CHIPS:
The Department of the Navy Information
Technology Magazine (January–March 2005),
pp. 26–27, available at www.chips.navy.mil/
archives/.
1 5 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWCR_Summer2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Summer2010\NWCR_Summer2010.vp
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 8:49:06 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
158
Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 3, Art. 25
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss3/25
REVIEW ESSAY
“SIR QUINLAN: NUCLEAR ZEALOT FOR MODERATION”
Henry Sokolski
Quinlan, Michael. Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Princi-
ples, Problems, Prospects. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009.
184pp. $49.95
Potentially limitless in its military destructiveness and boundless in its ability to
provide carbon-free power, nuclear energy all but begs viewing through the con-
jectural political lenses of infinity and zero. As a result, much of what passes for
sound policy and insight regarding its management is not just reckless and
self-defeating but technically impracticable.
Sir Michael Quinlan (1930–2009), with whom I
had the good fortune to work, understood this. An
intelligent, modest, and religiously curious man,
Quinlan helped shape much of the British nuclear
weapons policy. His public service spanned nearly
four decades, including work as private secretary to
the British chief of air staff, as director of defense pol-
icy in the British Ministry of Defence, as UK NATO
defense counselor, and as permanent undersecretary
of state at the ministries of Employment and Defence.
What is most refreshing about Quinlan’s insights,
reflected in this work, is how consistently he avoids
the most current popular extremes. For example,
those opposed to nuclear weapons imagine how much
better the world would be without them and theorize
about the challenges of maintaining a utopian state of
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zero nuclear weapons. For those who back the bomb, it comprises just the oppo-
site. They will argue that large deployments and testing have been useful histori-
cally and that to continue such practices could make us safer today.
Of course, neither state—nuclear zero nor a return to nuclear plenty—is the
world in which we live, and yet most nuclear-policy experts relish supporting
one or the other vision. Quinlan on the other hand, never seemed entirely com-
fortable in either camp.
In this book Quinlan deflates the merits of such arms control fads as declara-
tions of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
pushing nuclear weapons force dealerting beyond current levels, nuclear
weapon–free zones in Southwest Asia and the Far East, U.S.-Russian nuclear re-
ductions that focus on strategic systems but fail to include Moscow’s massive
numbers of tactical nuclear weapons, going to very low numbers of nuclear
weapons (much less going to zero), and demanding entirely nondiscriminatory
nuclear-nonproliferation schemes.
However, after warning against such “righteous abolitionist” bromides,
Quinlan is just as critical of “dismissive realists.” Rightly or wrongly, govern-
ments, he notes, have repeatedly promised to disarm as part of their commit-
ments to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain. Not pursuing
these promises in some sensible fashion now, he concludes, risks increasing the
most serious nuclear danger of proliferation.
This gives rise to what Quinlan describes as his “practical agenda”: follow-on
agreements that reduce nuclear strategic warheads to roughly twelve hundred
warheads per side, agreements to make NATO and Russian tactical nuclear de-
ployment numbers much more transparent, reductions in the Russian numbers
in exchange for the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear deployments on European soil,
increased U.S. reliance on advanced nonnuclear systems, research and develop-
ment in nuclear weapons–related verification, and maintenance of existing nu-
clear testing and production moratoriums.
All of these ideas seem plausible. Whether their pursuit will produce the kind
of international cooperation needed to prevent further nuclear proliferation is
less clear. As Sir Michael notes, a key failing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty is the limited capability of international nuclear inspections to detect il-
licit weapons activities. Another is the absence of satisfactory arrangements to
reconcile what states believe to be their “inalienable right to peaceful nuclear en-
ergy” with the NPT imperative to avoid the “risks of facilitating clandestine and
threshold weapons capabilities.” As a result, even if Quinlan’s “practical agenda”
is implemented, it is doubtful that this along with his other modest proposals to
increase the intrusiveness of international nuclear inspections would come any-
where close to resolving the dilemma.
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This shortcoming is fundamental. It should also be excused. Quinlan was try-
ing to write a brief book (of 180 pages) that would cover the key aspects of
nuclear-weapons security policy. This unavoidably dragged him into such
fields as nuclear power, international nuclear inspections, and energy policy,
with which he was far less familiar than with nuclear weapons policy writ
large. To address properly the profound dilemma that Quinlan recognized in
the NPT would require far more detail regarding the history, law, and eco-
nomics associated with civilian nuclear energy, on the challenges it faces
besting nonnuclear energy, and on the difficulty of asserting real control over
its spread than he had either the time or space to devote.
Similarly, his critique of ballistic missile defenses belies a limited and, argu-
ably, dated focus on the use of such defenses solely against nuclear-armed ballis-
tic missiles. This may be the right way to view them in the context of Central
Europe today. But the latest trend for the most advanced armed and innovative
states (e.g., the United States, Israel, Japan, and China) is toward deploying
highly accurate, smart, conventionally armed ballistic missiles and unmanned
drones (some of which are totally unarmed, with reconnaissance or jamming
payloads), as part of an effort to produce strategic results without having to re-
sort to nuclear war. Against this airborne tide, more rather than less missile de-
fense (both ballistic and cruise) would seem not just likely but useful and
prudent.
These qualifications, however, should be seen for what they are—quibbles.
Certainly, had Sir Michael lived, he would have relished further refining his own
analysis. As it is, almost all of what there is in Thinking about Nuclear Weapons
deserves careful consideration, if only to avoid the dangerous extremes that the
current debate over nuclear weapons continues to generate.
R E V I E W E S S A Y 1 5 5
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BOOK REVIEWS
THE PURSUIT OF MARITIME TRANSFORMATION
Erickson, Andrew S., Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, eds. China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation
in Comparative Historical Perspective. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009. 544pp. $49.95
The third book in the Naval Institute
Press’s Studies in Chinese Maritime De-
velopment series is a collection of essays
and case studies that is important not
only for those working in naval studies
and for sinologists, but also for scholars
concerned with the idea of strategic cul-
ture and its application.
Following an introduction by Erickson
and Goldstein, the book is organized
into four parts: the premodern era (Per-
sia, Sparta, Rome, and the Ottoman
Empire); the modern era (France, Rus-
sia, imperial Germany, and Soviet Rus-
sia); Chinese maritime transformations
(Ming and Qing dynasties, the Cold
War); and China in comparative per-
spective, with essays on contemporary
Chinese shipbuilding prowess, China’s
navy today as it looks toward blue wa-
ter, and the Chinese study of the rise of
great powers.
The contributors are such renowned
scholars as Barry Strauss, Arthur
Eckstein, James Pritchard, Holger
Herwig, and Bruce Elleman. As stated
in the book’s introduction, a close read-
ing of the case studies reveals distinct
differences between China and other
powers that have pursued maritime
transformation. Erickson and Goldstein
note that Beijing has an impressive
commercial maritime dynamism and is
uncovering a robust historical maritime
tradition. China understands that stable
relationships with its continental neigh-
bors are a prerequisite for the growth of
maritime power. The issue of Taiwan
and the strategic significance of China’s
maritime trade routes mean there is no
real comparison with the Kremlin’s
pursuit of naval power.
The concluding chapter, by Carnes
Lord on China and maritime transfor-
mation, is a key element in this meta-
narrative of naval history—an approach
that is valuable as a complement to the
customary focus on the leading naval
power but not as a substitute for it.
Lord depicts a genuine maritime trans-
formation, and the case studies provide
a valuable historical perspective, al-
though the chapter’s connection to part
4 is limited.
The most useful chapters are those on
China, because they contribute to the
historical memory of Chinese policy
makers. Elleman notes the extent to
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which defeat helped lead China to mod-
ernize its navy; defeat in both opium
wars forced China to bring new ideas to
the forefront. Bernard Cole’s assess-
ment of the Cold War reveals a Chinese
naval service viewed by its military and
civilian masters as an organization
whose primary mission was to support
army forces. Defensive concerns gained
priority, and a new engagement with
naval power had to await the end of the
Cold War.
Current Chinese developments under-
line the folly of the Western military
posture, with its planning largely fo-
cused on Afghanistan and Iran. There is
a serious risk that crucial long-term ca-
pability will be sacrificed to the exigen-
cies of campaigning in Afghanistan.
While the development of Chinese ca-
pability has led to responses by such re-
gional powers as Japan, Taiwan,
Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and
South Korea, there has not been a suffi-
cient move from awareness to action on
the part of other powers. The Chinese
naval challenge is apparent as an aspect
of an increasingly far-flung Chinese de-
fense system that has serious implica-
tions for Western interests in the
Middle East and South Asia—implica-
tions that are not addressed by counter-
insurgency capability.
JEREMY BLACK
University of Exeter, England
Hasik, James. Arms and Innovation: Entrepre-
neurship and Alliances in the Twenty-First-
Century Defense Industry. Chicago: Univ. of Chi-
cago Press, 2008. 224pp. $35
For decades, analysts have understood
the nonmarket conditions of defense
development and procurement. First,
government-as-buyer and ultimate legal
authority are atypical market con-
straints and, second, military weapons
systems often have no commercial
equivalents and may also have several
unique component or material require-
ments—for example a one-off elec-
tronic component architecture.
The recent trend of fewer systems re-
quired, or at least procured, in the
roughly synchronous post–Cold War
and precision-munitions eras has more
often than not exaggerated the already
anomalous defense-systems market.
The Department of Defense (DoD) gen-
erally buys or intends to buy smaller
numbers of more capable and compli-
cated ships, manned aircraft, tanks,
munitions, etc., than it has in the past.
Advancing technological sophistication
and relatively smaller unit buys, in turn,
pressure defense-systems suppliers’
business models, alliances and acquisi-
tions, systems integration competen-
cies, and subassembly, component, and
material supply chains.
James Hasik is a defense industry ana-
lyst and former naval officer with de-
grees in history, physics, and business.
His first book (coauthored with Mi-
chael Rip in 2002) was a well received,
comprehensive examination of GPS and
its implications in modern warfare.
With this book, Hasik continues his in-
sightful analysis of the DoD toolbox via
a set of six case studies covering dispa-
rate defense-system development proj-
ects woven into a succinct but
overarching analysis of the current in-
ternational arms industry. The cases ex-
amined are air, land, sea, and space
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systems, each a precision-guided
weapon project and a mission-planning
system.
The book’s foremost merit is its sober
analysis, grounded in business econom-
ics. Each case covers technological, eco-
nomic, and operational trade-offs and
frames each project within a relevant
and timely international business con-
text. For example, Hasik’s space-system
case emphasizes the competencies and
alliances of the few firms competing in
the satellite business. He explores the
credible competition for the Space-
Based Infrared System Low (SBIRS
Low) satellite contract by the five-
hundred-employee Spectrum Astro
Corporation against the established and
significantly larger firm TRW Inc.
Hasik’s land-vehicle case demonstrates
how the DoD benefited from decades of
prior research and development in
South Africa on blast-resistant vehicle
design, greatly accelerating the Army’s
and Marine Corps’s adaptations for our
current wars. As a bonus, Hasik adroitly
presents the academically rigorous
clearly, and for a reader accustomed to
plowing through the arcane prose of
technical reports and academic papers,
this is no small gift.
The Department of Defense is con-
stantly looking for innovative technolo-
gies through its service labs and several
science and technology development
programs. The enduring challenge is in
managing the underlying risk and in the
integration into a complex system-of-
systems life cycle amid competing pri-
orities, operational commitments, and
assessments of the future strategic envi-
ronment. Although this book could be
more comprehensive, it need not be.
Through his case-study selection and
opening and closing synthesizing
chapters, Hasik provides a cogent and
instructive assessment of innovative
technology development and procure-
ment approaches across defense system
sectors. Arms and Innovation suggests
opportunities for more nimble defense
systems innovation in the future, op-
portunities that do not require compre-
hensive acquisition reforms or
reiterations of revolutions in military
affairs.
DAVID FOSTER
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division
China Lake, California
Yoo, John. Crisis and Command: A History of Ex-
ecutive Power from George Washington to George
W. Bush. New York: Kaplan, 2009. 524pp. $29.95
John Yoo’s most recent book is far
more than a defense of the George W.
Bush administration, which he served,
as some of his many critics may find it.
In fact, Crisis and Command is a care-
fully documented study of the exercise
of presidential power from George
Washington to President Obama. This
is the last book in a trilogy by Yoo, the
first two being The Powers of War and
Peace (2005), which explains the found-
ers’ original understanding of the
foreign-affairs power within the
Constitution, and War by Other Means
(2006), which discusses the law and
logic behind the Bush administration’s
counterterrorism policies. This study
extends well beyond the Bush adminis-
tration, focusing mainly on Presidents
Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lin-
coln, and Franklin Roosevelt. In each of
these respected leaders Yoo finds bold
presidents who changed the existing po-
litical order and transformed it into
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their own. They found distinction by
leading the nation through crises, care-
fully shaping the direction of national
security policy and recasting the
boundaries of presidential authority.
Through careful historical analysis, Yoo
reminds us that the relationship be-
tween presidential greatness and the
exercise of executive power is an
inextricable link that has always taken
advantage of the vague contours of Ar-
ticle II of the Constitution, which ad-
dresses executive authority. In his
historical analysis, Yoo carefully traces
the founders’ work at the Constitu-
tional Convention to accommodate the
executive’s energy and decisiveness
within a workable constitutional
framework.
In quelling the Whiskey Rebellion and
addressing the Indian uprisings of
1789–90, the first U.S. president be-
lieved that Congress having created a
military, he had the authority to decide
when and how to use it. In the latter
case, Washington sought no authority
from Congress when he directed an at-
tack on the Wabash and Illinois Indians
150 miles within their territory. Simi-
larly, in the Prize Cases, President Lin-
coln concluded, and the Supreme Court
agreed, that after hostile acts are di-
rected against this nation the president
is bound to accept the challenge with-
out waiting for any legislative authority.
President Roosevelt went even farther
prior to the Second World War by tak-
ing action to assist Britain through the
Lend-Lease program and to isolate Ja-
pan from critical resources without
congressional approval or consultation,
actions that clearly provoked Japan and
drew the United States ever closer to
war.
A later section in the book reflects the
application of this lengthy historical
analysis to the current administration
and to the response of the Bush admin-
istration to 9/11. Yoo points out that
President Bush looked to former presi-
dents for support of his actions. He
states succinctly that “Congress simply
does not have the ability to make effec-
tive, long-term national security deci-
sions because of the difficulty in
organizing 535 legislators and the polit-
ical incentives that drive them toward
short-term, risk-averse thinking.”
In his closing thoughts, Yoo reflects on
President Obama’s early determination
to close the detention facility at
Guantanamo, to terminate the CIA’s
special authority to question terrorists,
and to suspend military commissions in
the middle of the trials of al-Qa‘ida
leaders for war crimes. Describing the
new president’s law enforcement ap-
proach to terrorist violence, he asks
whether this approach, although popu-
lar with his liberal supporters, can be
successful. He suggests that the new
president may be learning to “draw on
the mainspring of Presidential power as
deeply as his greatest predecessors.”
COL. JAMES P. TERRY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, RETIRED
Chairman, Veterans Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Cloud, David, and Greg Jaffe. The Fourth Star:
Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future
of the United States Army. New York: Crown,
2009. 330pp. $28
Journalists David Cloud and Greg Jaffe
have attempted to provide a narrative
of the U.S. Army from the end of the
Vietnam War through the present wars
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in Iraq and Afghanistan by tracing the
careers of four Army general officers.
Using biographic sketches of Generals
John Abizaid, George Casey, Peter
Chiarelli, and David Petraeus, The
Fourth Star seeks to show how the
Army has changed doctrinally and de-
veloped its leaders. Cloud and Jaffe de-
liver a story that is engaging, although
short on analysis, explaining how as an
institution the Army adapted post-
Vietnam. As a result of their approach,
the story of the “epic struggle” for the
Army’s future between fighting coun-
terinsurgencies and conventional bat-
tles is anecdotal at best. The scholarly
opinions that have shaped the debate
over the future Army doctrine are
missing.
Cloud and Jaffe argue that the Depart-
ment of Social Sciences (“Sosh”) at West
Point was instrumental in shaping the
strategic thinking of these Army leaders
as well as of the Army as an institution.
The book attributes the unconventional
thinking of Petraeus and Chiarelli to
their experiences as Sosh instructors.
Cloud and Jaffe explain how Petraeus
collaborated with Andrew Krepinevich
(author of The Army and Vietnam,
1988), to place the blame for the ser-
vice’s failures in Vietnam directly on the
Army. Throughout the text, the authors
are careful to note Sosh alumni who
serve with or under these generals. Yet
the emphasis on the role of the Sosh fac-
ulty in this story is somewhat misleading
—especially since both current and for-
mer Sosh faculty are the main sources
for much of the narrative. One could
have easily looked to West Point’s De-
partment of History to find similar con-
nections and influence. The roles of Dr.
Fred Kagan and Brigadier General H. R.
McMaster in shaping the “surge”
strategy of 2007 and 2008 represent an
example.
However, Cloud and Jaffe do succeed in
chronicling four generals whose careers
began at the end of Vietnam and have
culminated in the present. Petraeus is
portrayed as the overly competitive
Francophile infantryman, Abizaid as
the international soldier-student of
Arab culture, Casey as the hard-charging
armor officer, and Chiarelli as the ca-
reer tanker of Cold War Europe. While
Reagan’s military readied itself for tank
battles with the Soviet Union, these of-
ficers were going to graduate school
and thinking seriously about the next
war. In the post–Cold War years, all
four men gained promising reputations
during crises in Kurdish Iraq, Haiti, and
Bosnia.
The chapters on Iraq are the most inter-
esting. Abizaid, as commander of U.S.
Central Command, seems to under-
stand the challenges of a post-Saddam
Iraq but is powerless to stop the rush
toward de-Baathification. Petraeus, for
his part, appears as the imperious com-
mander, acting as a statesman and com-
mander in creating a post-Saddam
government in Mosul. Conversely,
Casey seems overwhelmed, coming to
terms with his errant assumption about
defeating the insurgency through elec-
tions and politics by the end of 2006. By
the end of the book, Abizaid and Casey
have become the older, ineffectual
model of the post-Vietnam Army, while
Chiarelli and Petraeus are the newer,
progressive model—the Army that em-
phasizes protecting the people over pro-
tecting the force.
The Fourth Star offers additional under-
standing to events already described by
fellow journalists Bob Woodward, Tom
Ricks, and Linda Robinson. However,
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the book about this epic struggle for the
future of the Army doctrine is still yet
to be written.
LT. COL. JON SCOTT LOGEL, U.S. ARMY
Naval War College
Miller, Aaron David. The Much Too Promised
Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli
Peace. New York: Bantam, 2008. 407pp. $26
This interesting book aims at unravel-
ing a significant mystery that has lain at
the heart of international diplomacy for
more than a generation: Why and how
has America failed to bring lasting
peace to the Middle East? Specifically,
why, despite so much expended Ameri-
can money and political effort, does
peace between the Jordan River valley
and the Mediterranean look as far off
today as in the last forty years? Answers
to this question have never been lack-
ing, yet few authors have tried to tackle
it comprehensively and fairly.
There are few individuals better placed
to answer this question than Aaron Da-
vid Miller, a scholar-diplomat who was
an eyewitness to much of the drama he
recounts, having served as an adviser on
the Middle East to six U.S. secretaries of
state. Miller’s prose is accessible and
more, as he draws the reader into behind-
the-scenes vignettes that make the most
of a topic that is potentially mind-
numbing, given its complexities and
nuances. The author is refreshingly
open about his biases as an American
Jew whose emotions about the plight of
the Palestinians are sincere, as are his
not-infrequent frustrations with the Is-
raelis. His notion that both Israelis and
Palestinians are caught in a macabre
diplomatic dance that occasionally
delves into comedies of the absurd
would merit a smile, were it not for the
countless lives—and, as Miller demon-
strates, diplomatic careers—that have
been wrecked while the band plays on.
Miller’s vivid, usually empathetic de-
scriptions of the cast of characters alone
are worth the price of admission. This is
diplomatic history at its most accessible
and enjoyable. Miller’s lively work is
thoroughly researched, including inter-
views with almost all the dramatis per-
sonae, so this is much more than a
you-are-there account. The author’s
analysis of the problems that he, like so
many others, failed to unravel fully is
candid and detailed, and it will be a ref-
erence source for future generations of
scholars.
Moreover, The Much Too Promised
Land deserves high praise for finding
paths through all the major minefields,
not least the vexing issue of the Israeli
lobby, the alleged den of limitless Jew-
ish money and aggressively neocon in-
fluence on U.S. foreign and defense
policy. While not all readers will accept
Miller’s answers, the fair-minded will
appreciate the care and tact with which
he addresses them. In this sense, this
work is a polite refutation of such re-
cent academic writings as those of Pro-
fessors John Mearsheimer and Stephen
Walt, who have perhaps indulged in an
overdrawn analysis of Israeli influence
in Washington, D.C.
In his conclusion, Miller offers some
thoughtful guideposts to thinking about
this never-ending problem and what it
means for regional and international
security. Considering that the Arab-
Israeli dispute looks as intractable as
ever (and that the Jewish state is facing
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demographic crises that threaten to
overwhelm it by the end of this century,
if not before) the author’s counsel, in-
cluding a plea for humility, is refreshing
and much needed. His concluding
thought about America’s role in the
peace process, that “although we remain
vital to peacemaking, we can’t drive the
train as much as I once believed,” is a fit-
ting one and captures the essence of the
author—a thoughtful observer, seasoned
analyst, veteran diplomatist, readable
scholar, and all-around mensch.
JOHN R. SCHINDLER
Naval War College
Law, Randall D. Terrorism: A History. Cambridge,
U.K.: Polity, 2009. 342pp. $24.95
Rarely is a book written to fulfill the au-
thor’s own need for a scholarly work on
a topic that he teaches at university. So
when Associate Professor Randall Law
determined that he must write a book
on the history of terrorism, he sought
to satisfy a need not only for himself
but for other professors and researchers
who deal with the subject. According to
Law, “When I started teaching a course
on the subject shortly after September
11, 2001, I could not find a book for my
students that told this story in a clear
chronological fashion, that provided
sufficient analytical framework, that
made use of the most recent scholarly
work, and that was comprehensive but
succinct.” Law’s book does exactly what
he intended.
Dr. Law, a historian, immediately wres-
tles with his own working definition
of terrorism with two core assertions.
The first is that individuals or groups
act through rational and conscious
decision making within political and
cultural contexts. Therefore, according
to Law, terrorism is not “a kind of mad-
ness.” His second states that terrorism
is a communicative act intended to in-
fluence the behavior of the audience.
Consequently, the author emphasizes a
correlation between terrorism and the
media throughout the book.
An astute reader might ask on what ba-
sis the author chose certain groups and
historical events. Actually, Law selected
three viewpoints that would give the
reader a broad understanding of the
complexity of the subject. The first is
what he calls the “terrorist toolbox,” a
set of tactics, behaviors, and methods
normally associated with terrorism. The
second is that terrorism is “violent the-
ater” that leverages symbols and pro-
vocatively violent acts. The third
viewpoint is that terrorism has become
a cultural construct, while the word it-
self connotes illegitimacy or is used as a
label to vilify enemies.
Although concise and of a nice, work-
able size for classroom use, the volume
treats terrorism with a stunningly
all-encompassing approach. Its sixteen
chapters truly span the historical, cul-
tural, and political underpinnings of
terrorism.
As one who teaches graduate courses on
terrorism to federal, state, local, and
tribal law-enforcement professionals, as
well as military leaders, I found this
book to be a welcome addition to the
multitude of scholarly materials on ter-
rorism. Randall Law has written the
quintessential work on the subject, one
that is provocative and educational, and
will stimulate a necessary dialogue for
future decision makers.
JEFFREY H. NORWITZ
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Georgia
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McCarthy, Andrew C. Willful Blindness: A Mem-
oir of the Jihad. New York: Encounter Books,
2008. 250pp. $25.95
For anyone who has followed, however
peripherally, the disposition of those
who have come to be called “detainees”
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Andrew McCarthy’s Willful Blindness is
a mandatory read. McCarthy was the
prosecuting U.S. attorney in the case of
the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdel
Rahman, for the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade Center. The book chroni-
cles McCarthy’s prosecutorial clean
sweep in that case, in which ten defen-
dants were convicted and the remaining
two pleaded guilty. McCarthy details
with great insight and clarity the con-
spiracy to bomb the World Trade Cen-
ter and the tortuous road of the
prosecutorial effort after the attack
—tortuous because the available law
enforcement and prosecutorial tools
were either antiquated or inadequate to
cope with the enormity and complexity
of the perpetrators’ efforts.
The United States has been grappling
for years with how to treat and process
those who have been captured and held
during the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Protocols of neither intelligence,
justice, nor the treatment of prisoners
have proved adequate to deal sensibly
and reliably with a diffuse yet tight-knit
group of adversaries.
The book begins with the chapter
“Imagine the Liability!” referring to a
concern of the FBI that an informant
placed in the inner circle of the conspir-
ators might materially contribute to the
success of the operation. Indeed, the
informant in this case worked his way
into the conspiracy only because of his
bomb-making skills. His FBI handlers
envisioned a very difficult legal battle if,
despite the warning provided by their
informant, the plot nevertheless suc-
ceeded. As a result, the informant was
extracted and hidden before the actual
target or timing of the effort had been
discovered. Through the efforts of their
informant, the FBI knew that some-
thing was afoot, but they did not know
precisely when or where, having
exfiltrated their undercover source be-
fore he could gain access to that critical
information.
Although this work reads much like a
novel, it offers clear examples of how
laws and procedures established for a
very different context can have severe
and unanticipated side effects.
As a single example of many mentioned
in the book, the process of discovery
during the preparation for trial can
cause to be divulged important infor-
mation that should be protected. As is
routine in such matters, in the course of
the pretrial workup a list of unindicted
coconspirators is developed. On such a
list, in 1994, was the name Osama Bin
Laden. Appropriately, under U.S. law,
the list was made available to defense
attorneys for the accused; it was subse-
quently leaked to Bin Laden, who was
in Kenya at the time. As McCarthy
writes, “Think, though, how valuable
[the fact] that [he was on the list]
would be for bin Laden to know. If you
are he, you say: ‘Maybe the government
has an informant in my inner circle.
Maybe I should use a different phone.
Maybe I should stop having meetings in
my usual places because they might be
bugged.’”
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Finally, this book is helpful for connect-
ing the dots after the fact, for reconsid-
ering how such adversaries think and
plan. For example, McCarthy points to
statements made three weeks prior to
the actual attack of the USS Cole in Oc-
tober 2000 by Sheikh Omar’s son, and
also to the writings of Nidal Ayyad, one
of those convicted in 1995 of the first
attack on the World Trade Center: “We
promise you that next time it will be
very precise and the World Trade Cen-
ter will continue to be one [of] our
targets.”
ROGER W. BARNETT, PROFESSOR EMERITUS
Naval War College
Casey, Steven. Selling the Korean War: Propa-
ganda, Politics, and Public Opinion, 1950–1953.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008. 476pp. $55
The far left and the far right have some-
thing in common, especially when their
enemies hold the White House. They
each tend to think that the president
can get away with anything, because he
controls the media and the media con-
trols the public, especially when it
comes to issues of war. Professor Steven
Casey of the London School of Eco-
nomics actually knows something about
this topic, usually the realm of strong
opinions based on strong prejudice. In
2000 Casey wrote perhaps the most
perceptive study ever published on
presidential policy and public opinion
during World War II. His Cautious
Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ameri-
can Public Opinion, and the War against
Nazi Germany (2001) demonstrated
that FDR late in the war could not lead
the public to change its opinion that the
Nazi Party, not the German people, was
the primary culprit of German aggres-
sion. The president did not make this
distinction, but the country focused
blame on Hitler and his inner circle,
whom the Allies would remove from
power. They would not sanction the
plan of Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Morgenthau to dismantle German in-
dustry or to smash the German nation
into a bunch of separate principalities.
Why punish the people for the sins of
their deposed government?
Casey takes on President Harry S.
Truman under different, later circum-
stances. Truman wanted to “de-escalate,”
so to speak, public opinion lest it lead
to World War III versus China and the
Soviet Union. The president, in this ef-
fort, refused to call the Korean conflict
a “war,” as opposed to “a police ac-
tion,” his fateful phrase first uttered at a
press conference on 29 June 1950. This
signal to the American people did not
work out as the White House planned,
as Korea quickly turned out to be a war
by everyone’s definition—except that of
executive branch officials, who inadver-
tently freed the administration’s oppo-
nents from pressure to mute their
criticism, which is what the minority
usually does during a war lest it flirt
with disloyalty. “The administration’s
subdued public posture,” says Casey,
“often afforded the Republican opposi-
tion the perfect opportunity to take the
offensive.” Indeed, the public seemed
mystified about government policy, as
one State Department official pointed
out: “Those who approved our resis-
tance [to the communist invasion] in
Korea now find the present situation
completely confusing and baffling.”
A student of the Korean War can now
understand why the administration had
such difficulty containing Douglas
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MacArthur before firing him on 11
April 1951. Could the White House
come up with a line to rival the gen-
eral’s riveting message: “There is no
substitute for victory”? Perhaps, but it
could not deliver one, since its credibil-
ity was largely shot by mid-1951, when
Truman registered 23 percent public
approval, the lowest in the history of
the Gallup Poll. In a battle of sound
bites, General Omar Bradley, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had to res-
cue administration policy by testifying
that MacArthur’s proposal to attack
China “was the wrong war, at the
wrong place, against the wrong enemy.”
One hears that Casey’s next book will
be about the U.S. Army and correspon-
dents in World Wars I and II. This
reader would have preferred that he
pushed on into the next war—doing
presidents, policy, the media, and pub-
lic opinion during Vietnam. For those
of us particularly interested in those
topics, Casey would thus produce a tril-
ogy on wartime policy worthy of the
three volumes on military operations
produced by Douglas Southall Freeman
(Lee’s Lieutenants, on the U.S. Civil
War) and Rick Atkinson (The Libera-
tion Trilogy on the U.S. Army in the Eu-
ropean theater in World War II). Yes,
Steven Casey is that good.
MICHAEL PEARLMAN
Lawrence, Kansas
Hendrix, Henry J. Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Di-
plomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the Amer-
ican Century. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2009. 288pp. $34.95
Commander Henry J. Hendrix has writ-
ten a neat monograph based on his
doctoral work. He makes two related
arguments: first, that one cannot un-
derstand the diplomatic style of Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt without first
understanding his attitude toward the
efficacy and use of naval power; and
second, that the existing literature has
not adequately integrated naval and
military historical methods of analysis
with existing diplomatic historical ap-
proaches. Consequently, previous inter-
pretations of Roosevelt’s foreign policy
decisions, as they relate to incidents
that involved the use of naval power,
are incomplete, precisely because they
do not fuse the diplomatic and political
with the naval—especially the perspec-
tive reflected by the navalist attitudes of
Theodore Roosevelt.
As for structure, the book begins with
the now-common device of the narra-
tive vignette—in this case the “sailing of
the Great White Fleet,” as a means of
establishing the ambience of the mo-
ment of the great president and his
great fleet. With the reader now inter-
ested in “the rest of the story,” Hendrix
proceeds in a workmanlike and profes-
sional manner, establishing in the first
chapter the basis for the beginning of
the “beautiful relationship” between TR
and the object of his affection and de-
sire, the U.S. Navy. Included here is the
story of Roosevelt’s famous action as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy regard-
ing the deployment of Admiral George
Dewey’s Far East Squadron to Manila
Bay. This episode may be regarded as
typical of Roosevelt’s activist attitudes
and actions regarding the Navy.
The remaining chapters focus topically.
The closing chapter on the Great White
Fleet is the only one that deals directly
with the linkage of the U.S. Navy to an
“American Century.” The odd man out
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is the chapter on technology, although
it is a welcome discussion, given both
TR’s fascination with new technology
and the inherently high-tech nature of
navies in general. Additionally, this
chapter provides ammunition for a
much larger argument about modern
Americans and their fascination with
technology.
However, the bulk of the book deals
with the diplomatic-naval arguments
mentioned. Hendrix makes an excellent
case for his thesis that previous histori-
ans have paid too little attention to the
intersection of naval and diplomatic
trends of analysis. He employs a
multidisciplinary approach that exam-
ines naval signals, logbooks, war plans,
and other archival Department of the
Navy records to render less opaque
some of TR’s diplomatic actions and
motivations.
Although this work is not a biography,
it adds value to existing ones, especially
Edmund Morris’s Theodore Rex, which
focuses exclusively on his presidency.
Theodore Roosevelt had many different
personae, and it has not escaped histo-
rians that he was not only a historian
but also a naval historian, par excel-
lence. Neither has it escaped them that,
along with A. T. Mahan and Stephen
Luce, he is the father of the modern
U.S. Navy. However, Hendrix makes a
strong argument that TR’s naval per-
sona was critical to understanding his
use of power, especially in foreign
relations.
The book’s minor weakness is its nar-
row, monographic scope. The chapters
proceed in a generally chronological
manner but maintain no extended nar-
rative thread—the unifier, instead, is
the topical theme. Hendrix may have
missed an opportunity to make a larger
statement about the relationship of the
man to the institution and its impor-
tance to the United States under the en-
tire Roosevelt “dynasty.” There is much
peripheral evidence here about the in-
stitutional and organizational aspects of
the Navy that made this reviewer long
for more discussion. TR’s presidency
was a time of profound change in the
military establishment of the United
States, a period that involved the Root
reforms of the Army and the establish-
ment of the General Board of the Navy,
as a sort of proto–naval general staff.
TR’s role in these critical early years of
the General Board would have been
worth exploring.
These are minor quibbles in an other-
wise fine book that adds substantially to
the understanding of an important as-
pect of the rise of the United States to
great-power status and influence during
Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency. I rec-
ommend this book for a broad audi-
ence, especially those interested in the
development and execution of Ameri-
can foreign policy in the early twentieth
century.
JOHN T. KUEHN
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Brooks, Max. World War Z: An Oral History of
the Zombie War. New York: Crown, 2006. 352pp.
$14.95
“A breath of fresh air stormed into the
Naval War College over the rotting
flesh of the undead,” reads the first
book-club selection of the President
of the Naval War College. Without vili-
fying another country or radicalizing
any group, World War Z’s zombie
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pandemic and ensuing global chaos are
the vehicle transporting the reader
straight into the potential realities of
what can happen when the functional-
ity and safety of our cultural norms,
personal values, societal ethics, and
governmental structures are stressed,
overwhelmed, and broken.
A quick title scan of current military
and national security professional read-
ing lists suggests that there is something
different about the selection; most are
exclusively works of nonfiction, and
none of them have the word “zombie”
in their titles. However, one does not
have to be a zombie fan to enjoy this
book. Another consideration is that if
any book passes the zealous scrutiny of
a cultlike following of “zombie-o-
philes” and the similarly exacting stan-
dards of the President of the Naval War
College, this should spark your curios-
ity—if not an automatic “add” click for
your personal military and national se-
curity reading list.
World War Z is a work of apocalyptic
fiction set in modern times and told in
a journalistic style. Man is the main
character; the zombie simply provides
the literary mechanism facilitating a
journey into “total war.” The book
opens and reads like, and brings about
imagery combining, George Romero’s
1968 classic Night of the Living Dead,
Quentin Tarantino’s often eclectic and
avant-garde directing style, and Tom
Clancy and Clive Cussler’s flair for
globe-trotting storytelling. Attention to
historical detail, geopolitical issues, and
nuances of social and applied sciences
makes it intriguing for most nonfiction
and historical-fiction purists. Three
years of research and the confirmation
of all facts and assertions by a profes-
sional “fact-checker” enable readers
to focus and to immerse themselves
into the horrifying musings of what
can happen when mankind faces
annihilation.
The narrative travels beyond the brink
of extinction and continues on a jour-
ney of choice, response, societal resil-
ience, and recovery. These choices and
actions allow one to go beyond contem-
plation and explore the potential pre-
ventive measures and solutions needed
not only to survive but to win.
Are there any negatives about World
War Z? There are, and readers can find
their own likes and dislikes. One nota-
ble point is the physiological and bio-
logical improbabilities associated with
the ability of zombies to exist and sur-
vive, but as with all science fiction,
some bending of reality is to be ex-
pected. On occasion political biases
creep into the writing where perhaps
more neutral or nuanced references
would have been more effective and less
distracting. Those comments aside,
World War Z is a great read.
The most telling local review of the
book, here at the Naval War College, is
the number of students and faculty
who, as parents, have said they were go-
ing to share the book and read it again
with their children as part of developing
their understanding about the world,
and people’s responsibilities to them-
selves and one another. Applying this
metric, World War Z is a worthy choice
for any reader, be they practitioners of
national security or not.
LT. COL. JAYME SUTTON, U.S. ARMY
Naval War College
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IN MY VIEW
SUPERCARRIERS FOR SMART SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY
Sir:
The focus of the Naval War College Review Winter 2010 issue on the maritime
strategic perspective in the Pacific elicits fresh contemplation on the role of the
U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers as global American representatives and thus as effec-
tive and necessary tools of foreign policy and diplomacy in the new era of un-
constrained, and literally “asymmetric,” confrontations of nations and factions.
Professors Li and Weuve (“China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update”)
present a perceptive discourse on how the fast-growing Chinese economy could
substantiate Hu Jintao’s “emerging interests” in “some new level of power-
projection capabilities” despite the lagging (carrier aviation) technology base of
the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Methodical analysis of the “implications” of
China’s carrier “acquisition” for the strategic concerns of the United States and
western Pacific nations surrounding China remains understandably specula-
tive. That may be due in part to China’s characteristically enigmatic nature, its
calculated cycles of silence and cacophonous rhetoric. China, taking its time in
its military power buildup, cleverly holds the rest of the world in suspense as to
its strategic intentions.
Clearly, the twenty-first-century world and its expanse of oceans have be-
come “contested commons,” in the phrase of Under Secretary of Defense (Pol-
icy) Michèle Flournoy in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings of July 2009. But
there will probably be no more major sea battles the likes of Midway. Navigating
the contested commons will call for a real-time and astutely adaptive foreign
policy. So why a big carrier force of the U.S. Navy? The answer is “smart power.”
American defense and geopolitical experts have called for “smart power,” de-
fined as the sum of the nation’s “soft power” (a concept of Harvard’s Joseph Nye,
referring to nonmilitary international reach) and the classic military capability
now called “kinetic power.” The “speak softly and carry a big stick” dictum may be
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restated as “speak wisely, including judiciously saying nothing, but carry—and in-
deed be visibly ready to use—a big stick.” And that “big stick” would be the
“supercarriers” of the U.S. Navy. By far the most effective symbol and instrument
of the kinetic power of the nation, the aircraft carrier is the thirty-knot-plus mov-
ing air base. The U.S. Navy’s carrier fleet is “super” in a literal sense, with its nu-
clear power, displacements now reaching 100,000 tons, deployed air-wing
complement of over seventy-five aircraft (and unmanned aerial vehicles), and
catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) design (classified as
the “most capable but also the most expensive” by Li and Weuve). The most ad-
vanced steam catapult design is about to be replaced by a precision electromag-
netic catapult in the Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) class, now under construction.
The U.S. Navy, with ten-plus supercarriers still listed in the just-published
Department of Defense QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review), stands uncon-
tested above all major naval powers of the world, none of which nonetheless
would be caught without an aircraft carrier in its fleet—one or a few. Those
self-respecting naval-air powers are Australia, Brazil, Britain, France, India, and
Russia, with China obviously in an effort to join the status.
The carriers effectuate the doctrines of continuous forward presence and
on-demand power projection, both in peacetime and conflict. With carriers, the
Navy thus provides strategic deterrence to prevent wars; global vigilance over po-
tential third-world and insurgency surprises; expedient reprisal and quelling of
hostile foreign actions; flexible and adaptive airpower, ballistic weapons, and
amphibious land war support for the Air Force, Army, and Marines in war, not to
mention the on-the-spot mercy and peacekeeping missions in regional interne-
cine battles and natural disasters, as just experienced in the Haiti earthquake.
This advocacy for the carrier’s “big stick” does not negate the contributions of
Army and Marine land forces and strategic and tactical Air Force constituencies
to the nation’s kinetic power. But these components do not replicate the carrier
force’s visible peacetime forward-presence underscoring of diplomacy.
The best-won war is a war prevented from occurring. And the supercarriers
of the smart superpower may be the answer for keeping the balance of peace in
the future world.
THOMAS S. MOMIYAMA
U.S. Senior Executive Service (Retired), former director of the Naval Air Systems
Command’s Aircraft Science & Technology Programs, graduate of the Naval War
College and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the
Navy Professional Reading Program.
On the Navy Professional Reading Program (NPRP) website, www.navyreading.navy.mil, you will find a complete list of the sixty titles in
the primary library, as well as a brief synopsis of each book. The program in-
cludes works by some of the most celebrated authors in the world, as well as ex-
cellent books by less-well-known writers. Among the authors of note are these.
Stephen Ambrose was largely unknown outside of academic circles until
1994, when he published D-Day: June 6, 1944—The Climactic Battle of World
War II on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the invasion. In addition to
his highly regarded books on World War II, Ambrose has written on many other
aspects of American history, including multivolume biographies of Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Richard Nixon. He also founded the Eisenhower Center and
was president of the National D-Day Museum, in New Orleans, until his death
in October 2002.
James Bradley is the fourth child of Iwo Jima flag-raiser John “Doc” Bradley.
Bradley has had significant experience writing and producing corporate films
and corporate meetings; he has traveled the world, living and working in more
than forty countries for nearly a decade. His book Flags of Our Fathers, about the
battle for Iwo Jima, spent forty-six weeks on the New York Times best-seller list
and was made into a film directed by Clint Eastwood.
Winston Churchill, the former British prime minister, was a prolific author
whose highly acclaimed six-volume history of the First World War (The World
Crisis) was published in 1923–31. His six-volume work The Second World
War was published from 1948 to 1953. He received the Nobel Prize in Litera-
ture in 1953 for his lifetime body of work. The NPRP includes his The Second
World War, volume 1, The Gathering Storm, a unique first-person account of the
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actions leading from the end of the First World War until May 1940, the end of
what he called the “Twilight War.” All six volumes are masterful expositions.
Thomas L. Friedman is a widely respected author and journalist and a
three-time Pulitzer Prize winner. He has traveled extensively reporting on the
Middle East, U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy, international economics,
and the worldwide impact of terrorism. He is the only author to have two books
in the NPRP. From Beirut to Jerusalem won both the National Book Award and
the Overseas Press Club Award in 1989 and was on the New York Times best-
seller list for nearly twelve months. The World Is Flat earned the Financial Times
and Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award, and Friedman was named
one of America’s Best Leaders by U.S. News & World Report.
Malcolm Gladwell has been a staff writer with The New Yorker since 1996. In
2005 he was named one of Time magazine’s “100 Most Influential People.” He is
the author of four books, including The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can
Make a Big Difference (2000) and Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking
(2005), both of which were number-one New York Times best sellers. From 1987
to 1996, he was a business and science reporter with the Washington Post.
Robert Heinlein, known as the “dean of modern science fiction,” graduated
from the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis in 1929 and served on the revolu-
tionary new aircraft carrier USS Lexington (CV 2) in 1931. His commanding of-
ficer was Ernest J. King, who was later to serve as the Chief of Naval Operations
during the Second World War. Heinlein published over three dozen novels and
scores of short stories. His Starship Troopers won the Hugo Award in 1959; it has
been praised for capturing the feel of military service and the ordeal of young
people moving from recruits to battle-hardened soldiers.
David McCullough won the Pulitzer Prize on two occasions and the National
Book Award twice. In December 2006 he received the Presidential Medal of
Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian award. His book 1776 was a New York
Times national best seller in both hardcover and paperback; it has been called
“brilliant . . . powerful,” and “a classic.” He is a frequent contributor to and narra-
tor of historical television and film projects.
Herman Wouk, who studied at Columbia University, wrote radio scripts and
served in the U.S. Navy in the South Pacific in World War II. He drew on his
combat experience for his classic war novel The Caine Mutiny, which won a Pu-
litzer Prize and became a successful play and film. Other books include The
Winds of War (1971) and War and Remembrance (1975).
{LINE-SPACE}
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All of these authors, in their own particular ways, paint a picture of the world
in which they lived or the world as it might have been or may someday become.
You are encouraged to go with them on their literary journeys. You will be well
rewarded for your investment!
JOHN E. JACKSON
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